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Abstract 
The post-2014 ‘migrant crisis’ focusing mainly on the European Union`s southeast periphery 
where the so called Balkan Route1 exists, has demonstrated that the degree of integration 
and solidarity among EU members is not as deep and complete as expected. Attempts to 
outsource the crisis to its periphery impacted also on the relationship of the Union with EU 
candidate countries. The lack of a common EU policy and reluctance to share sovereignty 
became evident among EU members from early on. This has in turn led to a demise in the 
credibility of the EU, its fundamental principles like solidarity among its member states and 
protection of human rights, as well as, its institutions. The Erasmus+ Jean Monnet project 
MIGRATE CTRL + Enter Europe – Jean Monnet Migrant Crisis Network2 looks into the devel-
opments in the Balkan Route pre and post the EU-Turkey Statement and the responses by 
the individual countries inside this framework. 
Rationale of the MIGRATE Book 
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has moved into great uncertainty threatening to 
unravel some of the pillars of its stability. The Eurozone crisis3, along with the crisis of liberal 
democracy4 and of compromise-based decision-making and cooperation at the EU level have 
created a groundswell of support for xenophobic, populist and anti-democratic politicians 
across the continent that are strongly opposed to the further widening and deepening of the 
EU, to the degree of observing reversal secessionist tendencies, like in the case of ‘Brexit’. The 
‘migrant crisis’, has demonstrated that the degree of integration and solidarity among EU mem-
bers is not as deep and complete as expected, bolstering the already existing economic and 
socio-political crises. Reluctance to share sovereignty has become evident especially among 
the post-2004 EU member states. This has in turn led to a demise in the credibility of the EU, 
its fundamental principles like solidarity among its member states, as well as, its institutions.
The First Vice-President of the European Commission (EC), Frans Timmermans has recently 
stated that the ‘migrant crisis’ no longer exists, but we do still experience its consequences5. 
Scholarship discusses the implications of the crisis for the EU’s existence in general6 and high-
lights the connection between the ‘migrant crisis’ and a conglomerate of other recent crises in 
Europe, such as the Eurozone crisis and the security crisis7 and how the coexistence of these 
crises aided the strengthening of Euroscepticism in the EU8. 
The fact that the EU faces developing problems is not new in the EU. The EU experienced 
many challenges before, a lot of which, arguably, became more visible during the ‘migrant 
crisis’. Some frictions in the relationships among the Member States led to the debate about a 
so-called differentiated integration. Stubb9 states that this debate ‘is characterised by an excess 
of terminology which can give even the most experienced specialist of European integration 
a severe case of semantic indigestion’. The multiplicity of routes for differentiated integration 
has been analysed more recently too, in particular by Antoniolli10 and Schimmelfennig and 
Winzen11. Regarding EU’s enlargement to include more Member States, the advantages of EU 
enlargement for the EU as an institution during each of the prior waves of enlargement in 1995, 
2004, 2007 and 2013 was questioned, for instance, in Sjursen12 and Grabbe13. Nevertheless, 
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8the doubts about it were not strong enough to prevent the enlargement from taking place. 
These and other problems were integral to a cyclical process of EU integration14. However, 
while prior crises facilitated integration, current crises are seen as a threat to the existence 
of the EU15, as different Member States are now on the path of re-nationalising their policies, 
including creating a hostile environment for immigration16. All of these challenges combined, 
question further EU integration17. Some scholars18 even recognize the start of EU disintegration. 
In this volume we define EU integration broadly as both structuring and strengthening the 
relationships among the existing and exiting Member States, as well as enlarging to include 
new Member States. These processes are referred to as deepening and widening in previous 
research on EU integration, such as in La Barbera19.
The purpose of MIGRATE CTRL + Enter Europe – Jean Monnet Migrant Crisis Network (MIGRATE)20 
is to explore how the so called ‘migrant crisis’ affects the future of the integration process in 
the EU by examining the Balkan Corridor, including Turkey, Greece, North Mace donia, Serbia 
and Hungary. The case studies analysed present the multifaceted responses of these states 
towards EU immigration policies, or their lack of, in the area, conditioned by both the domestic 
environment of each country, but also by its relationship to the EU. 
MIGRATE is an Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Networks funded project for the period between 2016 
and 2019. Jean Monnet Networks have as a goal to assist in the creation and development of 
consortia in the area of EU studies in order to gather information, exchange practices, build 
knowledge and promote EU integration. MIGRATE aimed to create a trans-European forum 
for debate and dialogue and build a network of researchers, with expertise on EU Integra-
tion, Western Balkan Integration, Migration, Political Economy, Sociology, Law, Politics and 
Economics. The project focused on EU integration processes through investigating the impact 
of the on-going post-2014 ‘migrant crisis’ on these processes as a trigger-event of instability 
and transformation in the region.
The partners comprising the consortium are the South-East European Research Centre (SEERC), 
Greece, which is heading the project, Bilkent University, Turkey, the Navarino Network (NN), 
Greece, the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, North Mace donia, the Faculty of Polit-
ical Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia, the Central European University (CEU), Hungary, 
the Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz, Austria, the Konrad-Adenauer- 
Stiftung e. V., Berlin, Germany, and the University of Sheffield, UK. 
This volume is structured around a mental map of the Balkan Route. The central idea is to 
examine the peculiarity of the route comprised different countries with different relations to 
the EU (as of 2019), i. e. EU member states (Greece and Hungary) and EU Candidate countries 
(Turkey, North Mace donia and Serbia), the impact of EU decisions related to managing the 
‘migrant crisis’ on them, as well as, their individual responses based on already existing crises 
and tendencies in each specific country. The research took place from 2016 to 2018 and it com-
prised of both qualitative research, including semi-structured interviews and desk research.
In Chapter 1 Marcus Engler gives a critical overview of the EU-Turkey agreement, the first 
organised official reaction to the ‘migrant crisis’ at the EU level backed by the German gov-
ernment, setting the framework that conditioned the post-2016 responses of the countries 
on the Balkan Route. In Chapter 2 Dimitris Tsarouhas discusses Turkey’s response to the Syr-
ian civil war and the inflow of migrants21 within the framework of the Joint Action Plan and 
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the EU-Turkey agreement, conditioned by the country’s EU membership negotiations and 
aspirations of visa liberalization. In Chapter 3 Dimitris Keridis discusses the managing of the 
‘migrant crisis’ in Greece, the impact of the closing of the Balkan Route and the suspension 
of the Schengen Area on the isolation of the country from the rest of the EU, as well as, the 
turning point for Greece with the signing of the EU-Turkey Statement. In Chapter 4 Ilievski 
and Runcheva Tasev present the case of North Mace donia, an EU Candidate country bor-
dering Greece, an EU member at the epicentre of the crisis, dealing with flows of migrants 
transiting its territory and impacting on both its internal and external politics. In Chapter 5 
Armina Galijaš showcases Serbia’s response to the migrant flows and the country’s EU Can-
didacy motives behind it. In Chapter 6 András Szalai and Gabi Göbl deliberate on how in the 
Hungarian case, one of the Visegrad states, the ‘migrant crisis’ was securitized and used by 
the Viktor Orbán government in order to strengthen its position domestically. In Chapter 7 
Stefan Surlić discusses burden sharing by means of EU driven defined quotas in the Western 
Balkans, making a case for Serbia as an exception against other Western Balkan countries 
and highlighting EU candidacy as the main driver conditioning state responses.  
The ‘Migrant Crisis’ and MIGRATE’s Contribution to its Understanding 
What is today known and documented in the literature as the ‘migrant crisis’ of the current 
decade dates back to 2011, when a civil war erupted in Syria as part of the then on-going Arab 
Spring movements that arose in various countries in the South and South-East Mediterranean 
basin, contributing to the fear of growing flows of irregular migrants from the region into EU 
territory and exposing the gap among European policy circles on burden sharing22. The Syr-
ian civil war has been widely reported as the trigger event that displaced large parts of the 
Syrian population in an attempt of the latter to seek asylum in neighbouring countries of the 
region (mostly Turkey) or in other developed countries such as Germany, Sweden, Canada, 
USA, and Australia, just to name but a few. With 2011 being the starting point of this crisis, 
numbers of irregular migrants increased steadily in the following years, reaching a peak in 
2015 when the movement of people towards the Southern borders of the European Union 
got out of control with authorities in Greece and other countries in the region not being able 
to control the influx of people in their territories. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugee (UNHCR) Operational Portal on the Refugee Situation in Greece officially reported 
in 2015 856,723 arrivals by sea, 4,907 arrivals by land and 799 people dead or missing. This 
is in stark contrast with the 2014 reported figures of 41,038 arrivals by sea, 2,280 arrivals by 
land and 405 people dead or missing23. Figure 1 below presents the main entry routes of 
migrants to Europe between January and July 2015 when the ‘migrant crisis’ reached its peak. 
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Figure 1. Main Entry Routes to Europe by Migrants and Refugees, January–July 2015
From:
Syria: 57%
Guinea: 10%
Côte d l´voire: 5%
Spain 6,698
From:
Vietnam: 26%
Afghanistan: 24%
Georgia: 9%
Eastern Borders <1,000
Hungary 102,342
Mainly secondary 
EU Entrants (via Greece)
From:
Afghanistan: 29%
Syria: 28%
Kosovo: 23%
Greece 132,240
From:
Syria: 59%
Afghanistan: 25%
Pakistan: 5%
Italy 91,302
From:
Eritrea: 26%
Nigeria: 12%
Unspecified 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 11%
Sources: Frontex24
The composition of the groups of people crossing the Mediterranean comprised not only 
of people coming from civil war stricken Syria, but also of other countries of origin such as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and North African countries. Figures 2, 3, and 4 report in 
turn data on new asylum seekers, flows and stocks of migrants, and countries of origin of 
asylum seekers.
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Figure 2. New Asylum Seekers, 2016
Bubble size: New asylum seekers, 2017 
total min 160 – max 330 thousand 
New asylum seekers as a share of population, % 2017
0.00 0.51
Source: OECD25
Figure 3. Flows and Stocks of Migrants, 2016
Bubble size: inflows of foreigners, people 2016
min 19,508 – max 1 million
Permanent inflows as a share of population, % 2016
0.00 3.4
Source: OECD26
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Figure 4. Countries of Origin of Asylum Seekers, 2016
Bubble size: Asylum seekers to OECD countries, 5/2015–4/2016
min: 55 – max: 466 thousand
Source: OECD27
The main route followed by irregular migrants through the Balkans was named the Balkan 
Route, from Turkey through to Greece, to the Western Balkans, Hungary and then onward to 
Northern and Western Europe. As the intention of the people crossing was not to reside in 
any of these countries, their status was that of transit states. 
In the midst of rising criticism on human rights violations and lack of granting refugee pro-
tection in the EU, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed in August 201528 that 
Germany would provide full protection to Syrian refugees, suspending for the first time the 
Dublin Protocol29 in her country. Nonetheless isolation from her traditional supporters both 
domestically and at the EU level, pushed Angela Merkel to gradually abandon this position. 
At the same time, growing discontent by several EU members, most notably the Visegrad 
states and Austria, for the failure of border management in the periphery of the EU resulting 
in increasing numbers of irregular migrants passing through the Balkan Route, rooted for 
solutions that would include ‘better management of borders, the speedy review of asylum 
claims, the repatriation of those whose claims were rejected and the granting of economic 
aid to the poor and distressed countries where most migrants come from, provided they do 
a much better job in controlling their borders effectively30’. 
In early 2016, Hungary, alongside Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia (the so-called Viseg-
rad group of countries), and Austria decided to unilaterally close their borders in order to 
stop the transition of irregular migrants through their territories, in this way jeopardising 
the sustainability of the Schengen regime, a system, which as a concept, lies at the heart of 
EU mobility and integration. In March 2016, the EU-Turkey statement31 resulted in the clos-
ing down of the Balkan corridor in order to stop the influx of irregular migrants into Europe. 
Along the Balkan Route
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Engler (Chapter 1: Route Closed? The impact of the EU-Turkey Statement on refugee migration 
flows into Europe) focuses his analysis on providing a critical overview of the EU-Turkey State-
ment by examining humanitarian, legal and other related considerations. In his very insightful 
work he attempts to shed light on the inconvenient realities associated with the signing and 
implementation of the agreement. The author discusses how the much debated32 agreement 
has been a consensus between EU and Turkey on the grounds of common understanding 
and as an attempt from each side to minimize losses. As Engler asserts, the agreement, that 
was heavily criticized in respect to human rights, was based on the one hand on the urgency 
on the side of the EU, to control the inflow of irregular migrants, especially in view of rising 
populism within its territory, and on the other, Turkey’s aspirations to obtain visa liberalization 
and to resume its EU accession negotiations.
Analysing the case of Turkey, Tsarouhas (Chapter 2: Turkey and the European Migration Cri-
sis: apprehensive cooperation) examines the pre- and post- environments that were formed 
with the Joint Action Plan and the EU-Turkey Statement in the country. He discusses in detail 
Turkey’s role in offsetting part of the impact that the ‘migrant crisis’ would have on the EU 
and in doing so, it enhanced a transactional securitised form of cooperation with the Union 
as a ‘third country’. 
Apart from Turkey, on the receiving end of the policy split inside the EU on how the crisis 
should be managed, a set of another four countries on the Balkan Route were affected in 
a multitude of ways based on their domestic environment and their relationship to the EU 
before and after the route closed. 
The first such case is presented by Keridis (Chapter 3: The Migration/Refugee Crisis and the 
(Un/Re)Making of Europe: Risks and Challenges for Greece). Greece, an EU and Eurozone 
member, undergoing austerity and political turmoil33, found itself in the midst of the ‘migrant 
crisis’, facing a series of humanitarian, political, financial, foreign policy and security chal-
lenges. Keridis looks critically at EU asylum and migration policies and discusses how the split 
among EU policy makers impacted on Greece, which found itself cut off from the rest of the 
EU when it was suspended from the Schengen Area and later when it faced the closing of its 
borders with North Mace donia. 
Next on, Ilievski and Runcheva Tasev (Chapter 4: The Balkan Refugee and Migrant Corridor 
and the Case of North Mace donia) discuss extensively how the ‘migrant crisis’ impacted on 
North Mace donia at a time when the country was going through a prolonged dramatic inter-
nal political crisis. When in the beginning of 2016, the Visegrad states, together with Austria 
and Slovenia, unilaterally decided to close their southern border and adopt pushback poli-
cies, North Mace donia made the contested decision to close its border with Greece in order 
to contain the flows of migrants resulting into a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. 
The authors discuss in length how the political ripples of anti-immigration sentiments shared 
by a group of EU countries and diffused in the Western Balkans, impacted on the domestic 
political scene in North Mace donia.
Galijaš (Chapter 5: Permanently in Transit. Middle Eastern Migrants and Refugees in Serbia) 
makes a case of how EU conditionality played a significant role in the decisions taken by the 
Serbian government, in an attempt to move closer to opening more Chapters in the accession 
discussions with the EU. The author showcases how, while other countries faced with the cri-
sis exhibited secessionist dynamics, Serbia, having its accession to the EU as a strategic goal, 
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used the migrant crisis as an opportunity to show the EU its willingness to act as a facilitator 
in this very difficult and troubling period for the Union. 
Contrary to the case of Serbia, Hungary has been an example of secessionist forces operat-
ing within the EU. Already existing tendencies of rising populism, Euroscepticism and anti-EU 
sentiments fed into the ‘migrant crisis’ and became central to state rhetoric. Szalai and Göbl 
(Chapter 6: The Construction of the Refugee Other in Hungary during the 2015 ‘Migration 
Crisis’) discuss one of the most important cases of a Visegrad state, which defined to a large 
extent how the crisis unfolded throughout Europe, and also severely affected the advent of 
populist forces at the EU level. The FIDESZ-government34 of Viktor Orbán by way of securitis-
ing the ‘migrant crisis’ through populist narratives, meticulously constructed external threats 
to the purity of the Hungarian population and used the crisis as a vehicle to further establish 
control over the political environment domestically. 
Finally, Surlić (Chapter 7: Who said Quotas? The Role of Serbia in Burden Sharing of the 
Migrant Crisis) discusses the Quotas system, which refers to an EU proposition in reference 
to a joint response to the ‘migrant crisis’ by all member states and the willingness of Serbia, 
as a candidate member state in the Western Balkans35, to take part in it. By doing so, Serbia 
would not only ensure a safe and humane transit of migrants through the country, but also 
become a destination country proper. The author offers a detailed assessment of the Quotas 
system and a critique of the rejection of a common asylum policy at the EU level. Lastly, he 
questions the ability of Serbia to actually become a destination country for migrants. Surlić 
cautions that the Quota system could be appealing to countries in financial need that would 
benefit from external funding, as opposed to the more developed countries in the EU. This 
means that in case of a new migrant wave, Serbia and other Western Balkan countries may 
well find themselves in a position similar to the Turkish one, where EU countries would be 
more willing to financially assist the integration of migrants away from their borders, rather 
than to admit them in their territory.
In the conclusions, Prodromidou and Gkasis discuss the effect that the managing of the 
‘migrant crisis’ on EU integration and enlargement, within the framework set in the section 
‘Rationale of the MIGRATE Book’ by Kushnir, Kilkey and Strumia, defined as ‘both structuring 
and strengthening the relationships among the existing and exiting Member States, as well 
as enlarging to include new Member States’.
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Abstract
           
The number of refugees and migrants who arrived in Europe via the Eastern Mediterra-
nean Route rose sharply in 2015 and subsequently decreased just as sharply. Politicians and 
media representatives frequently attribute this decrease exclusively to political measures for 
controlling migration. However, this view disregards both the complexity of the factors that 
influence refugee flows and the inherent limitations of migration data. Using the example of 
the EU-Turkey Statement, this article aims to demonstrate not only that restrictive migration 
control measures should be criticised in normative terms but also that causal connections 
should be critically examined.
Introduction
Despite significant human rights criticism36 and considerable doubts about the length of its 
political shelf life37, the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 is still in force more than three 
years later. It survived the failed Turkish coup attempt of July 2016 as well as the resulting 
substantial disruption of EU-Turkey relations, including the de-facto suspension of Turkey’s 
EU accession process as well as the failure to realise the liberalisation of visas, which was 
central to the Erdoğan government’s agenda. The statement stands despite repeated threats 
by the Turkish government to terminate38 it.
The German government’s and the EU’s primary goal for collaborating39 with Turkey was to 
halt the spontaneous and irregular inflow of refugees and migrants via the Aegean Sea. Addi-
tional objectives were to prevent migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, to implement legal 
entry routes into Europe, and to improve living conditions for refugees in Turkey. To this end, 
a joint action plan40 was agreed on 29 November 2015. In it, Turkey assured stricter controls 
of its sea and land borders, the implementation of readmission agreements with Greece and 
Bulgaria, and the tightening of its visa policy. In return, the EU promised to support Turkey 
with extensive financial aid (€3 billion) to improve the living conditions of refugees. Addition-
ally, collaboration on refugee policy was linked to the resumption of Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations and the planned lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens. However, EU 
governments did not consider these measures sufficient to reduce the number of arrivals on 
the Greek Islands, which gave rise to the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016. In it, Turkey 
agreed to take back all individuals who entered the EU irregularly via Turkish territory as of 
21 March 2016. As a quid pro quo, the EU agreed a one-for-one principle whereby it would 
accept and settle a Syrian refugee for every Syrian refugee returned to Turkey, with a cap set 
at 72,000 refugees. Moreover, the EU promised that its member states would accept a larger 
number of refugees from Turkey as soon as the number of irregular border crossings would 
show a sustained decrease. Lastly, Turkey was awarded an additional €3 billion in financial 
aid to support refugees.
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Figure 1. Sea Arrivals Recorded on the Greek Islands 
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Source: UNHCR 2019/Operational Portal – Refugee Situations (accessed 190619), 
Chart by the Author
Debating the Causes of the Decrease in Crossings
Even though the war in Syria and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, and although 
the number of refugees arriving in the European periphery remains high, the number of arriv-
als via the Eastern Mediterranean Route has dropped to relatively low levels since the refugee 
agreement has come into effect (see chart). Representatives of the European Commission 
(EC)41 and national governments, including the German government, frequently attribute these 
low levels directly and exclusively to the EU-Turkey agreement, partially in combination with 
the ‘closure’ of the Balkan Route. Many representatives from the media, academia42, think 
tanks43, and NGOs also accept this explanation without question.
The European Commission talks about a fall in irregular migration flows of 97 percent44 as a 
result of the EU-Turkey Statement. However, this view does not factor in prior and overarching 
trends. Admittedly, through the course of 2015 the number of refugees and migrants arriving 
on the Greek Islands from Turkey via the Aegean Sea rose until it peaked at 211,663 recorded 
arrivals in October 2015; but following that peak, there was a steady decrease through the rest 
of the year. Yet the EU-Turkey Statement did not come into force until 21 March 2016. After-
wards, arrival numbers continued to decrease, and since April 2016, numbers have returned 
to the levels recorded in early 2015.
In view of these numbers, Thomas Spijkerboer45 concludes that there is no correlation between 
the EU-Turkey agreement and the decrease in the number of migrants and refugees crossing 
the Aegean from Turkey to Greece. However, he does not offer an alternative explanation. 
Murat Erdoğan46 also considers the effectiveness of the agreement as ‘very limited’. He argues 
that the decrease was largely due to Russian intervention in Syria, which commenced at the 
end of September 2015 and which cut off escape routes into Turkey.
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Research Findings:  
Complex Causalities and Limited Impact of Political Decisions 
Migration research uses a variety of theoretical models to describe the determinants of ref-
ugee movements, in particular their development and changes in their quantity and quality, 
but all models agree that these determinants are extremely complex. Empirical research into 
the most recent migration flows into Europe (e. g. Crawley et al; Squire et al.; Brücker et al.; 
Kuschminder)47 also emphasises the diverse nature of influencing factors. Protecting the EU’s 
external borders and reducing ‘illegal migration’ – which political actors frequently present 
as a threat to security, cultural homogeneity and social order - has long been a political goal 
both for the EU and its constituent nation states. The catalogue of measures implemented in 
pursuit of this goal has been widely described and comprises physical border controls, restric-
tive visa policies, carrier sanctions48, and collaboration with countries of transit.
Researchers have been intensely debating49 for some time the effectiveness of migration pol-
icy in general and policies to reduce migration in particular. Some argue that border control 
policies are not effective in preventing irregular migration50. These researchers emphasise 
that such measures simply promote short-term shifts in entry routes, which consequently 
become ever more dangerous and more expensive. Other researchers do see an impact of 
border control policies, whereby a key variable is the willingness to cooperate on the part of 
countries of transit51. Collaboration with countries like Morocco, Mauretania and Senegal is 
quoted as a key reason for the fact that for several years now comparatively few refugees 
and migrants have been arriving in Spain via the Western Mediterranean route. Conversely, 
the collapse of the political systems and state apparatus in Tunisia in 2011 and in Libya52 in 
2014 have been cited as the main cause for the rise in the number of crossings via the Central 
Mediterranean route. Against this backdrop, a key responsibility for controlling migration in 
the Eastern Mediterranean falls to the Turkish government.
Limited and Unreliable Data
In contrast to the complexity of potential influencing factors, the available data which would 
allow for an empirical verification of correlations is very limited. Analyses like those completed 
by the European Commission (which focus exclusively on data relating to crossings via Medi-
terranean routes) do not take into consideration multiple key factors. For a start, these anal-
yses suggest that data relating to crossings – produced by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or national 
authorities – is reliable, and that it is possible to make clandestine migration entirely trans-
parent. In addition, an exclusive focus on gross quantitative data fails to consider the large 
extent of diversity within the migrant and refugee population and migrants’ many varied 
motivations. For example, it is a common assumption that political instruments such as the 
EU-Turkey agreement will have an identical, equal impact on many different groups of people.
However, a simple look at the nationalities and places of residence of the refugees who have 
already arrived and those who continue to arrive in Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean 
Route renders the above assumption implausible. Among these refugees are Syrians arriv-
ing directly from Syria and Syrians who have already spent a longer time in Turkey; Afghans 
straight from Afghanistan and Afghans who have spent years living in Iran or Pakistan. Fur-
thermore, there are differences regarding existing social networks and family situation 
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(e. g. single, married, with children, etc). In addition, academic research has shown that only a 
small proportion of all refugees globally who seek to migrate to Europe is able to do so. Even 
before the EU-Turkey Statement, the very act of crossing of the Aegean Sea – which is only 
one stage of the entire flight route – posed an insurmountable barrier for many refugees due 
to the risks and costs associated with it. Owing to an underlying misjudgement of the varied 
preferences, needs, and levels of mobility of migrants, instruments such as the EU-Turkey 
Statement are therefore based on the erroneous assumption that a constant, anonymous, 
and homogeneous ‘mass’ of people would continue to make its way towards Europe.
In view of the complex causal connections and the limitations of data sources, further exten-
sive empirical analyses are urgently required. Such analyses would need to triangulate mul-
tiple data sources and should consider data relating to the intentions and abilities of a rep-
resentative number of migrants before and after decisions such as the EU-Turkey Statement 
came into force. Analyses should be configured to differentiate according to groups (e. g., 
nationality, place of residence, socio-demographic characteristics, social networks, family situ-
ation). Research should also seek to obtain information regarding the numbers of attempted 
crossings/numbers of migrants intercepted by Turkish authorities both at Turkey’s eastern 
and southern land borders as well as in the Aegean region. Additional data about the living 
conditions of refugees in Turkey and other countries as well as changes in these conditions 
is also required. Lastly, any such research should be embedded in a more extensive tempo-
ral and geographic context and should consider migration movements on different routes.
Factors Underlying a More Complex Explanation
Even though there is a demonstrable need for further research as discussed above, this is 
nonetheless a good place to list the factors which might have contributed to the decrease in 
the number of crossings. I will present these with the caveat that there are many research 
gaps which make it impossible to quantify the importance of individual influencing factors. 
The political measures along the Balkan Route53 as well as collaboration with Turkey have 
undeniably made the Eastern Mediterranean route significantly more difficult, prompting 
refugees to postpone or abandon54 their migration plans. This is because such measures 
expose refugees to the risk of being returned to Turkey and/or of being detained in the des-
olate hotspots of the Greek islands for long periods of time. With that, my main argument 
here is that while political decisions clearly have an impact, they are neither the most impor-
tant nor the single decisive factors for explaining the decrease in numbers.
As numbers of crossings started to decrease from November 2015, it is likely that seasonal 
factors had an effect. Indeed, 2014, 2016 and 2017 show similar patterns. Due to bad weather 
conditions and the subsequent higher risks of sea travel, fewer crossings occur during the 
winter months. 
A second explanation for the decrease in the number of crossings is the depletion of the pool 
of refugees in Turkey who wanted to migrate to Europe and were able to do so. Evidence in 
this regard comes from surveys conducted among Syrian refugees in Turkey, according to 
which a majority of refugees would like to remain in Turkey until it will be possible for them 
to return to Syria, and this majority has no intention of travelling onwards into Europe55. The 
decrease in numbers would thus be explained through the fact that a large proportion of 
those refugees who wanted to reach Europe and had the possibility of doing so had already 
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achieved their goal by March 2016. The depletion of the potential migrant pool is also a result 
of changed Turkish policies. Turkey abandoned its initial open borders policy in the spring of 
2015 following high arrival numbers and terror attacks, and instead implemented a rigorous 
policy of closure56. This involved closing border crossings, making it more difficult to obtain 
visas, and building walls along Turkey’s borders with Syria and Iran. Some reports claim that 
border guards shot refugees dead. This situation made it significantly more difficult for ref-
ugees to reach Turkey. While the legality of the EU-Turkey agreement in itself is a matter for 
debate57, the above listed policies are clearly in breach of international law; and yet they are 
being silently tolerated by European governments. 
It is also possible that reports about refugees’ living conditions in Europe by refugees already 
settled in Europe deterred at least some refugees from realising their migration plans. The 
large influx of refugees into Europe in 2015 was fuelled by some extremely unrealistic expec-
tations about life in Europe partly resulting from misinterpreted political communications and 
‘welcome’ messages. In view of refugees’ actual experiences – shaped by processing times 
lasting several months, accommodation in gyms, and hostile reception by host country pop-
ulations – some of these unrealistic expectations have become more moderate, prompting 
some refugees to return or seek to return58 to their own countries or to Turkey. To what 
extent this factor has indeed directly impacted refugees’ intentions to migrate must become 
the focus of additional research.
Further evidence for the hypothesis that migration potential has become depleted is that 
the significant ‘shift in routes’ anticipated by many observers has not yet manifested itself. 
Granted, the number of recorded crossings via the Central Mediterranean Route rose slightly 
in 2016 (2015: 153,842; 2016: 181,436; 2017: 119,369; 2018: 23,370), prior to falling again sig-
nificantly since mid-2017. However, very few refugees from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq used 
this route, as it is far too difficult for these groups to even reach Libya. Some refugees con-
tinue to choose the Aegean route despite the EU-Turkey agreement (2016: 173,500; 2017: 
29,700; 2018: 32,5000); in addition, a rise in crossings of the Greek-Turkish land border59 has 
been recorded (2016: 3,300; 2017: 6,700; 2018: 18,000). Crossings via the Black Sea Route as 
well as smuggling from Turkey into Italy have been limited so far60. Ultimately, refugees con-
tinue to enter using people smugglers or false papers. In 2017 alone, the EU28+ (including 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) received just under 200,000 first-time appli-
cations for asylum from refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. This trend continued in 
2018 (166,000). In light of this figure, assertions issued by political actors according to whom 
the Eastern Mediterranean Route and the Balkan Route have been closed since April 2016 
have to be moderated61. Even so, this number is low considering that there are more than 
5.6 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries (June 2019)62.
Conclusions
Explanations that attribute the decrease in the numbers of refugees arriving via the Eastern 
Mediterranean Route simply to the EU-Turkey agreement must be considered with caution. 
Given the limited nature of the available data and the complexity of influencing factors and 
causal connections, it is not empirically possible to attribute causality in such a direct and 
unambiguous manner. Where politicians make such assertions, they offer a political fairy-
tale rather than a meticulous analysis of causation. The narrative of ‘the active and successful 
closure of migration routes’ serves two purposes. Domestically, in view of the electoral suc-
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cesses of extreme right parties, it is intended to demonstrate to unsettled segments of the 
population a political ability to act. At the same time, it sends a signal to potential migrants 
and refugees currently residing in countries of first asylum and/or their country of origin. In 
conjunction with deterrent campaigns63 and more restrictive asylum and deportation policies, 
the message is that it is simply not worth it to undertake the dangerous and arduous journey 
to Europe. The narrative thus intertwines a causal impact and a claim regarding the legality – 
or at least the legitimacy – of the underlying political action. It suggests that political measures 
such as different development- or trade policies or large-scale legal admission schemes are 
unnecessary because migration control seems to be working.
The overestimation of the impact of the EU-Turkey Statement in political circles further carries 
the risk that governments with a dubious and worrying human rights record are being put 
into a position of strength. While the Turkish government is a key actor in European migra-
tion control, it cannot simply send to Europe hundreds of thousands of refugees who actu-
ally have no intention to migrate further, even if it threatens to do so for strategic reasons.
The EU-Turkey agreement, and even more so the collaboration with Libyan militias, has been 
rightly criticised by many from a human rights perspective. Political concepts which empha-
sise a short-term reduction of immigration fail to consider that the negative medium- and 
long-term consequences of such policies on the global refugee situation could be devastat-
ing. When countries like Australia, the United States or the European Union are in breach of 
human rights or visibly reduce their commitment to refugee policy, they reduce the incentive 
for Southern states, which harbour the vast majority of refugees in the world, to improve their 
record of respecting refugee rights and human rights64.
With regard to the continued implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, it would be desir-
able to activate at long last the Voluntary Humanitarian Admissions Scheme contained within 
it. In practice, the one-for-one principle has long been abandoned. Until the end of February 
2019, 20,292 Syrian refugees were resettled from Turkey into EU states as compared to 2,441 
readmissions into Turkey65. However, in view of around 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, 
that number is negligible. It is shameful to hear the European Commission talk about solidar-
ity with Syrian refugees and even see it calculate how many lives have allegedly been saved 
through the refugee deal66. Despite the financial aid given by the EU, many refugees in Tur-
key continue to live in the most difficult of conditions. The increasing and occasionally violent 
clashes between host communities and refugees during which in 2017 alone thirty-five people 
are said to have died67 are but one piece of evidence of these difficult conditions. Establishing 
larger quotas would be an effective lever and could improve the coordination and control of 
migration flows. In this way, EU governments could indeed prove their solidarity.
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Abstract
This chapter examines the migration and refugee crisis, as well as its aftermath, placing Tur-
key at the heart of the analysis. Turkey has played a pivotal role in this policy area, both with 
regard to its handling of Syrian and other refugees who fled to Turkey, as well as by assisting 
the European Union in dealing with migration flows to its territory. The chapter derives from 
data from secondary sources as well as in-person semi-structured interviews conducted in 
2016 in Istanbul and Ankara with representatives of the Turkish state, international NGOs 
and civil society actors.
The chapter starts off by providing the context within which Turkey dealt with the influx of 
Syrian refugees after 2011. It then moves on to analyse the policy framework that governed 
issues pertaining to refugee and asylum prior to the onset of the Syrian civil war, thereby 
highlighting some of the limitations of Turkey’s approach stemming from the Cold War era 
and its identity-building process during the 1930s. The next section of this chapter elaborates 
on the changes introduced during the 1990s and 2000s, a period characterized by a reformist 
drive amidst fluctuating relations with the EU. The next part discusses the landmark agree-
ments reached between the Union and Turkey in 2015 and 2016; the Joint Action Plan (JAP) 
and EU-Turkey Statement have proven durable and long-lasting, allowing the EU to contain 
the domestic political repercussions that the crisis has had on a number of member states 
(especially those hardly affected by it in the first place), while locking in a cooperative frame-
work between the two sides. However, EU-Turkey cooperation on migration is also indicative 
of a new, transactional approach in EU-Turkey relations, whereby Turkey becomes a valuable 
partner for the Union on issues of common interest but is progressively removed from the 
circle of potential accession states and thus relegated to an EU ‘partner’ on an ad hoc basis. 
The 2013 Readmission Agreement between the two sides is illustrative of this development. 
Introduction
The ‘migration crisis’ has dominated European Union politics from 2015 onwards, when 
large number of migrants arrived at the borders of a number of member states. For Turkey, 
however, the issue of how to deal with a large number of refugees had emerged in 2011, 
following the onset of the disastrous Syrian civil war. Turkey has been at the forefront of 
hosting Syrian refugees in its territory and, along with Jordan and Lebanon, has done more 
than any other individual state to confront this major issue head on. Further, at the peak of 
the European migration crisis, EU-Turkey relations were revived, albeit temporarily, due to 
the key role played by Turkey in dealing with the issue and the need by Brussels and major 
member states to engage in a domestic damage limitation exercise. Paradoxically, precisely 
at the moment when EU-Turkey relations appeared to be on terminal decline, the EU-Turkey 
agreements of 2015 and 2016, as well as the commitments made by the two sides, revived 
the prospects of wider cooperation. 
However, and as argued in the chapter below, this revival was the result of an agreement 
that was strictly based on an interests-based approach. In a general sense, the implementa-
tion of the EU-Turkey deal has reinforced the transactional character of EU-Turkey relations. 
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Moreover, the sheer number of both refugees and migrants now on Turkish territory pose 
a major challenge for policy-makers regarding prospects and options for integration and 
accommodation in public life. 
This chapter examines the migration and refugee crisis, as well as its aftermath, in light of 
EU-Turkey relations. It starts off by providing a context to the refugee crisis in Turkey and by 
discussing the country’s policy prior to the onset of the crisis. The next section analyses the 
content of the EU-Turkey migration agreements, namely the Joint Action Plan and the EU- 
Turkey Statement as well as their aftermath and repercussions. Without doubt, Turkey has 
been the main protagonist in offsetting some of the consequences of the migration and ref-
ugee crisis for the European Union. In the process, its own legal framework has been trans-
formed and a securitized form of cooperation with EU member states has been enhanced. 
This has survived waves of crises and deepening mistrust between the two sides. 
The Syrian Refugees’ Arrival in Turkey: Context
At the present time, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are hosting more than five million refugees, 
primarily from Syria. Turkey is by far the country that has undertaken the heaviest task: accord-
ing to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), almost 4 million Syrian 
refugees currently reside in Turkey alone68. At the peak crisis point for Europe, back in 2015– 
2016, Turkey had been hosting more than 3 million people from Syria (Konrad-Adenauer-
S tiftung, 2017: 2). In terms of population, there is now roughly one refugee or migrant for 
every 20 Turkish citizens residing in the country, a number that no EU member state have 
had to deal with in the past.
The vast majority of Syrian refugees live outside camps, as only 360,000 currently reside in the 
camps69. As the country was faced with an influx of Syrian refugees, primarily from cities such 
as Aleppo, as early as 2011, Turkey created camps early on. It could, however, not be fore-
seen that the civil war would escalate quickly over the next few years and that existing camp 
infrastructure would prove wholly inadequate to accommodate and ever-increasing number 
of people entering the country. The Turkish government repeatedly argued that closing the 
door to those seeking refuge would be an inhumane act; it stressed the cultural affinity with 
the Syrian population, as well as its humanitarian concerns for the plight of people fleeing 
war, so as to prepare the ground for Turkish citizens to accept the high number of refugees 
entering the country70. A very large number of refugees have sought to settle in Istanbul, not 
least because of the city’s size and economic potential. As discussed below, they are now able 
to work legally in the country; however, the vast majority engage in informal employment, 
which has contributed to growing resentment by the local population. The majority of the 
rest of the refugees live close to the Syrian border, which resulted in a rather asymmetrical 
distribution of the refugee population in the country (see Table 1). On the part of Turkish 
authorities and a large part of the population, the expectation was that settling close to the 
border was a welcome development, encouraging the prospects of Syrians returning to their 
homeland following the end of conflict. Nevertheless, the extent to which the end of conflict 
will mean the return of Syrian refugees is unknown. Crucially, the Turkish government’s - 
welcoming policy towards Syrian refugees was predicated on the foreign policy assumption 
that the Assad regime would soon collapse, and that regime change was all but inevitable71. 
Thus, the very generous policy that was followed at the beginning of the crisis in terms of 
welcoming record numbers of refugees was very much based on the assumption that the 
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country would be able to reap the benefits of this generosity in post-Assad Syria, to which it 
expected to play a protagonist’s role. The fact that the Civil War has followed a very different 
path, that Russia has become the most active power in the region propping up Assad and that 
the latter is now increasingly re-legitimized by the international community as the country’s 
sovereign leader has meant that this policy logic has been undermined. Until the EU-Turkey 
Joint Action Plan was agreed upon, Turkish President Erdoğan asserted that the country had 
already spent more than $8 billion in seeking to provide for Syrians in the country72. The fig-
ure rose further and had reached $12.5 billion by the time the agreement with the EU was 
reached (see Figure 1). Support received from abroad was negligible, reaching only a paltry 
3 percent of the total amount spent (EU-Turkey Statement, 2015). 
Table 1: Top-10 Turkish Cities Hosting Syrians
Ten Provinces with Highest Number of Registerd Syrians (as of 10 November 2016)*
Province Total Population 
(excluding Syrians)
Number of  
registered Syrians
% of Syrians**
1. Istanbul 14,657,434 413,406 2.7
2. Sanliurfa 1,892,320 398,551 17.4
3. Hatay 1,533,507 377,731 19.8
4. Gaziantep 1,931,836 318,802 14.2
5. Adana 2,183,167 149,049 6.4
6. Mersin 1,745,221 135,921 7.2
7. Kilis 130,655 122,734 48.4
8. Bursa 2,842,547 100,665 3.4
9. Izmir 4,168,415 95,610 2.2
10. Mardin 796,591 93,071 10.5
* Figures of the Turkish Directionate General of Migration Management (DGMM).
** Figures rounded
Source: International Crisis Group 201873
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Turkey’s Migration and Asylum Policy 
Following the establishment of Republic, Turkey’s refugee laws were characterized by an 
extreme degree of restrictiveness. According to the relevant Settlement Law dating back to 
1934, those eligible to receive the status of a refugee in the country were solely people ‘of 
Turkish culture and descent’. Although the country changed greatly ever since, severe restric-
tions on the legislative framework remained in place for a long period of time. Following 
the start of accession negotiations with the European Union and as analysed below, Turkey 
revised the 1934 through a new law but maintained the emphasis on the ethnic background 
of those who are entitled to settlement and, potentially, citizenship. The fundamental philos-
ophy of the state’s approach thus remained unchanged, as discussed in more detail below74.
In 1951, the landmark Geneva Convention consolidated in one definition the understanding 
of who is a refugee and established the principle of non-refoulement, prohibiting states from 
returning refugees to states where they could face torture and other forms of prosecution 
due to their race, ethnicity, nationality or opinion75. In 1967, the additional protocol agreed 
in 1967 broadened the definition of a refugee and obliged states to comply with the Conven-
tion’s provisions without limitations to date76. Turkey is a signatory to both of those key doc-
uments; however, the country added a geographic limitation in terms of incoming refugees. 
Simply put, this means that a right to asylum in Turkey could be granted only to those arriving 
from Europe. The direct consequence of the geographic limitation has been that refugees 
arriving from elsewhere in the world, as happened both in the aftermath of the Iraq war in 
the 1990s and more recently due to the Syrian conflict, are legally seen as ‘guests’, with no 
asylum claim right and therefore expected to depart from the country at some ill-defined 
point in the future. After the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the first Gulf War, as 
well as the earlier Iraq-Iran war of 1980–1988, people fleeing conflict in the Middle East (and 
further East) started arriving in Turkey. The country became a transit spot for those whose 
destination was further west, while others would attempt to settle in Turkey itself. The legal 
and regulatory framework of the country was inadequate to deal with the new reality; Turkey 
had ceased to be a country of emigration to safer and more prosperous western nations. It 
was therefore imperative that new initiatives be taken to deal with the changing reality. This 
gathered pace following the Syrian refugee crisis. 
In 1994, Regulation 69/1994 offered a temporary protection status to refugees. Those whose 
status was approved then became entitled to resettlement in third countries by use of UNHCR 
services77. This was the first instance in which Turkey defined refugees (stemming from Europe) 
and asylum-seekers (stemming from elsewhere in the world) by use of national legislation 
instead of merely relying on international legal commitments78. However, the big legislative 
changes to consolidate various instruments occurred in the 2000s as a result of two factors: 
first, Turkey’s EU accession talks; second, the Syrian crisis and agreements with the European 
Union. Turkey’s EU vocation appeared solid after 2005: having obtained a candidate coun-
try status in 1999, it began accession negotiations in 2005. Legislative alignment with the EU 
acquis is a major precondition for accession, and the National Action Plan (NAP) for Asylum 
and Migration, endorsed by then Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2005, pointed to Turkey’s will-
ingness to proceed with alignment.
In 2006 and as accession negotiations were under way, an Implementation Directive further 
specified the legal status of refugees and asylum-seekers; nonetheless, the geographical lim-
itation was maintained throughout, resulting in effect in a two-tier asylum and migration sys-
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tem: the first, referring to Europeans, was resulting from Turkey’s approximation to the West 
during the Cold War. The second, referring to non-Europeans was a nascent development of 
developments in Turkey’s eastern neighbourhood during the 1980s and early 1990s, such as 
the influx of Iraqi Kurds after 1988 as well as the first Gulf war of 199079. Nevertheless, this 
did not automatically mean dropping the crucial geographic limitation. The NAP had identi-
fied two preconditions for lifting that limitation. Turkey wished for a) EU member states to 
commit to burden sharing so as not to impede the implementation of such a change and b) 
amendments to existing legislation so as to impede a rapid influx of refugees in the country 
during the country’s accession process80. 
The EU accession process had offered fresh impetus for reform in Turkey’s legislation regard-
ing migration and asylum. By the time the Syrian civil war erupted, however, the two-track 
system identified above had remained in place and those already in the country had limited 
access to vital services and legal protection. What is more, relations with the European Union 
had become unstable and unpredictable, as the Cyprus imbroglio slowed down the accession 
prospects of Turkey and scepticism by large member states, such as France and Germany, 
slowed down Turkey’s alignment with EU law. By 2011, Turkey’s politics in dealing with the 
Syrian crisis pointed to generosity and solidarity; its capacity to deliver sustainable protection 
was limited and its relations with key EU member states under strain.
In 2013, the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International protection (LFIP) was a 
major step forward, constituting the first ever integrated national law concerning asylum in 
the country81. Along with the creation of an integrated new body to deal with the issue of 
migrants and refugees, the General Directorate for Migration Management (GDMM), it con-
stitutes a major innovation in Turkey’s approach. It is not accidental that the UNHCR, which 
warmly welcomed the new law, played a considerable role in drafting it as well82. Moreover, 
the European Union hailed Turkey’s legislative efforts in the context of the Visa Liberalization 
Roadmap83. The new law focused on individual asylum request cases and was very much in 
line with EU legislation and asylum procedures, such as provisions regarding ‘safe third coun-
tries’ and ‘first-country-of asylum’84. It defined a number of categories of foreigners for the first 
time and was explicit regarding the term of entry, stay and exit in the country85. The creation 
of the GDMM, subject to the Interior Ministry, meant that tasks regarding the management 
of migration would now fall under the authority of the newly established body instead of the 
General Directorate for Security. The new law also granted, for the first time, limited access 
to social services for vulnerable groups such as conditional refugees and asylum seekers86. 
The formation of the GDMM has had consequences for other Ministries as well: there is now 
a more integrated approach by way of incorporating migration- related Departments to 
agencies such as the policy or the gendarmerie; previously, such agencies merely had Unites 
dealing with the issue (Interview 3). 
Finally in 2014 a Temporary Protection Regulation was issued, which included the granting 
of rights to healthcare and education to those under protection status and in line with the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention87. A number of changes were introduced to ease the 
presence of Syrian nationals in Turkey and despite the high number of unregistered citizens 
of Syria residing in the country. Aside from the temporary protection status offered to them, 
Syrian nationals would from that point on be issued with biometric ID cards, in line with EU 
laws and regulations. Furthermore, access to the labour market would now be made possi-
ble, as would access to psychological services and counselling. The latter is particularly rele-
vant for the thousands suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and carry not only the 
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physical but, equally importantly, the mental health scars that brutal conflict is accompanied 
by. The implementation of the regulation, however, has been far from smooth. Both bureau-
cratic delays and the reluctance to follow through on what is actually prescribed in the regu-
lation means that the number of Syrians who have managed to gain access to the biometric 
ID cards remains very low (Interview 2). 
It is worth stressing that the process of adaptation to international norms on asylum and 
migration has had a discernible effect on the Turkish authorities’ management of the crisis. 
Cooperation with international NGOs has expanded greatly, not least because of the latter’s 
direct involvement in capacity building and project implementation as implementing partners 
(Interview 1). Further, organizations such as the UNHCR and the International organization for 
Migration (IOM), now a UN body, play a key role in managing the process. Non-governmental 
organizations, municipalities and international agencies set up language courses for Syrians 
in an attempt to break the important language barrier; success has been limited, however, as 
demand is sky-high and the ability of the country to coordinate a unified response and respond 
to the challenge is far from guaranteed (Interviews 1, 2 and 4). Nevertheless, the picture is far 
from rosy: as most refugees are in the south of Turkey and municipalities are primarily dealing 
with attempts to ease their living conditions, asymmetries in approach between the central 
state and municipal authorities often impedes their cooperation (Interview 4). Coordination 
problems go to the heart of managing the migration and asylum framework. 
All of the above demonstrate the cooperation between Turkey and international organiza-
tions, including the European Union, at a particularly sensitive time. Nevertheless, important 
limitations to Turkey’s full alignment with international practice persisted. First, the 2013 Law 
did not grant equal protection to all groups entering the country, relying instead mostly on a 
2001 EU Directive on temporary protection88. Second, the new legislative framework did not 
include the right to work for Syrian refugees. Instead, the people concerned would need to 
apply and receive work permits under a cumbersome and heavily bureaucratic process, which 
drove most in the underground economy89. As a consequence, the spirit of the new legislative 
framework, while greatly expanding on existing arrangements, did not offer a path towards 
sustainable livelihood for the millions that had entered the country and left their ability to 
access healthcare and education services to the discretion of the government instead. Finally, 
the geographic limitation was not lifted. According to Kirişçi90, the reasons behind this deci-
sion emanate primarily from Turkey’s fears about the consequences of lifting the limitation 
without entering the EU. 
EU-Turkey Relations After 2013
The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement 
In late 2013, EU-Turkey relations started improving after a prolonged period of stagnation. 
In October, a new chapter was opened for negotiations, as a result of a change in govern-
ment in France and the election of Francois Hollande replacing the ‘Turkey-sceptic’ Nicolas 
Sarkozy. Cooperation between the two sides was affirmed through changes in Turkish legis-
lation discussed above. In December of that year, the two sides took a step further, signing 
a Readmission Agreement. According to the agreement, Turkey would readmit third coun-
try nationals that had entered the European Union illegally through Turkey in exchange for 
assistance in beefing up border security and, more importantly, setting out a roadmap that 
would eventually lead to visa-free travel for Turkish citizens visiting EU91 member states92. 
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The agreement is significant for a number of reasons: it bolstered the cooperation between 
the two sides at a time when the migration crisis was intensifying, especially for Turkey. Sec-
ond, it signalled that the Union was now in search for viable agreements with third countries 
to enhance its internal cohesion in the face of vociferous opposition against migration-friendly 
policies, especially by the newly admitted members in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, it 
symbolized the interdependent nature of the EU-Turkey relationship on migration, despite 
the fact that the framework of the agreement did not relate to Turkey as a candidate country 
but was rather placed in a ‘third country’ context and with an eye to limiting migration flows 
entering EU territory93.
The Joint Action Plan and EU-Turkey Statement 
In November 2015 an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan was adopted by the two sides, followed 
by the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016. These provided the backbone to long-lasting 
cooperation over the migration issue between and remain, until today, the key instruments 
through which the two sides have sought to manage this policy issue. They therefore need 
to be examined in some detail. The JAP resulted from a decision by the European Council 
in September 2015 to step up cooperation with Turkey on the issue of migration. Heads of 
State and Government understood the key role played by Turkey in mitigating some of the 
effects of the migration crisis regarding their ability and willingness to host migrants and/or 
refugees. Crucially, the JAP linked cooperation on migration with Turkey’s EU aspirations, by 
promising to open new acquis chapters for negotiation. This was a minimal price to pay for 
the EU, considering that earlier efforts to lock Turkey closer into the EU policy framework had 
not been particularly successful.
Aside from reinvigorating EU-Turkey accession talks, the JAP called for more cooperation 
between the two sides, including the deployment of the European Boarder and Coast Guard 
Agency Frontex (Frontex) personnel to Turkey and extra financial assistance to Turkey to 
cope with Syrian citizens under temporary protection, beyond the funds already committed 
through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)94. Three billion Euros were thus earmarked 
for Turkey under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey scheme; crucially, the money would be 
disbursed through project implementation through NGOs and international organizations, 
and Ankara would thus prove unable to be the direct beneficiary. EU financial assistance was 
also foreseen to assist the country in enhancing its capacity to meet the benchmarks identi-
fied by the EU regarding negotiating with Turkey for visa-free travel of its citizens to the EU, 
a major prize for any Turkish government. Visa liberalization discussions had begun in 2013 
and the Union had identified 72 benchmarks for Turkey to meet prior to gaining the right for 
visa-free travel. A new anti-terror law, alongside appropriate regulation concerning personal 
data, have long been the major obstacles to the successful conclusion of these negotiations; 
JAP offered new impetus to the process. Moreover, the JAP reinforced Turkey’s EU aspira-
tions by stressing the ‘negotiating candidate country’ status of Turkey, thus linking the issue 
of cooperation on migration with Ankara’s aspirations towards full membership. Indeed, 
chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy was opened in December 2015 and more were 
promised in the future. Meanwhile, Turkey was shaken by successive terrorist attacks on its 
soil, which underscored its close geographic proximity to the Syrian civil war (the two states 
share a 900km long border) as well as its resulting vulnerability. To illustrate, a dreadful attack 
in Ankara took place only days prior to the EU-Turkey Statement.
The EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 confirmed the progress made since the JAP and the 
fruitful cooperation between the two sides in their fight against smugglers and the attempt to 
36
ease living conditions for Syrians in Turkey. Ankara opened its labour market to Syrian nation-
als and updated its legislation on visa requirements for Syrians and other foreign nationals. 
Nevertheless, a concrete formula to stem the flow of migrants crossing from Turkey into 
Greece, and therefore potentially further west deep into EU territory, was seen in Brussels 
as necessary. To that end, the Statement set out a ‘one-in, one-out’ formula: for every one 
irregular migrant returned to Turkey from Greece another Syrian in Turkey would be resettled 
in an EU member state, up to a maximum of 72,000 persons (European Council 2016) Aware 
of the potential outcry over a measure that threatened impersonal treatment in violation of 
fundamental human rights, the Statement underlined that the process would be governed 
fully by the relevant international humanitarian standards, and that it constituted a ‘temporary 
and extraordinary measure…necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order’ 
(ibid.). This did little to assuage fears that the European Union was now becoming complicit in 
a process that undermined human rights, both regarding Turkish nationals in the south-east 
of the country95 as well as the rights of refugees96. Equally significant was the 72,000 cap that 
the Statement placed on the potential irregular migrants that member states would be host-
ing. The number was very low, given the scale of human movement at the time, and this was 
soon proven true. The Union claimed that ‘voluntary contributions’ by member states would 
suffice to deal with the issue. However, the question of reallocation soon split the Union, with 
countries from the Visegrad in particular refusing to show the solidarity they had expected 
earlier from western Europe, countries like Greece becoming overwhelmed by large numbers 
(see Figure 1), and member states further west being hardly affected by the crisis.
The Statement further called on Turkey to make sure that all illegal land and sea crossings 
towards EU territory be blocked for smugglers carrying irregular migrants. It thus turned Tur-
key into the most important EU ally in the fight against irregular migration. Brussels considered 
the deal the necessary price to pay and therefore went beyond the JAP in a) allocating another 
€3 billion of financial assistance to Turkey b) promising the opening of another acquis chapter 
(number 33 on financial and budgetary provisions) and c) accelerating the visa liberalization 
dialogue with a view to ensuing the lifting of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens by end 
June 2016, provided all benchmarks could be met. A long-stalled accession process was now 
being revived by Brussels and Berlin in particular, as Chancellor Merkel faced the largest crisis 
of her premiership by accepting more than one million migrants into Germany and stead-
fastly refusing to place a cap on the number of people that Germany would be welcoming97. 
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Figure 1: Global Distribution of Syrian Refugees, 2016
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Turkey and Germany, two countries of roughly equal size, deep economic bonds and a love-
hate relationship spanning decades, became the main protagonists in the ongoing saga. 
Ankara had every right to be pleased: it was voluntarily undertaking the task that the Euro-
pean Union had refused to implement itself – and rightly felt that the lack of solidarity among 
EU member states provided it with a golden opportunity to make progress in its relations 
with the Union at a time when its relations with the EU had reached a new low. Crucially for 
the Turkish government, harmonious cooperation with the EU and the reliance of Brussels 
on Ankara to deal with the migration crisis suggested that visa-free travel to the Union could 
become a reality. Not least for electoral purposes, the realization of this long-cherished goal 
would be seen as the ultimate triumph of Turkish diplomacy, above and beyond the opening 
of a few more negotiating chapters.
Durable Agreements, Worsening Tensions: the Post-Deal Environment
Although the criticism against the EU-Turkey migration deal has not fully subsided, its suc-
cesses cannot be ignored. The number of people attempting to cross illegally into EU terri-
tory has dropped considerable, and the networks of smugglers that profited greatly from the 
absence of such cooperation in the past have lost out. The European Union, though regular 
updates and data pertaining to the agreement, has stressed the benefits incurred through 
the implementation of the deal. The second anniversary of the deal saw the Commission 
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claim that arrivals on the Aegean Sea islands from Turkey had dropped by an astonishing 
97 percent in two years; daily, this meant an average of about 80 a day, compared to more 
than 3,000 during 201599. Further, the Commission underlined that resettlement of Syrian ref-
ugees to member states continued apace and that support provided to Greece had allowed 
the latter to manage the crisis more effectively. Finally, the Commission underscored how its 
financial aid to Turkey had enabled hundreds of thousands of Syrian kids to attend school 
in Turkey, 1.2 million people to get access to healthcare and hundreds of new schools to be 
constructed100. Despite occasional threats to end the agreement, mostly resulting from the 
alleged ‘dishonesty’ and ‘non-cooperation’ by the EU101, Turkey has continued to implement 
the agreement throughout. It has also partnered with both Greece and NATO to beef up 
coast guard supervision of the Aegean Sea and to continue disrupting smugglers’ attempts 
to bypass surveillance and policing at sea.
Nevertheless, tensions with the EU have remained throughout the implementation period 
and domestic instability has fuelled deterioration in relations with Europe102. In that context, 
two events stand out: the 15 July 2016 coup attempt against the Turkish government is the 
most important. The bombing of the Turkish Parliament, tanks on the Bosporus Bridge and 
the attempted assassination of President Erdoğan came as a surprise to most observers. 
Hundreds of civilians lost their life and thousands got injured, as the President called on the 
people to defend democracy in the country. This extraordinary coup attempt was attributed 
to a faction of the armed forces linked to the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who has been 
living in the United States since the 1990s. The government responded by clamping down on 
the putschists and then moved quickly to declare a state of emergency to ‘cleanse’ the state 
of conspirators and fellow-travellers of the alleged masterminds. In the process, hundreds 
of thousands of civil servants, and private sector employees, lost their jobs and associated 
rights. The army, police, media, judiciary and academia all saw alleged conspirators impris-
oned or accused of cooperation with the putschists. Whilst the Turkish government called 
for solidarity by Europe amidst its ‘anti-terrorist’ measures and accused the Union of ignor-
ing the trauma of 15 July, the EU condemned the coup attempt but also called for respect for 
democratic institutions and the quick return to the rule of law103. 
Second, acrimony increased further ahead of the controversial 2017 Turkish referendum to 
transform the regime to a (sort of) Presidential democracy. As domestic Turkish politics and 
the associated tensions between different segments threatened to spill over to EU member 
states with a large Turkish population, Germany and the Netherlands were accused by Pres-
ident Erdoğan of restricting freedom of speech by prohibiting or curtailing campaign events. 
Turkey’s belligerent rhetoric, characterizing German and other officials as ‘nazis’, heightened 
already escalating tensions104. Turkey’s close cooperation with Russia, beginning in 2016, 
meant that the EU and Turkey were driven further apart on how to even deal with the Syrian 
crisis, an issue that had united them until then. To top it all, stringent anti-terror legislation, 
objected to by the EU, has meant that visa-free travel remains elusive for Turkey, further 
fuelling existing tensions. Gaining the right to visa-free travel has been a long-cherished goal 
of every Turkish government since the EU ceased the practise following the 1980s coup105. 
Heightened political instability in Turkey has been combined with the non-resolution of the 
Syrian crisis and has led to increasing tensions regarding the integration and accommodation 
of millions of refugees. Turkey is ambivalent as to the extent to which it wishes to integrate 
the Syrians in the country (Interviews 2 and 3). Sections of civil society, such as some trade 
unions, argue that informal employment by refugees undercuts minimum wage legislation 
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and penalizes Turkish workers as a result (Interview 6). Integration becomes harder still 
considering that Syrians are a majority in certain cities on the border (see Table 1) and form 
majorities in Istanbul neighbourhoods. The erstwhile welcoming attitude of the Turkish people 
has turned to increasing disappointment and anger, as it is becoming increasingly clear that 
most Syrians intend to stay in the country even after a political solution has been reached in 
Syria106. Worryingly, politics has now entered the picture and the issue is no longer a matter 
of displaying solidarity to those fleeing conflict. When President Erdoğan raised the prospect 
of granting citizenship to Syrians in 2016, the opposition vociferously opposed such a plan 
and popular backlash forced Erdoğan to backtrack. Although about 70,000 Syrians had been 
granted citizenship by early 2019, the government now claims that eventually all refugees will 
return home, a rather unlikely prospect107. Humanitarian organizations in the field allege that 
the current status of Syrians in Turkey cannot continue as is for a long period of time (inter-
view 6–8), although it is equally clear that awarding full citizenship rights to all of them is not 
feasible. Meanwhile, incidents of violence between Syrians and locals, sometimes resulting 
in deaths and widespread urban violence, have been on the increase, especially in the west-
ern urban centres where cultural misunderstandings and differences are as ripe as those 
between Syrians and EU member states108. At least in the western part of Turkey, polls suggest 
that locals see the Syrian refugees as neither willing nor able to integrate in Turkish society. 
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that EU-Turkey cooperation over the migration crisis, although real, 
has been apprehensive. Fraught with challenges and complexities, the EU-Turkey agreement 
has been a landmark in how the Union has dealt with the crisis and has offered it the possibil-
ity of diffusing some of the tension associated with the issue. Turkey’s generous and hospita-
ble reaction at the onset of the crisis, a combination of benevolence and political calculation 
regarding Syria, proved a saving grace for a Union divided and split on how to deal with yet 
another structural problem, following the Eurozone crisis. Moreover, Turkey has cooperated 
closely with Europe as well as international organizations and NGOs to upgrade its legislative 
toolkit and adjust it to the changed realities of the 21st century. Turkey is today much more 
than a country of emigrants abroad: it is a transit country for migrants and refugees wishing 
to migrate from East to West; as well as a destination country resulting from its raised eco-
nomic profile109. The modernization of its laws and regulations on migrants, refugees and asy-
lum-seekers is an attempt to reconcile the multiple identities that country has now acquired. 
Although the EU-Turkey agreements have survived waves of instability and tension, major 
challenges remain. For the EU, immigration continues to top citizens’ concerns in several 
member states, fuelled by populist short-termism and the desire for electoral gains. Mean-
while, Turkey’s approach has undergone important changes too. The sheer number of ref-
ugees now residing in the country has led to inter-ethnic clashes and the consolidation of a 
schism between Syrians’ and Turks’ expectations as to the way forward. While the latter are 
openly questioning the desirability of Syrians remaining in the country, most of the former 
have sought to rebuild their livelihoods on Turkish soil and are reluctant to contemplate a 
return to their homeland. For years to come, Turkey will face a massive challenge regarding 
how to deal with its Syrian population. Whatever solution it comes up with, it will be met with 
resistance and doubts by segments of the population. Cooperation with the European Union 
and a sincere willingness to reach mutually acceptable solutions is but one of the many pre-
conditions on which the success of this project depends on.
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Abstract
The migration and refugee crisis that erupted in 2015 landed recession riven Greece with a 
series of humanitarian, political, social, and financial as well as foreign policy and security chal-
lenges. Following a near disastrous open-borders policy steeped in leftist ideological parochi-
alism, Athens aligned itself closely with Germany in support of the EU-Turkey deal that drasti-
cally reduced the human flows from Turkey into the EU and invited NATO naval forces to help 
monitor the implementation of the agreement. This paper is structured around two parts: the 
first part describes the immigration and refugee crisis itself, from a global, European and nation-
al-Greek perspective; the second part analyzes the risks to and policy responses of Greece and 
how they relate to the country’s overall geostrategic position, at a time when Europe is being 
redefined as it struggles to respond to a multitude of challenges.
Introduction 
In 2015 Greece faced an unprecedented crisis when almost a million people crossed disorderly 
its borders from Turkey on their way to Europe. The crisis landed Greece with a humanitar-
ian challenge at the peak of its own economic recession, while it threatened to overwhelm 
the Greek state’s limited administrative capacity, destabilize the regional order by potentially 
igniting tensions with neighbouring Turkey and North Mace donia, marginalize Greece further 
within the European Union (EU), both politically and physically, and upend European integra-
tion at a time when Greece needed and depended the most on the solidarity of its EU partners. 
At first, the incoming government of Alexis Tsipras exacerbated the problem by adopting 
an open-borders policy that reversed some of the border controls that its predecessors had 
struggled to introduce. Eventually, however, Athens proved flexible and realistic. It supported 
the emerging EU consensus on enhanced border protection and the controlled and measured 
flow of refugees into the EU. The Greek government abandoned its leftist proclamations and 
aligned itself closely with Germany in support of the EU-Turkey deal that drastically reduced 
the human flows from Turkey into the EU. Furthermore, the Greek government invited NATO 
naval forces to help monitor the flows in the Eastern Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece. 
Finally, the Greek government buried away much of its populist euro-scepticism and turned 
into a champion of furthering integration, especially in the field of immigration and asylum 
policy that should be dealt with at the EU level rather by each state separately. 
The crisis, however, weakened the EU as a whole as it seemed to confirm its geopolitical 
weakness while it strengthened the nationalist, euro-sceptic voices within many EU member- 
states and contributed to the Brexit vote in the British referendum of 2016. In Germany, the 
EU’s core country, it allowed a xenophobic, right-wing party, named ‘Alternative for Germany’, 
to enter the federal parliament, coming third in the September 2017 elections, making the 
formation of a new governing coalition in Berlin a difficult political and numerical exercise. 
The Schengen Area did hold together, as its dissolution would have been extremely costly, 
especially for the very open and inter-dependent economies of northern Europe. But the cri-
sis, that followed a period of severe economic contraction after 2008, has had a deep political 
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impact, turning Europe sharply rightwards. With the exception of France where, thanks to 
the electoral law and the daring charisma of Emmanuel Macron, a staunchly europhile presi-
dent and parliament were elected, the crisis accelerated the decline of Europe’s most distinct 
political force, that of social democracy, and contributed to the rise of a group of nationalist 
and, occasionally authoritarian, leaders in Central Europe that view Brussels with increasing 
hostility. In fact, the crisis threatened to divide the EU along a Western mainstream and an 
Eastern alternative (plus an exiting Britain) that has come to resent the influence and the 
reforms propagated by the EU bureaucracy. 
Moreover, it seems that there has been no permanent fix to the challenge of managing the 
influx of migrants and refugees and that a new crisis might occur with devastating conse-
quences for the future cohesion of the European Union. There is still no administrative capacity 
in Greece to process in a timely manner the influx of people and return significant numbers 
of illegal immigrants to Turkey. Germany, with its fairly generous asylum policy and with an 
economy of full employment, continues to act as a gigantic magnet stimulating human flows 
that can undermine European integration and strengthen further the return to strict national 
border controls.
This paper is structured around two parts: the first part describes the immigration and refu-
gee crisis itself, from a global, European and national-Greek perspective; the second part ana-
lyzes the risks to and policy responses of Greece and how they relate to the country’s overall 
geostrategic position, at a time when Europe is being redefined as it struggles to respond to 
a multitude of challenges. 
The Crisis
With one person displaced every 3 seconds, there are more displaced people in the world 
today (approx. 65 million) than during World War II110. Still, with armed conflicts becoming 
more protracted and environmental pressures mounting, the number of refugees is bound 
to increase. Despite the magnitude and the importance of this phenomenon, general per-
ceptions and policy responses are often incorrect or inadequate and the gap between public 
opinion and the opinion of experts is vast and growing. 
While recent wars in the Middle East and Northern Africa pushed a dramatic wave of asylum 
seekers and migrants toward Europe in 2015–2016, 84 percent of the displaced remain in 
low to middle-income countries and 8 out of 10 refugees are living in neighbouring countries. 
With more than 40 percent of refugees displaced for more than 10 years and 20 percent for 
more than 30, supporting alternative livelihoods and ensuring access to services and legal 
protection has never been so compelling.
The above short exposé provides a concise picture of the refugee challenge from a global 
perspective. Zooming into Europe, before dealing with the specifics of the 2015 crisis, it is 
useful to bear the following facts in mind. The international regime protecting the refugees 
was put in place in the aftermath of World War II. The provisions of the regime are generous 
and mandate the full protection of refugees. 
The regime was meant for the protection of the few political refugees escaping communism 
or military dictatorships during the Cold War, in other words for the protection of people 
coming from the First or the Second World, sharing the colour, religion and cultural outlook 
of Europeans and not for people from the impoverished and culturally alien global South. 
Indeed, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950 
and came of age with the 1956 refugee crisis, caused by the failure of the Hungarian revolu-
tion and the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet army when, as a result, 200,000 Hungarians 
fled to the West111.
Moreover, some Western countries, including Germany and Greece, went further and intro-
duced specific refugee-protection clauses into their constitution. The Greek constitution of 
1975 provides a good example of that when it states that ‘The expulsion of an alien under 
persecution for his defence of liberty is forbidden’ (article 5, paragraph 2). 
However, things evolved differently. There has been an interesting but much understudied 
chain of developments during the post-war era. War between states became rare and war 
among great powers became obsolete, in part thanks to nuclear weapons. War has not dis-
appeared but it has been ‘domesticated’. The vast majority of wars in the post-war era have 
been civil wars112. Civil wars are very much associated with poverty and they occur, almost 
exclusively, in the global periphery or what used to be the Third World113. As a result, contrary 
to the experience of World War II, that gave birth to the current international regime for the 
protection of refugees, the vast majority of refugees and internally displaced people today 
come from poor, third-world nations engulfed in civil war. 
As already mentioned above, traditionally, most of these people have remained either within 
their country of origin or in neighbouring countries. This has been the case with the millions of 
Palestinians festering in various Arab states, the millions of African refugees, as a result of the 
recurring sub-Saharan civil wars, surviving in the various African refugee camps or the millions 
of Afghans in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. As long as these people remained far and away 
from the West, little attention was paid to them. They were a concern for the hosting countries 
and the international humanitarian agencies dedicated to dealing with these issues but they 
were not a concern for the leaders or the public opinion of the powerful nations of the world. 
An exception in this 70-year long history was the forced displacement caused by the Yugo-
slav wars of succession in the 1990s. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia produced an 
intra-European wave of refugees not seen since World War II. However, the sympathy towards 
the victims and the relatively small numbers involved did not produce an anti-refugee back-
lash among the Western publics. After all, most of the forcefully displaced people remained 
within the borders of former Yugoslavia, with Serbia receiving the vast majority of them, some 
800,000 Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia. When war came to Kosovo in 1999, it was neighbour-
ing North Mace donia that hosted the hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees escaping 
Slobodan Milosevic’s terror. In short, the Yugoslav tragedy was a European war fought by Euro-
peans. Europe and the West, after some hesitation, were both able and willing to deal with it. 
It took place in the midst of the euphoria caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of 
East European communism and the end of the Cold War. As a result, NATO intervened mil-
itarily twice, first in Bosnia in 1995 and then in Kosovo in 1999. The United States, together 
with its major European allies, imposed a peace settlement first at Dayton over Bosnia and 
then, with Security Council Resolution 1244, over Kosovo, that opened the way for the seces-
sion of Kosovo from Serbia. 
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Things changed dramatically two decades later with the refugee crisis of 2015. With the advent 
of the crisis, Europe and Germany, in particular, were flooded by non-European, non-Christian 
and culturally alien refugees and immigrants at a time of increasing Islamophobia and social 
anxiety. For the first time since the introduction of the refugee-protection international regime, 
Europe was asked to walk the humanitarian talk it has been preaching for seven decades.
At first, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, welcomed the newcomers and, in a famous 
proclamation that has haunted her ever since, she welcomed the challenge and reconfirmed 
post-war Germany’s commitment to the full protection of refugees wherever they come from. 
However, as the crisis deepened, her allies started to abandon her. First it was Austria and 
then the sister party of her Christian Democrats, the staunchly conservative Bavaria-based 
Christian Social Union. Eventually, she was forced to change course, accepted the closing of 
the Balkan corridor, through which most of the influx took place, with the erection of heav-
ily guarded border fences, and sponsored an EU repatriation agreement with Turkey that 
decreased the flow by 97 percent. 
Meanwhile, as a result of the crisis, many in Europe started calling for the tightening or even 
the abandonment of the international regime for the protection of refugees altogether. They 
include not only the Visegrad extremists, of the likes of Viktor Orban114, who has equated the 
refugees with terrorists, but many conservatives on the centre-right as well. The overall Euro-
pean consensus has moved towards the better management of borders115, the speedy review 
of asylum claims, the repatriation of those whose claims were rejected and the granting of 
economic aid to the poor and distressed countries where most immigrants come from, pro-
vided they do a much better job in controlling their borders effectively116. 
As the French President Emmanuel Macron put it in his speech at the Sorbonne in September 
2017 ‘Only with Europe can we effectively protect our borders, take in those eligible for asy-
lum decently, truly integrate them, and at the same time quickly return those not eligible for 
such protection. So long as we leave some of our partners submerged under massive arrivals, 
without helping them manage their borders; so long as our asylum procedures remain slow 
and disparate; so long as we are incapable of collectively organizing the return of migrants 
not eligible for asylum, we will lack both effectiveness and humanity ... we need to do that 
without leaving the burden to the few, be they countries of first entry or final host countries, 
by building the terms for genuine, chosen, organized and concerted solidarity.’ 
Nevertheless, the feeling remains that the problem of immigration and refugees is here to 
stay, that the income inequality among the world’s regions has increased, that globalization 
has facilitated immigration and that Europe will be facing similar or worse crises repeatedly 
in the future117. Interestingly, the 2015 crisis proved that even small numbers can have huge 
political consequences. There were no refugees going to Great Britain and, yet, the images of 
disorder and chaos emanating from the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean played a major 
role in the voters’ turn against Europe in the British referendum. There are no refugees in 
Hungary today and, moreover, there are no refugees who want to go to Hungary anyway. This 
did not stop Orban from turning the refugee crisis into a major public concern and from pro-
claiming a crusade against the refugees and the cosmopolitan elites of Brussels who suppos-
edly support them. Even the number of close to two million people who came into Europe in 
2015, while much higher than in previous years, is, comparatively speaking, manageable, one 
might argue, for a European Union of 510 million with vast economic resources at its disposal. 
With this background in mind, let’s now turn to the crisis itself and its impact on Greece. 
The numbers paint a dramatic increase in the amount of illegal crossings into the European 
Union during 2015. While there were 72,500 crossings in 2012 and 283,500 in 2014, the num-
ber exploded to 1.8 million crossings in 2015, reports Frontex (The European Boarder and 
Coast Guard Agency) Risk Analysis Network118. According to UNHCR, the majority of these 
crossings, around one million, took place through the Mediterranean Sea Routes, and, more 
specifically, from Turkey into Greece, through the eastern Aegean Sea119. The total number 
of arrivals in Greece increased from 77,000 in 2014 to 911,000 in 2015. Whereas in the past, 
prior to 2014, most arrivals involved land crossings, mainly over the river border between 
Greece and Turkey in Thrace, in 2015 more than 90 percent of arrivals were by sea, with the 
Greek island of Lesbos being the primary destination followed by the islands of Chios and 
Samos. From these and the other Greek islands across from the Turkish coast, refugees and 
migrants were transferred to the northern border at Idomeni, on their way to Central Europe, 
in what became known as the Balkan corridor. 
According to Greek Police statistics, the number of sea crossings increased 1,905 percent 
between 2014 and 2015, from 43,500 to 872,500, of which half a million came from Syria, 
213,000 from Afghanistan, 92,000 from Iraq followed by citizens of Pakistan and Iran120. Among 
Syrians there were many women, children and older people. However, incoming Afghanis 
were mostly young men. The crisis peaked in October 2015 with 218,000 sea crossings into 
Greece but the number remained substantial until March 2016, when, following the signing 
of the EU-Turkey Statement, the influx started receding. 
However, according to the Financial Times, ‘…some worry the problem is merely being moved 
elsewhere.’ In April the numbers of migrants reaching Italy exceeded the total for Greece 
for the first time since June 2015, according to Frontex, the EU border agency. Some 8,300 
migrants were detected on the Central Mediterranean Route compared with 2,700 on the 
Turkey-Greece crossing121.
According to UNHCR, there are around 15 million refugees in the world today, excluding the 
internally displaced people and the 5.1 million Palestinian refugees, registered with UNRWA122 
since 1949. Syrians constitute the largest group, followed by Afghanis and Somalis. Due to the 
Syrian civil war, Turkey became the largest refugee-hosting country worldwide in total num-
bers, for the first time ever, but Lebanon remained the country with the highest concentration 
of refugees in per capita terms123. Today, it is estimated that some 3.1 million Syrians are in 
Turkey alone124, with only 10 percent in refugee camps and the rest in various Turkish cities, 
according to a Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations’ report125. It is important to 
keep this broader picture in mind because while the increase in refugees and illegal migrants 
heading to Europe in 2015 was dramatic, the actual number reaching the European Union, 
which comprises 28 member-states, remained relatively small, especially when compared with 
the number of refugees reaching some smaller and much poorer countries outside Europe. 
Why the surge? The answer to this question is not so straight forward. There is the obvious 
reason of the Syrian civil war. Indeed, while violence in Syria erupted in 2011 and intensified 
after 2012, the summer of 2015 was a turning point. The reversal of Assad’s fortunes, with 
the help of Russia, meant the prolongation of the war and persuaded many Syrians to leave 
and seek permanent resettlement elsewhere, preferably in Europe. The Islamic State’s reach 
from Syria’s eastern wastelands into its Kurdish and Arabic heartland, in the north and the 
west, and into Iraq, with the fall of Mosul, that country’s second largest city, together with the 
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intensification of the fight around Syria’s main city, Aleppo, further contributed to the forced 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Syrians and Iraqis. 
However, there is no consensus that the objective realities on the ground in Syria and Iraq 
alone caused the surge. Far from it, the cause of the surge is hotly debated in Europe, as the 
refugee crisis became highly politicized and polarized between two opposite visions. One is 
best represented by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the other by Hungary’s Prime 
Minister Victor Orban. For Orban, there was no influx of refugees but an ‘invasion’ of illegal 
immigrants, as even Syrians came to Europe not directly from war-torn Syria but through 
safe Turkey. Furthermore, the flow included many non-Syrians, coming from poor third-world 
nations. According to Orban, this ‘invasion’ took place because of the misguided perceptions 
and the policy mistakes of the passive liberal elites of Europe who espouse multi-culturalism 
at the expense of Europe’s Christian identity.
Critics of Merkel, both inside and outside Germany, pointed to her statements, welcoming 
the Syrian refugees stranded in Hungary in September 2015, as a main reason for turning 
the refugee wave into a tsunami126. Similarly, the newly elected Greek government of Alexis 
Tsipras, initially a radical leftist, was accused of foolishly abolishing all border controls and 
doing away with the detention of all illegal entrants, as applied by the previous Greek admin-
istration, led by Antonis Samaras, a conservative. 
Critics claim that when it comes to influxes of such magnitude, being ‘humane’ has the unin-
tended consequence of acting as a magnet, attracting more people and complicating, rather 
than resolving, the refugee problem. They point to the fact that whereas, in the past, Italy was 
the preferred gate of entry into Europe, after the election of Tsipras to the Greek premiership, 
in January 2015, Greece became, by far, the most heavily trafficked entrance into Europe. 
Furthermore, the influx receded when the ‘inhumane’ closing of the land border took place, 
effectively blocking the Balkan corridor. 
It is true that the Greek government included many activists and supporters of migrant and 
refugee rights. But even Greeks who did not belong to the Left showed a certain understanding 
for the government’s argument. Faced with Turkey’s intransigence, boats entering the Greek 
territorial waters could only be escorted to the nearest Greek port and not be pushed back 
towards Turkish waters, since this could easily have caused their sinking and the loss of human 
lives. However, when the pressure from Europe to do something and start controlling the flows 
mounted, Tsipras, quite realistically, subscribed to Merkel’s plans for a deal with Turkey, that 
involved the return to Turkey of all people coming to Greece after March 20, 2016, and the 
detention of all entrants in the Greek islands away from the Greek mainland.
Apart from the ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ factors described above that directly contributed to the 
surge, there has been a third set of indirect factors. These factors concerned the policies of 
other countries in Europe’s borderlands. Italy, under the leadership of Matteo Renzi, aban-
doned the policy of ‘mare nostrum’ and intensified the patrolling of its sea borders during 2015. 
Morocco successfully cooperated with Spanish authorities to effectively control the land and 
sea border between the two countries. On the contrary, Turkey, faced with a humanitarian 
crisis within its borders, a failed policy in Syria and Europe’s indifference, did not do much to 
stop or, even limit, the smuggling of hundreds of thousands of people from its coasts. 
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The refugee crisis afflicting Europe in 2015 was the result of many factors, with each factor 
pointing to a different culprit and requiring a course for future action127. While there has been 
a certain rise in the ‘demand’ for crossing illegally into Europe, the incoherent and ineffective 
border-controlling and refugee/immigration policy on the part of the EU as a whole exacer-
bated the problem. The increased ‘supply’ of illegal, uncontrolled, undocumented and, often, 
chaotic crossings further stimulated the demand to migrate in the first place. 
As a consequence, during 2015, there was a continuing shift in the flows of people coming 
out of Syria from Lebanon and Jordan towards Turkey, as the easiest conduit into Europe. 
Similarly, Turkey attracted many economic immigrants from Africa and Asia who wanted to 
cross into Europe. It has been little noticed and not much discussed in Europe but this accel-
erating shift threatened to destabilize Turkey and provided the main impetus for agreeing to 
the March 2016 deal with the EU. 
In sum, all these events affirmed Europe’s need for both an effective and unified border-con-
trol mechanism and a legal and organized way for immigration, grounded in the protection 
of refugees according to international law, a via media as proclaimed by President Macron. 
Greece’s Geostrategic Position in and After the Crisis
While the crisis initially threatened Greece’s international standing, at the end it was some-
how and, at least momentarily, resolved thanks, in part, to its privileged geostrategic posi-
tion. What were the primary risks involved? To begin with, the risks were many and serious. 
The first and most immediate of them all was to have Greece cut off from the Schengen Area 
where it belongs and turned into a pan-European hotspot and detention center for immi-
grants and refugees alike. In the most nightmarish scenario, Greece would have become for 
Europe what Nauru is for Australia. The small island republic of Nauru in the south Pacific has 
been turned into a giant camp for the detention of all boat arrivals into Australia in exchange 
for some financial aid128. The prospect seemed real when the North Mace donia built a fence 
along the border with Greece and policed it with the help of some of Greece’s EU partners. 
The then foreign minister of Austria, Sebastian Kurz and the country’s newly elected chan-
cellor, organized meetings with his counterparts from the countries lying along the Balkan 
corridor excluding Greece. Frontex dispatched a mission on North Mace donia’s border with 
Greece. There was a lot of noise for suspending Greece’s membership in the Schengen Area. 
Finally, on November 12, 2016, Germany temporarily reintroduced border controls for the 
flights from Greece, citing concerns for the security situation and the threats resulting from 
the continuous significant secondary movements. Since Greece shares no land border with 
any other member-state of the Schengen area, border-free travel from Greece is only possi-
ble through air and through the sea lane to Italy.  
Another risk had to do with the security of Greece as a hosting nation, in the broader sense 
of the term. There is no doubt that the human wave of 2015 coming into Greece from Turkey 
included a small percentage of criminals, terrorists and would-be jihadists. A gunman, killed 
during the terrorist attack against the Stade de France in Paris in November 2015, carried a 
passport that belonged to a Syrian refugee who had passed through Greece the month before. 
There have been several stories of smuggled guns, forged passports and jihadist networks 
reported in the press. There was also a concern about public health and a fear of epidemics 
which did not materialize. 
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Another risk arose unexpectedly from the work of NGOs and international agencies. As the 
crisis gathered pace, Greece was flooded by a plethora of NGOs, pro-refugee activists and 
the media. UNHCR established a mission in Greece to deal with the emergency. While most 
of their efforts were commendable and they efficiently filled a gap in the management of the 
human flows crossing the waters in the Aegean Sea, their priorities and interests occasionally 
clashed with those of the Greek state. To begin with, these groups and agencies did not rec-
ognize the distinction between a refugee and an economic immigrant and thought of every 
incomer as deserving a free passage and asylum if he/she chose to apply for one. There were 
many incidents when activists attempted to mobilize and organize demonstrations and various 
forms of civil disobedience against the Greek authorities. The UNHCR itself is not accustomed 
to operate within a European environment as most of its past experience had to do with situ-
ations where state authority was non-existent or very weak. Many of these organizations had 
a lot of funding from various sources, including the EU, a significant administrative capacity, 
a long experience dealing with crises and a very good access to world media. As a result of 
this mostly complementary but sometimes antagonistic symbiosis between the Greek state 
and the NGOs/UNHCR, a peculiar relationship developed, punctured by the occasional flare 
ups of accusations of corruption from each side against the other. 
In a more traditional sense, the crisis threatened to cause deterioration in Greece’s relations 
with Turkey. At a minimum ‘search and rescue’ operations in the Eastern Aegean are compli-
cated affairs. The proximity of the Greek islands to the Turkish mainland make the crossings 
easy during most of the year and limit the time for the coast guard to respond to just a few 
minutes. When NATO was invited to monitor the situation and assist the two states and Fron-
tex, the Greek-Turkish rivalry complicated its mission. Alarmed by the crisis, NATO’s defense 
ministers decided to dispatch NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 to conduct reconnaissance, 
monitoring and surveillance in the territorial waters of Greece, Turkey as well as in inter-
national waters. But NATO’s mission has included only the northern and not the southern 
Aegean and cooperation with Frontex has been rocky. In both cases, it was Turkey objecting 
to the expansion of NATO’s mission into the Greek Dodecanese and in working closely with 
an EU institution, since Turkey wants no NATO operations in the demilitarized Dodecanese 
islands and is not part of the EU.
In addition, the flow threatened the stability of all the countries lying along the Balkan corri-
dor, most of which are poor and fragile to begin with129. The building of a fence by the author-
ities of North Mace donia along the border with Greece was received as a particular affront to 
Greek pride. More ominously, the crisis seemed to afford Turkey and Russia an opportunity to 
undermine Europe’s liberal consensus, which they have both come to detest in recent years. 
Ultimately, the crisis threatened to lead to the fragmentation of the EU with the nationali-
zation of refugee policies and the adoption of a beggar-my-neighbour attitude towards the 
problem. In certain quarters, Greece was vilified for its inability to control its borders, process 
the influx in an orderly fashion and provide its EU partners with reliable security data. The 
crisis reconfirmed Greece’s image as the sick man of Europe, the weakest of the weak links, 
a perennial problem that needed constant supervision if not amputation. 
Greece, however, found two unexpected ‘allies’ in its efforts at climbing back to some interna-
tional respectability. The first was Victor Orban, his rhetoric as well as his policies. The other 
was Tayip Erdogan who agreed to the EU-Turkey deal. 
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Orban’s policies of fence building trickled down to Hungary’s southern neighbours who got 
scared they might got stuck with thousands of unwanted refugees. This forced others to build 
their own fences effectively sealing off the Balkan corridor. In the age of social media, news 
travel fast. Prospective travellers in Turkey soon learned that crossing into Greece would prob-
ably mean their confinement in a hotspot on a Greek island where living conditions were bad. 
However, it should be noted that fences can only work if and for as long as they are heavily 
patrolled; otherwise, loopholes are soon found and the flow trickles in as is currently the case. 
Furthermore, Orban’s aggressive rhetoric, specifically targeted towards a resentful domestic 
audience, frustrated by the ever elusive convergence of its standards of living with Western 
Europe after thirty years of reform, highlighted the perils of anti-European populism for the 
European elites. In juxtaposition, the Greek stand appeared less frightening and more liberal, 
rational, serious and pro-European. While the euro crisis had divided Europe between North 
and South, the refugee crisis divided Europe between East and West, reopened the wounds 
of the Cold War division but put, at least for a moment, Greece on the right side of history, 
together with Germany and its other old west European allies.
However, the main reason for Greece’s come back, away from the grave risks the crisis initially 
posed, had to do with Turkey. The big question here is why did Erdogan offer his help and 
agreed to a deal with the EU? Some reasons are obvious: money and some rewards for Turkish 
citizens. Turkey was promised more than 3 billion of euros in aid for its refugee problem and 
an acceleration of the visa-free travel into Schengen for its people130. Currently, Turks are the 
only people west of Russia, together with the Kosovars, who need a visa to enter Schengen. 
Two other reasons have not received a lot of attention but they did play a role. The one had 
to do with the declining desire of refugees to leave Turkey in the first place, as they preferred 
to remain close to Syria, where things started to get a bit more stable in 2016, and the Balkan 
Route was closed. The other had to do with Erdogan’s ambition to be recognized as a powerful 
player on a par with Merkel, who together can shape Europe’s future. The EU-Turkey Statement 
reaffirmed this belief and created some space for the rapprochement of the two on an equal 
footing. Rather than begging for EU accession from a position of weakness, Erdogan struck a 
deal with Germany from a position of strength. 
However, the most important reason for Turkey not only agreeing to but, actually, champi-
oning the deal had to do with Turkey’s own growing sense of destabilization caused by being 
turned into a global magnet attracting hundreds of thousands of people wishing to cross 
illegally into Europe. The more people boarded the boats heading towards the Greek islands 
the more people arrived in Turkey or planned to make the trip to Turkey. By the fall of 2015 
the situation in Turkey was getting out of hand and Ankara understood this simple dynamic 
that escaped most liberal media reporting on the crisis. 
The deal itself has pulled Greece out of the refugee conundrum, allowed for some EU aid 
(monetary as well as in personnel and technical advice) to flow to Greece as an EU front-line 
state while it drastically reduced the human flows that had threatened to overwhelm the 
Aegean islands. Moreover, the deal has provided the breathing space for the rethinking of 
Europe’s asylum and immigration policy. 
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However, the EU leaders remain short-sighted. Relieved at managing to control the immedi-
ate crisis, they currently seem uninterested in dealing with its underlying causes and, thus, 
they make sure that the crisis, in one form or another, will return. One statistic is particularly 
disheartening: the total number of people returned from Greece to Turkey after the signing 
of the deal is only a few hundreds and it remains smaller than the corresponding number 
before the signing of the deal. In other words, although repatriation is at the core of the 
EU-Turkey Statement, it is not working due to the inability of processing the asylum cases 
currently piled up in Greece. While asylum cases in the Netherlands are decided within two 
months, in Greece and elsewhere it might take years, cancelling both premises of Macron’s 
vision for effectiveness and humanity131.
Schengen has exhibited some of the same flaws found in the monetary union and the euro. 
It was designed as a technical solution to facilitate travel and trade among the core European 
countries without much consideration of the politics involved. It worked as long as there was 
no crisis. When the crisis erupted, its political weakness came to the fore and threatened to 
unravel it. And, just as was the case with the crisis of the euro, the refugee crisis has led to 
strengthening its provisions and to increasing coordination among its member-states but not 
to the resolution of its genetic flaws. 
In the case of the euro, the main flaw has to do with the asymmetry between the surpluses 
of the north and the deficits of the south. In the case of the Schengen, that main flaw has to 
do with the attraction of Germany as an immigration destination and the asymmetry in the 
administrative capacity of the EU member states in dealing with the resulting flow in an effi-
cient and humane way. 
For all the difficulties involved, the stakes have been raised and failure is not an easy option. 
The unravelling of Schengen would have had dramatic consequences for inter-European 
trade and traveling. Most European economies are extremely open and interlinked with 
their neighbours. Reintroducing border controls would have deducted billions of euros from 
Europe’s GDP. For all the appeal of the populist argument against immigration and in favor 
of renationalizing immigration policy, it is this inescapable economic logic that has proved 
integration’s most important ally. 
The irony in all this is the fact that Greece is the country that benefits the least from Schengen 
and, consequently, would have lost the least from its dismantling. The reason is that the Greek 
economy is fairly closed, the value and volume of goods traded with the Schengen area is a 
miniscule fraction of the total inter-Schengen trade and Greece shares no land border with 
any other Schengen member-state. So, for Greece Schengen is only about air-travel which 
mostly concerns the tourist industry and not the trading of goods. And, air-travel is already 
fairly restricted due to heightened security checks before boarding a plane. 
Inescapably, for Greece the political effects of the 2015 refugee crisis were cumulative, as it 
occurred on the footstep of an economic depression. Despite some initial hesitation, Greece 
reaffirmed its devotion to Europe, as an unshakeable national strategic priority and put its 
trust on a European solution to the problem. The defeat of the anti-European option is to 
be welcomed to the extent that a Grexit (from the eurozone, the Schengen or the EU itself) 
could have exposed Greece to unmitigated geostrategic disasters. But it has to be admitted 
that the victory of the European option had more to do with the Greeks’ lack of confidence 
in their own power rather than the strength of the EU. 
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The EU reality remains deeply problematic as it involves forces and dynamics that, left 
unchecked, might further contribute to Greece’s marginalization into an unfavorable Euro-
pean periphery. It is high time for the Greek elites to realize the dangers involved in their 
unquestionable europhilia that often leads to a policy inertia or policy dependency on Brussels. 
They must find the courage, imagination and competency to work for the reform of the EU 
architecture, while understanding that EU membership is not a panacea but, on the contrary, 
it can, depending on national choices, accentuate problems and pathologies. In that regard, 
a good start for Athens would be to work together with other front-line states, such as Italy, 
for a new robust EU immigration and refugee policy. This policy will not only strengthen EU 
integration but it will also rebalance the costs of this integration in favor of southern Europe, 
that, without discounting its own responsibility, has paid the heaviest price for the flaws of 
the euro and the Schengen in recent years. 
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Abstract 
From its inception the European Union has been a preferred destination for refugees fleeing 
violence and persecution, as well as economic migrants from all over the world. This analysis 
explores the political consequences of the mixed migration flows moving from the Middle 
East, through the Balkans on their way to Central and Western Europe in 2015–2016. In addi-
tion to the refugees from the Syrian war, displaced persons originating from other parts of 
the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, and elsewhere were joined in Greece by migrants and 
refugees who were previously settled there, mostly unregistered people, outside the official 
temporary protection and asylum procedures. This migration phenomenon has encouraged 
nationalist political forces in the Western Balkan region and in the EU to portray it as a threat 
to national identity and core values, presenting competing visions about the future of the 
EU itself. Analyzing the extent to which such nationalistic reactions were evident in the coun-
tries along the Balkan mixed migration corridor, a particular focus is placed on the case of 
the Republic of North Mace donia132.
Introduction
From its inception, the European Union (EU), especially the countries which are its leading 
economic and political motors have faced continuous inflows of economic migrants, refu-
gees and asylum seekers. The last large waves of inflows were the people fleeing the wars in 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990’s. Those ended at the turn of the century, to be followed 
by a substantial and steady influx of people from the very same region, seeking asylum sta-
tus, mostly without any justification for political persecution, rather only as attempts to gain 
residence, access to social protection and the labor market. By the time Germany speeded 
up the deportation of these persons with full unjustified asylum claims,133 a new crisis, more 
substantial and with a higher ‘political explosiveness’ emerged. The years of 2015 and 2016 
were marked by a wave of over a million refugees and migrants arriving in the European Union 
through the Western Balkan Route. Although the old continent has always been an attractive 
destination for refugees and economic migrants, this last human influx has created unprece-
dented fears of ‘serious long-term consequences’, inspiring populist political forces to claim 
that it ‘will change the demographic map of Europe’, especially since these people came from 
countries outside Europe, the vast majority of them being Muslim. The bulk of this large num-
ber of people were refugees which made their journey across the Mediterranean, crossing 
from Turkey to the Greek islands, as a result of the after-shocks of the war there that shook 
that entire region. These people were joined within Greece by migrants and asylum seekers 
who were previously settled there, mostly unregistered people, outside the official tempo-
rary protection and asylum procedures. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of Afghani, Iraqi, 
Pakistani, Sudanese, Eritrean and other economic migrants and refugees, joined a massive 
mixed migration flow towards Western Europe.
The Balkan mixed migration corridor extended from the Eastern Mediterranean Route going 
from Turkey through Greece, the countries of former Yugoslavia, continuing through to Hun-
gary in the North and Austria in the West. This route was previously used by displaced persons 
originating from the Middle East, as well as a substantial number of refugees and migrants 
originating from North Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It became more intensively used after 
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the EU visa liberalization for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and North 
Mace donia in 2009–2010, with numbers of people peaking from 2014–2016.
The authors refer to migrants and refugees, two groups that have a different level of assistance 
and protection under international law. Making a distinction between them is not always a 
clear-cut process. A refugee134 is an asylum seeker135 whose claim has been approved. How-
ever, the UN considers people fleeing war or persecution to be refugees even before they offi-
cially receive asylum. The ‘umbrella term’ migrant can refer to refugees, economic migrants136 
and asylum seekers. These groups of migrants can overlap, as in the case of this crisis where 
mixed-migration flows were formed: asylum seekers and economic migrants making their 
way to Western Europe together.
We place our research focus on the refugee and ‘migrant crisis’ along the Balkan human corri-
dor in the period between September 2015 and March 2016, when the Western Balkan Route 
was effectively closed, after North Mace donia sealed its designated entry point for these peo-
ple at the border with Greece, upon the unanimous decision of the EU Council.
The EU itself was at a crossroad, torn between its core democratic values and the protection 
of human rights, the need to reinforce the area of freedom, security and justice in the Union 
and the need to counterbalance nationalists whose leaders took stances ranging from advo-
cating for ‘stronger nation-states’ at the expense of a weaker Union, down to outright racism.
This migration phenomenon has encouraged some of the right-wing political actors, as well 
as others in the region to present it as a threat to national interests, using this momentum 
to promote nationalistic policies, rallying for the ‘defense of the nation.’137 
We place a particular focus on the case of the Republic North Mace donia, presenting an anal-
ysis of the implications of the migration crisis in domestic politics, within the wider context of 
the Balkan mixed migration corridor, which we call the ‘Balkan Human Corridor.’ We analyze 
the salience of the country’s role as ‘border-keeper’ in this context, along with the responses 
of its state and non-state actors.
The State of Play, Initial Policy Responses and Reactions of Civil Society
The registration process of the people arriving at the improvised southern border crossing to 
Greece started as late as June 2015. Previously, waves of people had been allowed to enter 
and leave the country unregistered, in addition to the illegal crossings through other entry 
points in the country. Therefore, the actual number of refugees and immigrants who entered 
Europe between 2014 and 2015 is much higher than the official numbers, amounting to an 
estimated figure of over 1 million people.138
On August 19th 2015, the Government of the Republic of North Mace donia adopted a decision 
for declaring a ‘state of crisis’ on the southern and northern border of the country, based on 
the Law on Crisis Management (‘Official Gazette of Republic of Mace donia’ No.29/2005) due to 
the influx of refugees in the country. With the Parliament’s decision, the crisis was extended 
until June 2016 and was further extended until the end of 2016 at a session shortly before the 
unconstitutional dissolution of Parliament. During October 2016, the Government once again 
decided to extend the declared ‘state of crisis’ until the end of June 2017. 
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The country is a party of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967.139 It is also a state party of the 1954 Con-
vention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1997 European Convention on 
Nationality. 
The basis of the national legal framework for the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers 
is the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection,140 which was adopted in 2003, and amended 
in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015 and 2016 to fully meet high international standards, in line 
with the EU. The law governs the conditions and procedure for granting and cessation of the 
right of asylum to an alien or a stateless person, seeking recognition of the right to asylum, 
as well as the rights and duties of the asylum seekers and persons who have been recognized 
the right of asylum (Article 1, Paragraph 1), and governs also the conditions under which the 
Republic can grant temporary protection as well as the rights and duties of persons under 
temporary protection (Article 1, Paragraph 2). Furthermore, other laws on the various aspects 
of the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers include the Law on Social Protection, Law 
on Foreigners, the Law on Health insurance from 2010 which regulates the healthcare rights 
of the persons recognized as refugees, and others. 
The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection defines an asylum seeker as ‘an alien who 
seeks protection in the Republic of Mace donia, and has submitted an application for recog-
nition of the right to asylum, in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken in 
the procedure for recognition of the right to asylum’ (Article 3, Paragraph 1) and recognizes 
refugee as ‘an alien who, after examination of his claim, has been found to fulfil the require-
ments set out in the Convention of Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the law, that is, a person who 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or his political opinion, is outside the state of his 
nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that state, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the state in which he 
had a habitual place of residence, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it’ (Article 4, Paragraph 1). Persons under Subsidiary Protection are defined in Article 4-a of 
the law as ‘an alien who does not qualify as a recognized refugee but to whom the Republic 
of Mace donia shall recognize the right of asylum and shall allow to remain within its terri-
tory, because substantial grounds exist for believing that if s/he returns to the state of his/
her nationality, or if he is a stateless person, to the state of his previous habitual residence, 
he would face a real risk of suffering serious harms.’
The main amendments of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, made in 2015 and 
2016, were aimed at approximating the law with EU asylum instruments by legislating improve-
ments in the areas of access to territory and asylum procedures, as well as the conditions 
detaining people that are seeking international protection. Amendments include a procedure 
for registration of the intention to submit an asylum application at the border, which pro-
tects asylum-seekers from the risk of refoulement and allows them to enter and be in the 
country legally for a short timeframe of 72 hours, before formally registering their asylum 
application.141 Therefore, refugees were no longer treated as ‘illegal migrants’ and they, and 
the people providing them with transport (at a high price) did not have to be on the run from 
state authorities, making their transit through the country within the 72 hours’ time-frame 
legal, safe and organized.142 
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Ensuring the rights of asylum-seekers and persons who have been granted the right of 
asylum is a responsibility of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (Article 48 of the Law 
on Asylum and Temporary Protection). In this regard, in 2008, (North) Mace donia adopted 
an Integration Strategy for Refugees and Foreigners for the period 2008–2015143 and a cor-
responding National Action Plan (NAP)144. In this context, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy, in partnership with UNHCR, established the Center for Integration of Refugees and 
Foreigners responsible for facilitation of main activities outlined with the NAP. During the 
crisis two transit centers were in operation (Vinojug near Gevgelija/the border with Greece 
and Tabanovce near Kumanovo/the border with Serbia) in addition to the older, already 
operational reception centers located in Vizbegovo and Gazi Baba in the capital Skopje. It is 
noteworthy to mention that the 2008–2015 strategy was primarily aimed at facilitating the 
local integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE) from the region, who were granted 
international protection, without special consideration for refugees from outside the region.145 
In July 2016, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy published a Strategy for Integration of 
Refugees and Foreigners 2017–2027 and the National Action Plan for Integration of Refugees 
2017–2027, which caused a significant domestic political disturbance.
A number of bodies of domestic and international character, including the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), believe that ‘the country does not as yet meet interna-
tional standards for the protection of refugees, and does not qualify as a safe third country’, 
and even advises ‘that other states should refrain from returning or sending asylum seekers 
to the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace donia, until further improvements to address these 
gaps have been made, in accordance with international standards.’146
While the North Mace donian administration attempted to keep out people trying to cross its 
border with Greece, ‘ordinary citizens mobilized to help the refugees by donating food, clothes 
and medicines. In the absence of adequate aid or coordinated government support, donations 
from NGOs and individual volunteers proved life-saving for refugees waiting at the borders.’147
‘Legis’ is one of the few civil society organizations working with migrants and refugees in North 
Mace donia. Mersiha Smailovikj, one of the founders of Legis, provided a complex picture of 
the situation in the country back in 2015: ‘Mace donia has the dramatic record of 30 migrants 
hit by trains while walking along the railway lines they used to get their bearings. In most cases 
it happened in tunnels or on bridges where the victims, even if they saw the train arriving, 
had no room to get away. As Legis we have been looking for solutions, taking as an example 
the fact that in Serbia asylum seekers were not dying on the roads because there was a law 
permitting refugees to travel legally through the country for 72 hours. We applied pressure 
for the same law to be adopted in Mace donia. From June 19, 2015 a law came into operation 
authorizing refugees to circulate in the country for 72 hours and use public transport.’ She 
explains furthermore how the country copes with the situation: ‘In Mace donia, the state does 
not run the refugee camps (while Serbia has many) or provide aid to refugees – this is only 
given by non-governmental organizations. Policemen are not paid overtime. Refugee centers 
are at present empty because the migrants hurry to leave Mace donia. So Mace donia has, in 
effect, no expenses. It even earns a million Euro a month from tickets the refugees buy, the 
price of which has recently doubled. Before the migrants arrived, the trains were empty.’148 
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Legis has published a Public Policy Document on Improvement of Access to Rights and Pro-
tection of Refugees and Migrants with Focus on Vulnerable Groups where they had presented 
their work, their expectations and recommendations.149
The North Mace donian President Gjorge Ivanov presented an analysis of the budget costs of 
the state in the following way: ‘the truth is that Mace donia did not receive any financial assis-
tance from the EU to tackle the crisis, while the insignificant equipment received was largely 
inappropriate and inadequate for the actual needs. State institutions did not receive anything. 
The only donations as funds were allocated to international organizations and NGOs for the 
humanitarian aspect of the crisis. The state has no insight in the money. For the deployment 
of the army and police only we spend over €1.5 million a month. So far, the Republic of Mace-
donia has spent about €30 million from the budget. The reallocation of €10 million from the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funds for 2016, 2017 and 2018 (necessary for 
European reform of North Mace donia) to deal with the ‘migrant crisis’ speaks of the hypocrisy 
of Brussels. It is misleading the public that the Union has met our requirements.’ 
The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Mace donia in its Annual report 
for 2018 indicates that: 
‘In the Republic of Mace donia, the official number of refugees and migrants present in the 
camps was relatively low compared to the number of refugees and migrants, men, women 
and children, traveling on unregulated roads, which has significantly increased compared to 
last year. Refugees and migrants who travel via on unregulated routes are invisible to the 
country’s protection system and are left solely at the ‘mercy’ of smuggling crime groups or on 
their own survival instinct. Regarding the actions undertaken by responsible institutions, an 
improvement has been noted in comparison to the previous years, especially in relation to 
the detection and prosecution of the smuggling groups operating in the country. However, in 
certain instances, responsible institutions have continued the already established practices 
that are contrary to the principles and standards of human rights prescribed in international 
documents.’150
The Impact of the Migration Crisis on National Politics 
Due to the dramatic internal political crisis, the migrant and refugee issue had only a tributary 
role on the North Mace donian political scene between 2015 and 2016. The beginning of 2016 
created conditions for tensions along the Western Balkan Route, especially when the Visegrad 
Group of countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), together with Austria 
and Slovenia decided to close the Western Balkans Route, which prompted North Mace donia 
to follow by shutting down its designated border crossing with Greece and to construct a 
fence along the Southern border, following the Hungarian and Slovenian examples. These 
border closures along the Western Balkan Route gave German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
some maneuvering space, in light of her isolated political position at home and in the EU, due 
to her welcoming policies for these large numbers of people.151 Anti-immigrant and islamo-
phobic groups further flared the rise of the populist right in Germany, Austria and Hungary. 
 
The North Mace donian-Greek crossing was in the focus of international attention again in 
March 2016 when the refugees confronted the border guards at Idomeni, sparking a bilateral 
diplomatic dispute. Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos accused the North Mace donian 
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authorities of ill treatment of refugees while they were attempting to cut the fence and cross 
over through the crossing near Idomeni from the Greek side.152 North Mace donian Presi-
dent Gjorge Ivanov accused Greece of irresponsibly channeling more than a million people, 
including as Greek Defense Minister Panos Kammenos stated: possible ‘jihadists’ to Western 
and Northern Europe.153 
Tensions decreased when the EU officially decided to close the Western Balkans corridor 
and the EU-Turkey agreement was reached. The number of migrants passing through North 
Mace donia as a transit country dropped dramatically. 
The North Mace donian political scene lacked a substantial public debate during the peak of 
this crisis because of three main reasons: the domestic context, the cacophony of opposing 
positions of the two ‘blocks’ of EU countries plus the ones from EU institutions, and public 
opinion. 
The Domestic Political Context
The last North Mace donian political crisis started at the beginning of 2015 with a wiretapping 
scandal, when then opposition leader of Social Democratic Union of Mace donia (SDSM) and 
later Prime Minister Zoran Zaev publicly released a large number of secretly recorded phone 
conversations by the Ministry of Interior, which involved the highest-ranking government 
officials, including the former Prime Minister and leader of VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Mace-
donian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Mace donian National Unit) Nikola 
Gruevski. Following an array of lawsuits, large protests and political struggle, the so-called 
Przino Agreement was reached, with the assistance of the US and the EU.154 Nevertheless, 
the internal turmoil continued, reaching its pinnacle on 27 April 2017 when the North Mace-
donian Parliament was violently stormed by angry protestors, and many members of Parlia-
ment from the opposition were physically attacked, while the police was not intervening for 
several hours. Therefore, the country was in a state of severe political crisis from the end of 
2014 until June 2017 when a new Government was formed with Zoran Zaev as Prime Minister, 
taking the ‘migrant crisis’ out of the stage of prime public interest. Certainly, political opponents 
used the ‘migrant crisis’ as an opportunity to attack each other but only as attempts to gain 
public attention as such, rather than manifesting real difference in concepts and ideologies. 
The main reason why the theoretically leftist opposition was posturing, rather than actively 
opposing the government’s and the President’s decisions, was the strong support of public 
opinion to the so-called ‘protective measures’ taken by the state. These meant facilitating a 
transit of these people through the country as fast as possible in the first stage, while at the 
later stages, reducing the inflows of people through quotas coordinated with countries to the 
North along the route, and finally, shutting down the entry as requested by a joint decision 
of the EU Council.
Within the country, certain actions were rejected by the opposition simply because the gov-
erning party suggested them. The main opposition party at that time, criticized the amend-
ing the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, claiming it would not solve the problem of 
abysmal conditions in the refugee centers.155 However, they did not do more to stop or slow 
down the parliamentary legislative process on this issue. Furthermore, the opposition criti-
cized the decision to build a border fence in November-December 2015, arguing that it will not 
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solve the problem,156 but they did not protest against the building the fence once construc-
tion started, nor did they go against the decision to build another parallel fence in February 
2016. When several NGO’s were signing a petition demanding that the fence be removed in 
March 2016,157 the conservative media accused Zoran Zaev’s SDSM of being behind that ini-
tiative,158 a thesis that seems very far-fetched, as the opposition focused its energy on issues 
that would bring them more fresh votes, rather than possibly inflicting political damage on 
itself (as the public opinion polls demonstrate below).
The North Mace donian political scene witnessed the migration crisis (2015–2016) as a hori-
zontal political issue on which the government had no substantial political obstacles, across 
the party spectrum, to manage the transit of migrants along the short corridor. Ironically, 
the largest political disturbance related to the migrant and refugee crisis occurred well after 
the peak of the crisis, and it was used by the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE (which was a 
governing party during the peak of the crisis) mainly as a short-term proxy issue to spur anti- 
government sentiment, rather than a substantial policy standpoint.
The EU Institutions and the Crisis
Different groups of actors- the European Commission (EC), Germany’s policies (supported by 
Greece) and the Visegrad group, emitted messages which were conflicting at worst and dis-
sonant at best. This revealed a striking lack of capacity, cooperation and solidarity, as well as 
necessary communication between the countries along the route.159 The EC adopted a plan 
of action for immediate implementation, on how to cooperate, and what to achieve collect-
ively to better manage the flows of migrants and refugees, especially regarding quotas for 
receiving asylum applicants, reception capacities and border management.160 However there 
was serious push-back by the Visegrad group supported by Austria, Slovenia and Croatia.
The migrants did not consider the countries along the Western Balkan Route as their final 
destination. However, even as transit stops, Western Balkan countries were trying to limit the 
number of incoming persons, on the request of some recipient countries at the end of the 
corridor. As the numbers of people coming through the corridor increased, pressure from 
the latter group of countries increased, ultimately leading to a domino effect of border clos-
ures and increasing restrictions on movement.161 These countries refused to participate in 
any proposed mechanism for influx management which made a mutually acceptable solution 
for migrant management by the EU an even more distant prospectus. 
Thus, this crisis has created two ‘ideological blocks.’ A part of EU member states supported 
managed migration, which was a German proposal.162 The other group stood in support to 
the ‘Visegrad Four’ that proposed closing borders along the Western Balkan Route.
Hungary at the beginning of September 2015 witnessed thousands of people that were blocked 
at Keleti train station in Budapest for several days. The Hungarian right-wing government led by 
Viktor Orban had many attempts to contain and restrain migrants in camps once they entered 
Hungary. However, the migrants decided to move towards the Austrian border, following the 
so-called ‘March of Hope’, as people reclaimed their mobility and filled a two-lane motorway 
marching westward.163 Throughout just one weekend, at least ten thousand people arrived in 
Germany164 as the events in Hungary pushed the German government to declare, on 5 Sep-
tember 2015, that it would not close its borders to those wishing to seek asylum. Subsequently, 
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buses were organized to shuttle people from Hungary, across Austria, to Germany165. Hungary 
closed the border to Serbia immediately afterwards, and the migrants were prevented from 
crossing by a massive fence and an enormous number of security forces. The Hungarian deci-
sion to reintroduce border controls forced refugees coming up from Serbia to steer through 
Croatia which created a politically manufactured humanitarian crisis at the Bapska-Berkasovo 
crossing on the Serbo-Croatian border in the second half of September 2015.166 
The state of crisis in summer 2015 in North Mace donia resulted with measures undertaken 
by the army that was deployed and in November 2015 began to erect a fence along the bor-
der with Greece for limitation of migrant influx. The bilateral tensions between Greek-North 
Mace donian relations were a reflection of the divisions between the so-called ‘Merkel vs Orban’ 
positions. They were also reflected at other points of bilateral conflicts along the Western 
Balkan corridor, such as the Serbian-Croatian tensions. 
At the beginning of 2016, the Schengen Area was under intense pressure and some border 
controls, albeit partially, were restored.167 Austria and Slovenia supported the block which 
advocated for the closure of borders along the Western Balkan Route, receiving support by 
the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk.
Western Balkan countries increasingly coordinated migrant policy and action, both logistically 
and politically. In November 2015, Croatia, North Mace donia, and Serbia took their first joint 
restrictive measure; they began to allow transit only to migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq. This was a result of Slovenia’s request to redirect migrants from non-war-torn countries 
back to Croatia.168 
Restricting the numbers of migrants became a trend at the beginning of 2016 in many coun-
tries throughout the EU. Slovenia and Croatia adjusted their policies and introduced restric-
tion on migrants by limiting entry only to those who intend to seek asylum in Austria and 
Germany.169 
Austria put a cap on the number of refugees: it limited the number of asylum claims to 37,500 
in 2016, and a total of 127,500 up to 2019. The latter number represents 1.5 percent of Austria’s 
population of 8.5 million.170 Afterwards, Austria decided to limit the number of new arrivals, 
created a plan for repatriating over 50,000 asylum seekers of three years and to construct 
new fences along its border with Slovenia. Finally, in February 2016, Austria introduced new 
measures for limiting the number of asylum applications to 80 per day171, and the number 
of transits to Germany to 3,200 per day. This measure followed the meeting between the 
heads of police services of Austria, Croatia, North Mace donia, Serbia and Slovenia in Zagreb, 
whereby collaboration was reached to significantly reduce migration flow to the greatest pos-
sible extent172. This was an introduction to the closure of the Western Balkans Route. At this 
meeting several other measures were adopted, such as standardization of migrant registration 
(unification of form and procedure) and allowing entry only on the basis of refugees fleeing 
war zones and in need of international protection (basically refugees from Iraq and Syria).
Following these decisions, North Mace donia passed new controls that restricted Afghan ref-
ugees from crossing its border. As well, Iraqis and Syrians would now be subject to further 
regulations, which included language tests to try to determine the person’s city, region and 
country of origin.173 North Mace donia explained these heightened measures as a response 
to the decisions taken by countries further along the route.174
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North Mace donia decided to construct a second fence along the border on February 8, 2016.175 
It was positively accepted by the countries of the Visegrad Group that offered their support 
for the country and sent police forces in late 2015 to the border with Greece, making a para-
doxical case of policemen from several EU states protecting a border crossing from the side 
of a non-EU state from people coming from a EU and Schengen zone state.
Austria hosted a summit in Vienna at the end of February 2016 for the ministers of foreign 
affairs and ministers of interior of Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Western Balkan coun-
tries. Greece was not invited, and in a clear sign of diplomatic protest, it called its Ambassador 
back to Athens on consultations. Official Athens also added that this meeting was ‘nonfriendly 
and anti-European’.176 The European Commission also criticized the restrictions along the 
Balkan Route ‘as unlawful and contrary to an EU-wide approach.’ Austria’s foreign minister, 
on the other hand, heavily criticized Germany’s refugee policy, calling it contradictory. ‘Last 
year, Austria accepted per capita twice as many asylum applications as Germany,’ Austrian 
Foreign Minister Kurz said, adding that ‘it won’t happen a second time.’177
That dramatic period was also marked by a meeting of EU interior ministers in Brussels to 
discuss the crisis, at which point the EU Commissioner for Migration warned that, ‘the EU 
has ten more days to reduce the number of migrants or else there is a risk the whole system 
will completely break down.’178 The following days Slovenia capped the number of migrants 
allowed to enter the country at 580, a step followed by Croatia and Serbia. In the last days 
of February 2016, there were approximately 500 new arrivals in North Mace donia. The new 
entry restrictions quickly aggravated the already tense situation at the Greek-North Mace-
donian border, which culminated in protests on 29 February 2016. Migrants stranded on the 
Greek side of the border broke the barricade and were quickly barraged with teargas by the 
North Mace donian police.179 During the following days the border was entirely closed, giving 
impetus to the EU-Turkey summit, and the official shut down of the Western Balkan Route, 
with a unanimous vote of the EU Council.
After the closure of the Western Balkan Route, inflows were significantly reduced. The Inter-
national Organization for Immigration reported that 172,000 migrants reached Europe by sea 
in 2017 compared to 363,000 in 2016.180 
The EU Council’s request for the closure of the North Mace donian-Greek designated crossing 
point gave the domestic managers of the processes a solid political and societal legitimacy, 
that they have done an efficient job in implementing an important requirement of the EU, 
much to the distaste of liberal political and academic circles throughout Europe. 
Public Opinion and Media
At the peak of the crisis, in October 2015, a survey conducted by the Institute for Political 
Research – Skopje (IPRS), showed that the majority of respondents (66.2 percent supported 
it, while 25.4 percent opposed) supported building a fence on the southern border.181 Addi-
tionally, citizens of North Mace donia evaluated EU’s handling of this crisis as highly negative, 
as reported by the public opinion poll of the International Republican Institute from January 
2016, when 59 percent of the respondents answered that the effects of EU’s handling of the 
crisis on North Mace donia are negative. That same poll also showed that 28 percent of the 
respondents thought that the government is providing ‘too much support to refugees’, while 
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another 37 percent responded that the government support is ‘sufficient.’182 According to 
Balkan Barometer 2017: Public Opinion Survey,183 only 7 percent of the Mace donians viewed 
refugees as the most important problem that Southeast Europe was facing at that moment. 
This is a significant drop, compared to the Balkan Barometer 2016: Public Opinion Survey,184 
according to which 18 percent of the North Mace donians believed that refugees were the 
most important problem, which was more than four times more than the regional average 
of 4 percent. In general, the 2017 survey concludes that attitudes towards refugees are less 
hostile than before. 
The regional average shows that the proportion of the population with a negative (40 per-
cent) and a neutral (41 percent) attitude towards refugees is equal. Compared with 2015, 
when the problem of refugees was significantly more relevant, there has been a change in 
attitude towards them: the number of those who regard them as a threat to their economy 
has decreased (from 47 to 40 percent). Nevertheless, according to the 2017 survey, North 
Mace donia was the only country where a majority of respondents found that refugees had 
a negative impact on the economy. In North Mace donia, 57 percent of the population gave 
negative responses to the question ‘What do you think about refugees coming to live and 
work in your city? Is it good or bad for your economy?’, compared to Albania with 29 percent, 
Kosovo with 17, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 44, Montenegro with 37, Croatia with 43, and 
Serbia with 47 percent. Only 8 percent believed that refugees are good for the economy, 
whereas 29 percent were neutral. In 2015, 66 percent had considered the arrival of migrants 
to be bad for the economy. 
Furthermore, the survey established respondents from North Mace donia as the least sup-
portive of affirmative government action in favor of displaced persons and refugees. Only 
47 percent of the respondents from North Mace donia agreed that the Government should 
provide affirmative measures to promote opportunities for equal access of displaced per-
sons and refugees, whereas this number was 74 percent in Albania, 89 percent in Kosovo, 
 82 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 75 percent in Montenegro, 67 percent in Croatia, 
and 71 percent in Serbia. Similarly, only 43 percent supported affirmative measures for dis-
placed persons and refugees when applying for a public-sector job, compared to Albania with 
68 percent, Kosovo with 79 percent, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 81 percent, Montenegro 
with 71 percent, Croatia with 54 percent, and Serbia with 64 percent. Furthermore, North 
Mace donia had the lowest support for better housing conditions for displaced persons and 
refugees compared to the other countries of the region. Only 51 percent believed that the 
Government should do more in order to ensure better housing conditions, compared to 
Albania with 77 percent, Kosovo with 90 percent, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 84 percent, 
Montenegro with 72 percent, Croatia with 61 percent, and Serbia with 65 percent.
Such negative public perceptions of migrants and refugees are tied to the characteristics of 
the country’s political culture, and thus are highly resistant to snap changes. Luckily, North 
Mace donia does not have significant far-right populist movements which would actively work 
on spreading anti-migrant sentiments and propaganda. 
As Marina Tuneva notes, during this crisis, the media poorly fulfilled its role to publish and 
broadcast relevant, topical news while also reflecting on the actions of government. ‘Media 
covered and interpreted the events in ways that revealed deep political divides within their 
ranks. Reports by outlets on one side of the divide could be seen as legitimizing government 
policies and helping spread the message that refugees did not belong in the country’. ‘On 
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the other side, several media outlets voiced criticism of the government’s policies towards 
refugees, while presenting the main problem in the frame of humanitarian crisis and the suf-
fering of the refugees. Human-interest stories in these outlets in effect called for vulnerable 
groups to be helped. These media to some extent presented the views of civil society, unlike 
the pro-government media which portrayed NGOs mostly as groups that opposed the govern-
ment’s efforts to deal with the crisis and contributed to the endangerment of national secu-
rity. Media in both groups, however, often ran news articles that lacked information needed 
for a good understanding of the context.’185 
The Strategy for Integration of Refugees and Foreigners 2017–2027 and the 
National Action Plan for Integration of Refugees 2017–2027
Ironically, the largest political disturbance related to the migrant and refugee crisis occurred 
well after the peak of 2015–2016. Namely, the new North Mace donian Government lead by 
SDSM, i. e., the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, drafted the Strategy for Integration of 
Refugees and Foreigners 2017–2027 and the National Action Plan for Integration of Refugees 
2017–2027, which were presented to the general public for comments before the final ver-
sion was approved by the Assembly. According to the Ministry, the Strategy was drafted in 
coordination with UNHCR and other relevant institutions. It was aimed at dealing with four 
significant areas for asylum seekers: housing, education, employment, and integration, revis-
ing shortcomings of the previous strategy and improving the integration process. 
The draft Strategy and Action Plan were met with severe antagonism from VMRO-DPMNE, the 
leading opposition party. It accused the ruling SDSM of threatening the overall security, the 
economy and the health system of the country with the permanent settlement of 150,000 to 
200,000 migrants on its territory. ‘These strategic documents will mean enormous costs total-
ling billions of Euros in the next ten years for accommodation and construction of buildings 
and settlements for migrants. That means enormous costs in the field of employment, social 
programmes, and funds that North Mace donia does not have any resources for.’ stressed 
VMRO-DPMNE MP Vlatko Gjorcev, adding that North Mace donia would be transformed from 
a transit country into a final destination for refugees.186 Furthermore, the VMRO-DPMNE 
pointed out that granting citizenship to tens of thousands of migrants and their permanent 
settlement would cause serious distortion of the labour market and significantly worsen the 
already difficult situation regarding the high unemployment, which has forced many North 
Mace donian citizens to move to other countries in order to secure work and livelihood.187
The Government categorically disputed these accusations, claiming that VMRO-DPMNE was 
trying to halt reforms by unfounded accusations and false news. According to SDSM, the 
Strategy was based on international standards and the Convention on the Rights of Refugees, 
which North Mace donia has ratified. The party said it had a document that serves as a road-
map and contains no binding acts concerning any ministry or institution. According to SDSM, 
‘the draft Strategy, which VMRO-DPMNE is abusing in its attempt to fuel fear and scare the 
citizens, is just a continuation of the same strategy for the period 2009–2015, adopted by the 
former government led by VMRO-DPMNE’.188 Furthermore, SDSM pointed out that the num-
ber of migrants interested in permanently settling on the territory of the Republic of North 
Mace donia was negligible. Official statistics support this stance. Namely, the Helsinki Com-
mittee recently published a report stating that, in the Republic of Mace donia, in the period 
from 2015 to June 2017, a total of 2243 requests for granting the right to asylum had been 
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submitted by 2,717 persons, only five of which had been granted official refugee status, and 
only 11 subsidiary protection.189 This shows that North Mace donia is merely a transit country 
for refugees, and hardly a country of final destination.
The public debate regarding the Strategy and the Action Plan instigated numerous instances 
of xenophobic hate speech towards refugees, and several civic initiatives organizing citizens 
petitions against migrants were set into motion. These civic groups were inspired and exploited 
by political forces in their populist hunt for votes. Furthermore, following the deadline for 
submitting comments on the Strategy and the Action Plan, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy reported that it had received identical comments from several VMRO-DPMNE-led munic-
ipalities, stating that accepting refugees and foreigners in North Mace donia ‘will destabilize 
the region and the country as a whole.’190
The opposition’s disapproval of the Strategy culminated when VMRO-DPMNE filed an inter-
pellation motion against Minister of Labour and Social Policy Mila Carovska, who, according 
to VMRO-DPMNE, had consulted neither citizens nor municipalities when drafting the stra-
tegic documents.191 The interpellation did not pass in the Assembly. As the local elections 
scheduled for 15 October 2017 were approaching, twelve VMRO-DPMNE-led municipalities 
announced their decisions to call for a referendum for the citizens to voice their opinion 
regarding a permanent settlement of migrants in their respective municipalities. The deci-
sions of the municipalities to hold referendums were annulled by the State Inspectorate for 
Local Self-Government Units.192
It is noteworthy to mention that, even though the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy ini-
tially planned for the Strategy for Integration of Refugees and Foreigners 2017–2027 and the 
National Action Plan for Integration of Refugees 2017–2027 to be adopted by the end of 2017, 
they have not been approved by the Assembly to this day.
Nationalist Backlashes in the East and West
The crisis has affected national politics along the Balkan migrant and refugee corridor and 
European politics in general, creating a momentum to present the wave of migration as a 
threat to national interests and ideals, cultural attitudes, social structures and demograph-
ical balance. 
As Charles Kupchan states, Europe has ‘historically embraced more ethnic than civic approaches 
to nationhood, unlike the United States.’193 This is clearly visible during the ‘migrant crisis’ when 
leaders of Eastern European states like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic 
have all expressed a strong preference for non-Muslim migrants.194 Slovakia came out with 
a statement that it will only accept Christian arrivals and that Muslims should not move to 
Slovakia because they will not integrate easily with the country’s majority Christian popula-
tion.195 This wave of statements was additionally encouraged by Hungary, whose Prime Min-
ister Viktor Orban said that his country did not want to accept Muslim refugees and he did 
not want to create an impression that Hungary is ready to accept everybody. According to 
Orban, ‘the moral, human thing is to make clear: please don’t come.’196 Poland was one more 
country in a row that encouraged Syrian Christians to apply for asylum because ‘religious 
background will have impact on the refugee status applications.’197 The selection of migrants 
based on religion as main criteria is an openly discriminatory policy, and a strong indicator 
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of the growing nationalism. The issue about Muslim migrants was one of the key topics for 
debate at national elections, debating on ‘how many people should be accepted’ and what 
the most suitable EU mechanisms for dealing with the crisis are. 
The 2016 French presidential elections were affected by the ‘migrant crisis’, strengthening the 
position of Marine Le Pen’s National Front. Even incumbent French President Macron stood 
for controlled migration. 
The pressure over this issue made changes to German policies, which initially promoted its 
‘welcoming culture’ for the migrant policies. In later stages, in order to avoid the breakup of 
government ‘due to immigration fight’ with her coalition partner, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
reached a compromise on immigration policy with Christian Social Union (CSU). The deal pro-
posed new screening at the Germany-Austria border to ‘prevent asylum seekers whose asylum 
procedures are the responsibility of other EU countries from entering the country.’ A network 
of ‘transit centers’ would serve as processing points from which ineligible migrants would then 
be sent back to relevant countries, but only if those countries consent. If those countries do not 
agree, Germany’s rejected migrants would be sent to Austria, ‘on the basis of an agreement.’198 
Certainly, this ‘deal’ had to do much more with political maneuvering and crisis public relations 
than substance. Germany’s so called ‘open door policy’ maintained cautious support at the 
last elections in 2017, although damaged on its right flank. Chancellor Angela Merkel at her 
first speech at the beginning of latest mandate said that ‘there is no question that Germany is 
historically Christian and Jewish. It is also true that Islam has in the meanwhile become part 
of Germany’, acknowledging that some Germans find that hard to accept.199 
The Italian elections campaign of 2018 was heavily based on narratives connected to migra-
tion and refugees. The former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi claimed that there are 600,000 
illegal migrants living in Italy who are a ‘social time bomb’,200 promising mass deportations. 
The new Italian government mounted heavy criticism ‘to Brussels’ for the way it dealt with the 
‘migrant crisis’, promising to roll back liberal policies and ‘take back control’ over the migration 
movements through its land and seas.
Generally, the ‘migrant crisis’ has created numerous divisions along Europe. It affected internal 
divisions in the European states and activated populist parties. After the ‘empty chair’ crisis 
in 1965 and the Euro crisis in 2009, the issue of these mixed migration flows has created the 
deepest divisions between EU Member States. The political leaders aimed to preserve the 
‘core European values’, disagreeing on the hierarchy of values in need of protection and the 
methodology how to proceed, even if something is vaguely agreed.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore the different historical experience with immigration in 
post-communist countries compared to Western member states of the EU. After World War II, 
Western European countries took in large numbers of non-Christian migrants from multiethnic 
backgrounds, particularly from former colonies. France saw an influx of Algerians fleeing the 
civil war from 1954 to 1962. In Britain, immigrants arrived from the Indian subcontinent and 
the Caribbean. In general, from the 1960s onward, the majority migrants to Western Europe 
came from outside the Continent, including people arriving as guest workers.201 
Post-communist countries, on the other hand, historically have had fewer migrants of diverse 
ethnicities, religions and cultures. And since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there have been 
no large waves of non-European migrants to Eastern Europe.202 These circumstances affected 
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the population of Eastern Europe to have less contact with people from different ethnic, lin-
guistic, religious and cultural backgrounds, making populist parties sound ‘relevant’ when 
presenting migrants as a ‘serious threat for the counties and its nations.’ What none of these 
populists can answer is how their societies will maintain the demographic power for their 
needed economic and societal development, in the context of their rapidly aging populations 
and galloping brain-drain towards the West. 
The second reason anti-immigration parties have a stronger presence in post-communist 
Europe is that those parties typically reject liberal social values that are more prevalent in 
Western member states and instead support Christian-based values.203 The re-emergence of 
these values in politics is related to the fall of the communist ideology, a sacred victory for 
these newly re-established democracies. 
As Ivan Krastev says, just three decades ago ‘solidarity’ was the symbol of Eastern Europe.204 
Today it suffers from disappointment, distrust, demography and democracy. He points out 
that ‘faced with an influx of migrants and haunted by economic insecurity, many Eastern Euro-
peans feel betrayed by their hope that joining the European Union would mean the begin-
ning of prosperity and an end to crisis, while many government leaders fear that the only 
way to regain political support is by showing that you care for your own, and not a whit for 
the aliens.’205 So, at the core of moral panic provoked by influx of migrants lies fear of Islam, 
terrorism, rising criminality and a general anxiety over the unfamiliar. In addition to this, as 
Krastev points out, the demographic panic is one of the least discussed factors shaping East-
ern Europeans’ behavior because the alarm of ‘ethnic disappearance’ could be felt in many 
of the small nations of Eastern Europe.
To paraphrase Krastev, while the issue of large influx of people politically divided Western 
European societies, the very same issue united many in Central and Eastern European states 
against the prospects of these people coming to their countries. Whereas one in seven Ger-
mans found a way to volunteer or assist the people coming in their country, many of the lat-
ter group of countries saw volunteers for the exact opposite.206
Conclusions
The ‘migrant crisis’ of 2015–2016 has created numerous internal and external divisions in 
countries along the corridor, from its starting points, up to the receiving end in Europe. These 
divisions have been manipulated to the effects of strengthening of populist forces that are 
threatening the core values of the European Union. The clear divisions among member states 
of the Union on this issue point to deeper cleavages in political cultures, with strategic con-
sequences, and a continuing cacophony about which political values take precedence, high-
lighting competing visions for the future of the EU.
These anti-immigration sentiments gave wind in the sails of nationalists in the EU, sending 
along signals to their Western Balkan counterparts to follow suite. The phenomenon of migra-
tion was presented as a threat to national identity, interests and ideals, cultural attitudes, social 
structures and way of life. Such sentiments and policies, in general, have stronger standing 
in post-communist countries compared to Western EU member states. This became clearly 
visible when leaders of Eastern European states like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic all expressed distaste for receiving these people, whereas for the numbers that they 
would agree to host, a strong preference for non-Muslim migrants was openly displayed. 
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The (North) Mace donian political scene witnessed the migration crisis (2015–2016) as a hori-
zontal political issue on which the government had no substantial political obstacles, across 
the party spectrum, to manage the transit of migrants along the short corridor. Ironically, the 
largest political disturbance related to the migrant and refugee crisis occurred well after the 
peak of the crisis, and it was used by the new opposition mainly as a short-term proxy issue 
to spur anti-government sentiment, rather than a substantial policy standpoint.
Regarding the media, as Marina Tuneva notes, ‘very little attention was given to the background 
of stories or to push factors that were driving the population flows. A paucity of information 
from state bodies, lack of human resources, and journalists’ lack of specialized knowledge and 
experience have been mentioned as some underlying causes of these defects … the capacity 
of Mace donian media to provide quality journalism in general is hampered by heavy influ-
ence from powerful political and economic actors, including the government. These factors, 
together with the commercialization of the media, combine to worsen the overall very sick 
state of Mace donian journalism.’207 
Public opinion which is a reflection of the country’s political culture maintains a frightened 
and uninformed view on incoming migration, a topic on which all political and societal stake-
holders need to address with an honest, analytical and objective approach, breaking harmful 
stereotypes, prejudice and daily propaganda.
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Abstract
Serbia has never been the chosen final destination for refugees from Iraq, Syria and other 
beleaguered countries like Afghanistan, which have embarked on the so-called Balkan 
route since 2015. But following the closure of this route in March 2016, between 3,500 and 
4,500 migrants have found themselves living in Serbia. This chapter analyses the composi-
tion and changing size of the migrant population, looking at the legal status of individuals 
and migratory paths taken. It moves on to examine reactions to the migrants by the state 
authorities and the Serbian public, together with the institutional response manifested in 
legal measures and infrastructural facilities, as well as, the political context in which related 
decisions were taken. Specific attention is given to the situation of refugee children, who 
attend state schools in Serbia. The analysis reveals a pragmatic and quite flexible admin-
istrative response to the refugees’ situation. However, the remarkable level of tolerance is 
largely related to awareness that the great majority of those stranded in Serbia are doing 
everything in their power to continue their journey into central and northern Europe – that 
is to leave Serbia.
Introduction
From 2015, until the corridor was blocked in March 2016, nearly 700,000 people from the 
Middle East travelled along the so-called Balkan route from Greece to central and northern 
Europe. Though the Balkan route was formally closed, this should not be taken to imply a com-
plete barricade of the Western Balkans: numerous paths continue to exist despite restrictive 
movement policies. It was a specific, state-controlled route that had emerged in mid-2015, 
and which wound its way through North Macedonia and Serbia to the European Union (EU), 
that was officially closed after the EU-Turkey Agreement in March 2016. The existence of this 
special route had allowed for a ‘partial suspension of the European migration regime, signi-
fying that people otherwise not authorized to do so could exceptionally travel across a num-
ber of borders in a relatively safe and quick manner’. Since the authorities put an end to this 
‘safe and quick manner’, several thousand of migrants have been stranded in Serbia, without 
realistic possibilities of continuing their journeys in a legal way.208
In this chapter, I firstly attempt to give an accurate picture of the size of this migrant pop-
ulation and to shed light on its composition in terms of nationality, gender, and age. Next, 
I explore the migrants’ situation in Serbia and the reaction of the host society. In trying to cope 
with the ‘refugee crisis’, Serbia is very much learning the hard way – though experience. The 
country has chosen a more humane way of dealing with migrants than have its neighboring 
countries Bulgaria and Hungary. A lot of questions can be asked about this stance.
1. To what extent have the state authorities’ decisions been affected by Serbia’s process of 
rapprochement with the EU? Do they come from the Serbian legislature itself?
2. Does Serbia’s policy influence migration into the country? Why, for example, did a rela-
tively high number of migrants from Iran register in Serbia in 2018?
3. Were there specific Serbian foreign policy acts related to migration?
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As well as, addressing such policy questions, I illustrate the very practical ways in which the 
state has been prepared to shelter, nurture and help migrant people. The role of the numer-
ous NGOs working in this policy and social field is also considered. It is significant that, since 
September 2017, most migrant children have been attending state schools. In a micro case 
study, the article explores how local communities have interacted with the newcomers.
At the height of the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 and 2016, fairly intensive research efforts were 
made, on which this study builds. The dynamics of the Balkan route have been explored 
ethnographically in two sample places, Preševo and Ljubljana.209 Scholars have investigated 
the emergence and closure of the route and its legal and political ambivalences. They have 
exposed the ‘violent European border regime’ that prevailed.210 North Macedonia and Serbia 
were deeply implicated in this regime, though, before the corridor was established, they had 
veered between humanitarian efforts and concern with securitization.211 There have been 
analyses of civil society organizations with a focus on attempts made at cooperation with the 
authorities in 2015; and Serbian migration legislation and politics have been explored in terms 
of how they produce migrant ‘illegality’.212 One consequence of this illegalization process has 
been the replication of borders far away from the actual state border.213 Between 2015 and 
2017, organized responses to the migration movements were transformed through a policy 
of ‘learning by doing’ which was adapted to local situations.214 During the ‘long migration sum-
mer’ of 2015, the Hungarian and Serbian governments embarked on increasingly different 
policy paths.215 In Serbia, there has been a great deal of attention paid to questions about 
human rights, the asylum system, and unaccompanied minors.216 Last, but not least, the ‘ref-
ugee crisis’ has been linked analytically to the migrant situation before this surge occurred.217
I build on this body of research and focus on the situation that has existed since the closure 
of the Balkan route, and especially on developments in 2018. This period of aftermath has 
been characterized by the finding of alternative routes, reduced migration flows, and a longer 
retention of people on Serbian soil. The questions I address in my discussion of these new 
circumstances include: 
1. How has Serbia acted since the borders were closed?
2. Has there been a change in the legal status of the migrants?
3. How has interaction between the state and the variously involved NGOs developed, and 
how strong is the state’s dependence on these numerous organizations and their finan-
cial and human capacities?
4. Has longer retention of migrants had an effect on the hospitality shown by the host society? 
5. With thousands of migrants staying within its borders for more than a year, is Serbia con-
tinuing to be no more than a transit country? 
The empirical basis for what follows consists of twelve semi-structured interviews conducted 
with different stakeholders and representatives from participating NGOs, and fourteen infor-
mal interviews with migrants, all of which took place between 23 February and 26 April 2018 
in greater Belgrade. The first of these were at the Rade Drainac primary school in Borča, a 
suburb just to the north of Belgrade. Those present were the school principal, Slavica Zajić 
Smiljanić, the teaching supervisor, Marina Todić, and a social worker seconded to the school. 
After that, I had the help of an interpreter, Snežana Mottaghi, while I talked informally with 
seven Farsi-speaking students, mostly from Afghanistan. Marina Todić participated in these 
interviews.
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In March 2018 an interview with Hans Friedrich Schodder, head of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Serbia was conducted, along with Mirjana Milenk-
ovski from the UNHCR public information unit, at the organization’s headquarters in Belgrade. 
Additionally, interviews were conducted with Nataša Markovska from the non- governmental 
Ecumenical Humanitarian Organization (Ekumenska humanitarna organizacija, EHO), a Christian 
organization focusing on poverty reduction, the development of inter-church cooperation, the 
promotion of human rights, and the building of a cohesive civil society in Serbia; with Stevan 
Tatalović, an information officer at the NGO Info Park, a refugee centre in Belgrade special-
izing in protection, information, communication, and education services, and at the national 
level a researcher for the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD); and 
with Vladimir Lukić, a social worker at the Asylum Centre in Krnjača, an urban development 
adjacent to Borča, (also in greater Belgrade). In the course of a one-day visit to this asylum 
centre, I interviewed seven migrants. In April 2018, I spoke informally with representatives 
from several different NGOs: Samuel Horn from Refugee Aid Serbia, Marija Tomić from the 
Ana and Valde Divac Foundation, Senka Škero Koprivica from the Belgrade Centre for Human 
Rights, Jana Stojanović from the Asylum Protection Centre, and Snežana Mottaghi from the 
Swiss Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA).
In addition to this material, UNHCR reports were used, and documents from the following 
organizations: the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, Serbia; Médecins Sans Fron-
tières; Amnesty International; the International Rescue Committee; the Serbian Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technological Development; and the United Nations Development 
Programme. Finally materials were consulted from several regional non-governmental and 
civil society organizations, such as the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights; Info Park; Atina; 
Are You Syrious?; the Asylum Protection Centre; Group 484; Refugee Aid Serbia; and the Ana 
and Vlade Divac Foundation.
The Size and Legal Status of Serbia’s Migrant Population
Most migrants did not perceive Serbia as their country of asylum. Even if they have sometimes 
lived in the country for years, they see it as a place of transit. On 30 December 2018, according 
to the UNHCR, there were 4,468 refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants in Serbia. Of these 
94 percent (4,205 individuals) were accommodated in sixteen centers administered by the 
Serbian government.218 Besides these, there were inner city facilities in Belgrade accommo-
dating migrants, almost exclusively men, who had recently arrived. The inner city is the first 
stop both for those who seek accommodation and registration, and for those who do not 
want to be registered and intend to move about irregularly.219 
The same source records over 206 migrants, again mostly men, known to be living outside 
the centers. These included some hundreds in Belgrade city, and smaller groups near Serbia’s 
borders with Croatia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The number of new arrivals is 
currently a few hundred per week; in November 2018, the UNHCR and its partners counted 
788 newly-arrived migrants in Serbia. Up to the autumn of 2018, most came from Iran, but 
this seems to have been a temporary trend directly linked to the abolition of the visa require-
ment for Iranians and the introduction of direct flights from Tehran to Belgrade three times 
a week. The pattern changed after 8 October 2018, when the Serbian government decided 
to reintroduce visas for all those coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran. A month later, the 
82
most numerous newly-arriving migrants came from Afghanistan (44 percent), Iraq (21 percent), 
and Pakistan (9 percent)220. This compares with the August 2018 figures of Afghanis (37 per-
cent), Pakistanis (17 percent), Iranians (24 percent), Iraqis (9 percent), Bangladeshis (6 percent), 
Syrians (1 percent), and migrants from other countries (6 percent).221
Most migrants coming to Serbia continue to arrive via North Macedonia and Bulgaria.222 Although 
Bulgaria is an EU member, migrants do not perceive it as an end destination. They are wary of 
that country’s alleged pushback policy, whereby migrants have frequently been stopped at the 
state borders and forcibly turned back, sometimes with excessive use of force.223 For Serbia, 
monthly arrivals of less than 1,000 migrants per month (as these now are) seem manageable, 
compared to the situation in September 2015, when up to 12,000 people arrived daily. It is pos-
sible to offer rudimentary humanitarian aid to those who need it. When the so-called Balkan 
route was closed to all except those of Afghan, Syrian and Iraqi origin – and a later on to Afghans 
too – migrants in increasing numbers were left stranded along the route.
What of those left stranded in the Republic of Serbia? According to circumstances, they can 
be granted different types of legal status. Migrants who come of their own volition and those 
who arrive involuntarily or as a result of persecution are differentiated. If the authorities 
determine that any asylum-seekers’ fear of persecution in their state of origin is justified, 
formal refugee status is granted. At a lower level, incomers can be granted two other forms 
of protection: ‘subsidiary protection’ and ‘temporary protection’.
The UNHCR office in Yugoslavia was opened in the late 1970s, and until 2008 it carried the 
sole responsibility for deciding who could be granted refugee status in Yugoslavia, later on 
Serbia. During this span of thirty years, no one receiving protection from this office remained 
in Serbia: all moved to the United States, Canada and Australia. Thus, it was possible to apply 
for asylum in Serbia, but not to stay there.
In 2008, with the implementation of a new Law on Asylum, the Border Police Department 
took over the mandate from the UNHCR.224 As Senka Škero Koprivica from the Belgrade Cen-
tre for Human Rights points out, about one hundred people have been granted asylum since 
this change.225 Some 59 individuals have been granted subsidiary protection, and 44 allotted 
refugee status.226 There is a huge discrepancy between the number of people applying for 
asylum and those who have been successful in their application: ‘[T]wo people were granted 
asylum and one person subsidiary protection out of 74 who submitted an official request,’227 it 
was said; and ‘even many of those who receive refugee status in Serbia, leave the country’.228
Problems begin one administrative step back. Effectively, most migrants from the Middle East 
do not even get to the stage of applying for asylum. Instead they must express an ‘intention to 
seek asylum’, upon which they receive the status of ‘migrant in transit’. When the Law came into 
force in 2008, only 77 persons registered with an ‘intention to seek asylum’; by 2015 this num-
ber had increased to 577,995. This form of registration is a necessary first step for migrants 
in Serbia if they want to get any kind of support. They can express their ‘intention’ orally or 
in writing to any police officer or competent official of the Ministry of the Interior at a border 
checkpoint or within Serbian territory. In doing so, they receive a ‘certificate of expressed 
intention to seek asylum’. The officer collects the individual’s personal and biometric data, 
takes an ID photo, enters all this into electronic databases, and sends the person to one of 
the asylum centers.229 This procedure was first devised in 2015 in Preševo/Preshevë, a town 
in southern Serbia near the border with Kosovo and with what has recently been renamed 
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North Macedonia. According to a UNHCR employee, it all came from ‘learnin by doing’ and 
included a lot of improvisation.230
Any ‘confirmation about intention to seek asylum’ issued by the police does not mean that the 
procedure leading to the granting of asylum commenced. On the contrary: people who have 
been granted this preliminary status cannot apply for asylum on their own initiative. They 
have to wait for staff from the asylum office to contact them. The result is an administrative 
blockage, only increased by lack of communication between the different levels of authorities. 
Serbia’s aspirations to become a member of the EU and fulfil the conditions required has led 
to the adoption of a law and the implementation of non-comprehensive practices. Clearly 
local institutions and their personnel have not been adequately prepared.231
The majority of refugees and other migrants in Serbia – all those who have registered and 
claimed ‘intention to seek asylum’ but have not yet been admitted to any proper application 
process for asylum – are allowed to stay in reception centers only for the first fifteen days 
after their arrival. In practice, despite the stipulations of the current law, they continue to 
receive services and aid, although there is no legal framework governing their rights and sta-
tus.232 So they arrive as ‘illegal’, become ‘legal’ for fifteen days, and then become ‘illegal’, or 
‘tolerated’, again.233 After their first fifteen days in Serbia they are treated as ‘migrants in tran-
sit’, assumed to be on their way to destinations in the EU. In reality, however, this ‘transit’ is 
slowed to a standstill. Many ‘migrants in transit’ have been in Serbia for more than a year234 – 
and this despite the fact that almost none of the incomers since 2015 has actually wanted to 
stay. This is not where the migrants had planned to seek international protection when they 
fled their countries of origin. Thus, their intentions coincide with the Serbian authorities’ aim 
to administer Serbia as solely a transit country.235
‘Pushback’ and ‘Game’, or How Migrants Move In and Out
With rare individual exceptions, almost the only legal way to enter the EU from Serbia is by 
way of transit zones into Hungary. Two of these are located along the Serbian border, in the 
towns Tompa and Röszke, near Subotica (Serbia) and Szeged (Hungary). Here, in December 
2018, the number of migrants the Hungarian authorities admitted was just twenty – the 
lowest number of admissions since Hungary closed its borders to Serbia on 14 September 
2015 by erecting a fence, a move backed up by the closure of the Balkan route in March 
2016.236 The subsequent dwindling of admissions has been documented by the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee: throughout 2016 twenty to thirty individuals were admitted through 
each of the two transit zones per day; from November 2016 it was ten; in 2017 only five; 
and since 22 January 2018 Hungary has reduced the quota further to one person in each 
transit zone per day – a total of just ten per week.237 
This reduction has been made according to what is called the ‘Hungarian list’ a list issued by 
the Hungarian authorities containing the names of those migrants who have been admitted 
to asylum procedures and are permitted to enter Hungary. All asylum seekers wishing to be 
put on this ‘Hungarian list’ need to be registered in one of the asylum centers in Serbia and 
must then wait there until it is their turn to be considered. Among the various criteria that 
determine who is allowed access to the transit zones, time of arrival in Serbia and extent of 
vulnerability are among the most salient.238
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It is officials at the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees who are responsible for filling in the 
list. During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the remainder states Serbia and Montenegro 
united to become, for a while, the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’. In 1992 this republic adopted 
a special Law on Refugees. It was mainly concerned with the admission of people from the 
other Yugoslav republics, and provided for their accommodation, necessary aid, and general 
humanitarian support. The Law was not concerned with determining the legal and adminis-
trative status of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who might be admitted. The 
Commissariat for Refugees emerged at that time as the most prominent national organization 
dealing with these issues, while the UNHCR, operating in Belgrade since the 1970s, has seen 
to asylum procedures within Serbian territory itself according to its mandate.239
The Hungarian border authorities use their ‘Hungarian lists’ to determine who may be per-
mitted into the transit zones.240 At Tompa they have a single list, while at Röszke they have 
separate lists for families, unaccompanied children, and single men. Since the difference 
between the number of migrants in Serbia and those legally permitted to enter Hungary is 
so vast, many people try to continue their journey illegally. It is here that the so-called ‘push-
backs’ come into play. These are places where such asylum-seekers are stopped and forcibly 
turned back to the country they came from. The practice of attempting to cross borders ille-
gally is referred to as ‘the game’.
Not only Hungary, but Croatia and Romania, and, since 2017, Bosnia and Herzegovina, have 
all sent large numbers of people back to Serbia – people who attempted to cross the state 
borders illegally. These pushback activities have often been accompanied by violence and 
serious injury.241 According to the reports the UNHCR has made on collective expulsions, 
in December 2018 alone, 128 asylum- seekers were pushed back from Croatia to Serbia, 
six from Hungary, seventeen from Romania, and thirteen from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
63 percentof these cases a denial of access to asylum procedures is alleged, and in 46 per-
cent accusations of mistreatment by the neighboring countries’ authorities.242 There are fur-
ther reports based on the testimonies of thousands of people, attesting to police brutality, 
humiliation or serious threats migrants have suffered when crossing the border from Ser-
bia or Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia. Asylum-seekers have reported that they were hit, 
deprived of their belongings, and threatened with guns. They have also been denied access to 
asylum procedures after crossing the border.243 According to the testimony of migrants and 
monitoring groups, since 2018 the Croatian police have engaged in a systematic campaign 
of violence and theft against migrants and refugees attempting to find a route to Western 
Europe through their country244. Asylum-seekers have often been slung into a van and been 
driven back to the other side of the border – or forced to walk. Amnesty International has 
released a report in which irregular migrants relate how the Hungarian police and military 
pushed them back to Serbia. In their own words: 
‘Once we managed to get 21 km into Hungary. But police came and still brought 
us back to Serbia. First of all when they caught us they said don’t worry we will 
take you to a camp. […] They transferred us to a different group of mixed police 
and military. […] They had a video camera with them. They said I had to say to 
the camera that I broke the law and we were only 3 km in. They were aggressive, 
they said if we didn’t do that, they would use tear gas and hit us. They gave us no 
papers, took no fingerprints. Just drove us back to the border by Kelebia and then 
looked at our passports and threw them over the fence.’245
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Despite experience of suffering violence and injuries, migrants often try to cross the border 
again, daringly engaging in ‘the game’. As Milena Timotijević from the International Rescue 
Committee, explains: 
‘Every time a refugee plays “the game” they are putting their lives at risk. They are 
at the mercy of unscrupulous smugglers and human traffickers; they are frequently 
pushed back, violently, by border guards; they are subjected to “survival sex” and 
other forms of sexual abuse. And yet they never stop trying.’246
Some have attempted to cross the border more than twenty times, and a few have eventually 
been successful. It is mostly men who play ‘the game’, but sometimes families with children 
play it too: 
‘Recently I met a family at Miksalište who have been in Preševo in southern Serbia 
since 2015. They have not moved from Preševo since then and they cannot stand it 
anymore. They also want to get into “the game”. Now they have come to Belgrade 
to Miksalište and have asked whether they should go through Bosnia or Hungary.’247
Miksalište Refugee Aid is a coalition of citizens, local companies and civil society organizations 
that provides aid and medical support to refugees from war-torn countries like Syria, Afghan-
istan and Iraq. It tries to meet their most pressing needs while they are in Serbia – either at 
the borders or at the Miksalište aid collection post and distribution centre in the capital, Bel-
grade. Though playing ‘the game’ is frequently unsuccessful and always very risky, and though 
migrants continue to arrive, a UNHCR representative claims that there has been a decrease 
in the number of migrants remaining in Serbia between 2016 and 2019248. Obviously, signifi-
c ant numbers have found undocumented ways to move on.
Between 8,000 and 10,000 migrants travelled through Serbia in 2017. Robert Crepinko, Head 
of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC), stressed that, in reality, ‘the Western 
Balkans route is not closed, despite the borders being much better protected’ now. Since 
refugees and other migrants cannot legally get to Western Europe, they have been increas-
ingly dependent on traffickers, who profit from the EU border closures and often do not 
hesitate to expose refugees to great dangers.249 Transit migration has been recriminalized, 
and refugees are in a state of extreme vulnerability. Yet, even though it has decreased, and 
even though transit has become more dangerous and financially more costly, the flow of 
migrants has not stopped. The migrants’ choice of border to be crossed on the way to cen-
tral and northern Europe is dependent on the connections they have with traffickers but 
also differs according to nationality. Kurds, Yazidi and other minority groups from Iraq go 
to the border of Romania, while others, such as Afghans or Syrians, go to the borders of 
Hungary and Croatia.250
On average, about forty people try to cross the Hungarian border each day, attempting to 
cut the fence. Often this is to no effect, but they continue trying nevertheless. NGO employ-
ees like Stevan Tatalović of Info Park have often managed to develop a trustful relationship 
with the migrants they know, and some of them feel sufficiently confident to talk openly 
about their experiences. In our interview, he related how some make attempts once or 
twice a week, and keep on doing so for months. Those who have the money make use of 
more sophisticated methods. For example, they hide between the goods in loaded trucks, 
or travel by car. If border guards find them, they might let them go, because there is much 
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corruption; such corrupt practices are called ‘professional smuggling’. Lukić says that truck 
drivers now stop and inspect their vehicles before entering a country, because migrants 
might have climbed in without their knowledge.251
In greater Belgrade, Samuel Horn from Refugee Aid Serbia expressed a suspicion that the 
smugglers are omnipresent in certain places, including the asylum centers, and that, in this 
way, migrants are encouraged to attempt continuing their Journey.252 According to Vladimir 
Lukić, social worker at the Krnjača Asylum Centre, employees know who the smugglers are 
and how they attach themselves to people touting their services.
With increased state securitization, there has also been an increase in ‘grey zone’ smuggling. 
New trafficking hubs have been established, for example in Timisoara in Romania, a city that 
is increasingly used as an anchor point for smuggling migrants towards Western Europe.253 
A refugee from Afghanistan, wanting to enter the EU through Hungary, explained his chances 
in an interview for the news portal N1: ‘We have no choice but to go with smugglers, other-
wise we wait here forever.’254 According to my informants and media reports such as those of 
Radio Free Europe, smugglers’ prices in 2018 were as high as 8,000 euros and even went up to 
10,000. International intelligence agencies estimate that smugglers in Southeastern Europe 
earned more than 5 billion US dollars in 2015 alone. Vladimir Lukić suspected that refugees 
living in the asylum centers could not afford such sums.255 In fact, it seems that, in 2018, most 
of those able to pay money like this were Iranians passing through Serbia on the smuggling 
route, invisible to the state and to statistics. Between August 2017 and October 2018 Iranians 
could travel to Serbia visa-free and were hardly anywhere registered as migrants.
Currently, there seem to be three main routes on which smugglers operate: a ‘northern route’ 
from Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, then to Austria and onward; a ‘southern route’ 
from Turkey via Greece, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia 
to Austria and on again; and the ‘Balkan route’ already referred to. This route, through Serbia 
and Croatia, was the one most commonly used in 2015, and has not ceased functioning. But, 
as the numbers Bosnian officials released in 2018 show, a ‘new Balkan route’ has come into 
being – from Serbia through Bosnia.256
A Case Study of Migrants’ Facilities: the Krnjača Asylum Center
In December 2018, 4,205 migrants were being accommodated in sixteen centers in Serbia, run 
and financed by the government and referred to as transit centers (TC), asylum centers (AC) 
and refugee centers (RC). Before the crisis of 2015, there were just five centers for migrants 
in Serbia, with a total of 810 beds; so the increase is considerable.257 Some of the centers had 
been used in the past to host refugees and internally displaced persons from former Yugo-
slavia. A large number of the present- day ones originated as barracks or resorts, and they 
have different owners. For example, the Adaševci Centre, once a holiday resort for workers, 
is located in Syrmia and is the property of NIS Petrol. The center at Bogovođa, a village in the 
Kolubara District, was once a resort hosting school children and families with health prob-
lems, but is now owned by the Red Cross. The Krnjača Asylum Centre, ten kilometers from 
Belgrade, is the property of the Ivan Milutinović Company (Preduzeće Ivan Milutinović, PIM) 
and once housed the company’s workers. It is the one we will now look at.
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The Entrance Gate of the Old Ivan Milutinović Company, now the Krnjača Asylum Center.  
Source: Armina Galijaš.
The former Ivan Milutinović engineering factory has been subject to insolvency proceedings 
since 2015.258 
Some of its previous personnel, such as the kitchen staff and the security men at the entrance, 
continue to be formal employees of the factory. However, ever since the Yugoslav IDPs and 
refugees started arriving during the wars of the 1990s, they have been paid by the Serbian 
Commissariat for Refugees and Migration. The old company still has a presence in things like 
its logo at the entrance gate, the uniforms of the security personnel and the photograph of 
Ivan Milutinović himself in the factory canteen, now turned into a dining room for the migrant 
inhabitants. Milutinović was a Yugoslav partisan general from Montenegro and an eminent 
military commander in World War II. He died in combat in 1944. In Tito’s Yugoslavia he was 
held up as a hero who had devoted his life to the idea of a communist Yugoslav state. The 
strangely ironical photograph shows him in his partisan uniform with the communist star on 
his military beret. In socialist times, the company built dams and ports in the Middle East, for 
example in Iraq in Umm Qasr and Basra.259 Quite by chance, those living today in the previous 
workers’ barracks mostly come from the Middle East.
But the irony goes much further. Today’s inhabitants had other migrant predecessors – those 
displaced by the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s. According to the Migration Pro-
file of Serbia published by the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, there were 203,140 
displaced persons from Kosovo, and 29,457 acknowledged refugees from other parts of the 
former Yugoslavia in Serbia in 2016.260 These barracks and dining room were their quarters. 
The photograph of Milutinović is one of a partisan who gave his life for a state that then dis-
integrated in violence; of a man whose name was chosen for a company that profited from 
Yugoslavia’s non-aligned status in the Cold War, but then suffered from new wars and vio-
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lence twice over. When the first migrants from the Middle East came to Krnjača in 2015, they 
encountered the Serb refugees and internally displaced persons, many of whom had been 
living there since 1993. Several of my interlocutors were present during this time. In their rec-
ollections, there were very few episodes of conflict between the two groups.261
In fact, the Serbian refugees and IDPs benefited from the new crisis, since they were offered 
improved accommodation. Many had been living in these factory barracks or similar accom-
modation for more than twenty years. It seems as if the new crisis forced the Serbian author-
ities to speed up action to remedy the previous one. The Regional Housing Programme, a 
joint initiative shared by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia, was set 
up to tackle the protracted displacements the 1990s conflicts had caused. On 24 April 2012, 
an international donors’ conference was organized in Sarajevo to raise funds for a housing 
programme. Sadako Ogata, who was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
at the time of the wars pledged to contribute, and so did whole nations – Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA.262
The Photograph of Ivan Milutinović in the Company’s Canteen / Migrants’ Dining Room.  
Source: Armina Galijaš.
When I paid a visit to Krnjača in March 2018, about 600 people were living in the former 
workers’ barracks. Krnjača is a ‘family center’, and proportionally, 44 percent of those there 
were children, 18 percent women, and 38 percent men. This contrasts with the transit center 
at Obrenovac, forty kilometres southwest of Belgrade, which, with 776 men in January 2019, 
has an entirely male population. In Krnjača (again taking January 2019 figures) the majority 
of the inhabitants (84 percent) are people who fled from Afghanistan, while 7 percent are 
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from Iran, 2 percent from Pakistan, 2 percent from Iraq, and 5 percent from other countries. 
Many of them have been in the center for more than twelve months. 
The number has fluctuated, however: new migrants have kept arriving, and some older ones 
have managed to continue their journeys illegally. In the first half of 2018, the number of 
these older ones had decreased by about a hundred. They did not all leave the country, and 
sometimes people left, only to return. Occasionally, this was to spend a few months some-
where near the border, waiting for an opportunity to cross over illegally. Such initiatives are 
tolerated both by the staff in the centres and by the Serbian state. My interlocutors confirmed 
that attempts at illegal border crossings increase as soon as the weather permits. If an attempt 
fails, people return to gather their strength, and then try again.263
With the current capacity number of 600 Krnjača it functions well.264 Three meals are served 
each day, and an impressive array of NGOs organizes different activities. In Krnjača, there 
are more than ten national and international organizations helping the migrants, including 
the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Danish Refugee Council, the Adventist Devel-
opment and Relief Agency (ADRA), the Ecumenical Humanitarian Organization, Caritas, the 
Red Cross, the Ana and Vlade Divac Foundation, UNICEF, UNHCR, SOS Children’s Villages, and 
Te-Tzu Chang. The organizations’ funds, however, are often very modest. After the closure 
of the Balkan route in 2016, the migrants’ length of stay increased significantly, which means 
that, although de jure they remain ‘migrants in transit’, de facto they are not. With this drastic 
change, their needs have altered.265 One of these needs is for proper medical attention, and, 
with aid from the EU, new medical units have been opened in all centres; in Krnjača currently 
there are three working surgeries.
Three-quarters of the migrants in Krnjača are families with children; the rest are single men 
and so-called unaccompanied minors, though these last are difficult to establish, as many carry 
no personal documents and the registration authorities are dependent only on their state-
ments.266 In March 2018, 71 unaccompanied minors were living in the centre, and four ‘guard-
ians’ from the Municipal Centre for Social Work (Gradski centar za socijalni rad) are responsible 
for their care. The guardians come to the centre every day for two to three hours to support 
the minors in their leisure time, for example by taking them on short outings to the country-
side, perhaps ending with a football match. However, as Vladimir Lukić, the social worker at 
Krnjača, pointed out, conflicts between the minors, or cases of drunkenness, are dealt with 
by others – for smaller incidents, the centre staff; for more serious ones, the police.267 The 
police take records and intimidate the culprits. What the minors lack is adequate protection: 
they are in a particularly vulnerable position, and risk being exposed to violence, exploita-
tion, and abuse. It is difficult to provide proper institutional support in Serbia because both 
the personnel and the knowledge are lacking. The infrastructures were not prepared for the 
situation the country now faces.268
‘Arrangements’ between the State and the Migrants
 
The Migrants – Their Makeshift Lives
As Stevan Tatalović of the NGO Info Park has pointed out, the foremost problem migrants 
face is the uncertainty of their situation: ‘There is no appropriate institutional support, and 
no proper protection.’269 The Serbian state has provided humanitarian aid, including food, 
footwear, clothing, babies’ nappies, and other similar things. But there is no prevention of 
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human trafficking or smuggling. Often only two private security employees are present in the 
centres, and they do not have the authority to be up to the task of controlling hundreds of 
people living in extreme circumstances. Tatalović mentioned the sexual abuse of boys, and 
a dozen robberies. There are no separate facilities for the accommodation of the unaccom-
panied minors. The police react if crimes are referred to them, but much goes unreported 
due to fears of retribution. Minors and women additionally risk ill treatment at the hands of 
traffickers and smugglers, who allegedly work through bribery of the victim, or the judge.270
Incidents such as these show the full effect of having illegal status. While refugees often 
choose the route through Serbia because they believe it is a safe passage posing little risk to 
life, and without extensive pushbacks or serious and systematic police maltreatment, they 
nevertheless have to survive without any institutional or legal protection. In Krnjača, minor 
incidents of crime or violence occur every two to three days, and major ones, once every two 
to three months. Sometimes the perpetrators end up in the detention room. But there are 
no consequences, either for the perpetrators or for the victims. Even if a report is filed, those 
responsible for the violence go unpunished, precisely because they have no legal status. If 
individuals are charged with a criminal offence or are caught at an illegal border crossing, the 
law stipulates that they should be deported from the country. But this measure is futile both 
in Serbia and in the rest of Europe, because there is nowhere the refugees can be deported 
to: it is impossible to send anyone back to Syria or to parts of Iraq. So, those who break the 
law continue to live in Serbia, and keep trying to enter the EU.271
Even if the migrants’ legal situation were resolved in their favor, the economic situation in Ser-
bia would make it very difficult to make any serious plans to stay, integrate, or expect a better 
future. The unemployment rate in Serbia stood at 11.9 percent in 2018, so that chances of 
finding a job are low, even for those able to learn the language.272 President Vučić’s commen-
dation of the pro-active integration of a family from Afghanistan is no more than a showcase 
instance, and is an exception that confirms the rule.273
The migrants’ situation in Serbia is indeed conflicted. On the one hand, they do not have a 
strong community there in any way comparable to those that exist in Germany, for example. 
A longing for this is one of the reasons migrants strive to go there. There, they imagine, they 
can find a ‘grey zone’ job and a place to sleep, even if their legal status remains unresolved. 
In Serbia the closest they can come to ‘community’ is a group of people of the same kinship 
group confined to a camp, and in a perpetual limbo that mocks their legal status of being 
‘in transit’. On the other hand, Serbia has seen no large-scale protests against migrants, and 
individual violent attacks on ‘foreigners’ have also been comparatively rare.274
Since the start of the school year 2016/2017, 150 migrant children have been enrolled in 
seven primary schools in greater Belgrade with the support of UNICEF. In early May 2017, the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development (MESTD) issued a Guideline 
on the Integration of all Children in the Education System, which regulates in detail the pupils’ 
enrolment and the support they are to receive as they are integrated into the school sys-
tem. The adoption of this guideline is very important, in view of the fact that in 2017 over 
2,000 migrant children of school age were to be found in Serbia.275
The children who live in the Krnjača Centre attend schools in neighbouring Borča. To impart 
some idea of their lives, I focus on some Farsi-speaking children from Afghanistan who go to 
the Rade Drainac primary school. A school bus, paid for and organized by a Swiss humanitar-
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ian organization, the ADRA, makes sure that the children arrive back at the asylum centre on 
time to receive their meals (they get a snack at the school as well). School attendance gives 
the youngsters their first opportunity to receive education since they left their home coun-
tries – or, in some cases, their first education at all.276
The general picture I got from my interviews at the school was that the migrant children were 
enjoying a successful intercultural and educational experience. The teaching staff observed 
that the newcomers have been well received and accepted by their peers, and the children 
confirmed this, saying that they were included in joint activities and that they played with the 
other pupils.
Importantly, they are assisted in their learning, especially with learning the Serbian language.277 
In advance of the beginning of the school year, teachers, parents, and pupils had been pre-
pared for the new situation. Around 400 teachers in nine school catchment areas near the 
asylum and reception centres had received specific training and thorough instruction on how 
to put the Ministry’s Guideline into practice. Together with the MESTD, the Commissariat for 
Refugees and Migration, UNICEF’s Belgrade office, and the Centre for Education Policy (Centar 
za obrazovne politike, CEP) helped with implementation. The latter is an independent, multidis-
ciplinary research centre providing professional support to decision-makers and practitioners 
in developing, implementing and evaluating policies in the field of education.278 The migrant 
children have been equipped with the school supplies they need and have been assigned to 
regular classes. The language of instruction is Serbian:
‘At the moment we have got interpreters who are very helpful for the children in 
the fifth to eighth grades, while the children from the first to the fourth grades have 
quickly mastered the language. [...] I do not speak English, which in fact is helpful, 
as they needed to learn Serbian very fast to communicate with me.’279
Care is taken in placement. The Branko Pešić primary school in Zemun, for instance, assessed 
the children’s cross-curricular competences at the time of their enrolment, so as to fit them 
appropriately into the school’s structure. Special IT-based applications have helped children 
learn the Serbian language in a separate group, while they have widened their knowledge 
of all other school subjects through an integrated curriculum which they share with the Ser-
bian children.280 So, although the UNHCR makes many complaints about the asylum system 
in Serbia, it acknowledges that the schooling of migrant children has been a shining example 
of good practice. Some 95 percent of the children living in the various refugee, transit, and 
asylum centres in 2018 were attending school.281
So how can the relations between Serbian society and the migrants be assessed more gener-
ally? According to the employees of the Krnjača Centre, the migrants have been well received 
by people in the surrounding area. A 2017 survey by TNS Medium Gallup in cooperation with 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Serbia showed that negative attitudes 
towards migrants arose due to security concerns. While many Serbian citizens donated 
food and equipment, they showed a lower level of readiness to initiate any closer interac-
tion.282 The Ninamedia Research Agency conducted a survey in 2016, according to which over 
86 percent of Serbian citizens believed that the asylum-seekers would not remain in Serbia, 
and some 34 percent confirmed that they would be concerned if they did.283 As an explanation, 
those surveyed observed that Serbia was a poor country and thus unable to help. In addition:
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‘the social distance towards asylum-seekers and migrants in general proved to be 
higher than what was recorded in surveys of 2012 and 2015: for example, only 
55 percent of the respondents accepted the possibility of asylum-seekers living in 
the same town, and only 26 percent accepted the possibility of an asylum-seeker 
being their spouse.’284
Between May 2016 and May 2017, three more surveys into attitudes related to refugees and 
migrants in Serbia were conducted, this time by the ProPozitiv Agency in cooperation with 
the Ana and Vlade Divac Foundation. These surveys covered eight towns and municipalities 
that were directly affected by the migration, as they were located along what had been the 
former Balkan route. Of those surveyed, 43 percent showed a positive attitude and a degree 
of empathy towards the migrants.285 A comparison of the results from all three of these most 
recent surveys reveals a relatively stable number of Serbian citizens expressing a similarly 
positive attitude.286 As Aleksandar Pavlović points out, Serbia has had a far easier task than 
any of the EU countries, for one simple reason: ‘The refugees entering Serbia had one, and 
one goal only – to leave it as soon as possible.’ Thus, for Serbia, it has been relatively easy 
to brag about ‘traditional Serbian humanism and hospitality’.287 On the other hand, it is also 
true that Bulgaria, which is in a comparable situation as one of the poorest EU countries and 
also one where the migrants do not want to stay, has reacted very differently to the crisis.
The State’s Dilemma – Treating the Migrants Well or Getting Rid of Them?
At the beginning of the ‘r crisis’ Serbia established a formalized corridor in response not only to 
the border openings by Germany, but also to the border closures by Hungary.288 Serbia aimed 
not ‘to produce sustainable solutions and alternative long- term migration policies’, but rather 
to ensure the swift transport of migrants out, which ‘would transfer the responsibility for them 
to the next state’ as quickly as possible.289 The state thus attempted to regulate matters on the 
understanding that the transit was an exceptional arrangement, and most Serbians reacted 
in a manner that corresponded with this state policy. Most citizens are compassionate and 
respectful to migrants, as long as it remains implicit that they will continue their journey.290
The Serbian state authorities have acted strategically and have played an important role in 
deflecting potential protests among the population into what has been relatively good accept-
ance of the migrants. Mirjana Milenkovski from the UNHCR’s public information unit credits the 
former prime minister and current president Aleksandar Vučić for this. He publicly denounced 
any protests that occurred, and has kept a firm grip through his substantially authoritarian 
rule291 – there is hardly any opposition in Serbia left, as all voices against Vučić’s rule have been 
silenced. The Serbian media, closely bound to official politics, has given its backing, contrasting 
a praiseworthy Serbia with its recalcitrant neighbors: ‘Images of migrants in Belgrade’s parks 
and smiling policemen holding migrant children were juxtaposed in the media with cages in 
which migrants were being held in Hungary, or angry Macedonian officers beating migrants on 
the border.’292 During 2015 and in the first six months of 2016, such a slant on the news was 
widely disseminated. It condemned Hungary and Croatia, self-styled ‘guardians of the gates 
to Europe’, and also Bulgaria.293 Serbia was different. Vučić proclaimed that his country would 
‘never erect walls’ or restrict the movement of people seeking protection. He had a decisive 
influence on public opinion.294 The media emphasized the humanitarian side of the migration, 
together with the humanity of Serbian citizens, effectively triggering empathetic attitudes. Many 
people became directly engaged in helping the refugees. Yes, there were dissenting voices: 
Mihalj Bimbo, mayor of the Kanjiža municipality in Vojvodina, claimed that ‘foreigners do not 
have the basic elements of intelligence and culture’; but such outbursts were very rare.295
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Vučić’s approach at the time was in line with the politics of the German chancellor, Angela 
Merkel. He was calculating his politics carefully with an eye on EU enlargement, and he capi-
talized on the refugee crisis.296 Accession to the European Union remains a strategic goal for 
the Republic of Serbia, but it involves compliance with European values and standards, and 
not least respect for human rights. A strategic legislatively and institutionally sound migration 
policy seemed particularly important for furthering the accession process.297
The benchmarks had been set by the EU. In the midst of the crisis, in July 2016, Serbia formally 
opened Chapters 23 and 24, which deal with issues of human rights and anti-discrimination. 
The Serbian Ministry of the Interior has been negotiating Chapter 24 with the EU, and the 
action plan for its implementation covers topics such as migration, asylum, visa policy, exter-
nal borders, and the Schengen regime (in which border controls are dropped).298 Already, 
following the closure of the Balkan route, Serbia began receiving financial support from the 
EU to cover the migrants’ basic needs at the collective centres: health services, clothing, food, 
water, child-friendly spaces, and informal education in things like sewing or learning the lan-
guage, and so on. Indeed, between the beginning of the refugee crisis and July 2018, the EU 
allocated more than 25 million euros in humanitarian aid to Serbia specifically to assist ref-
ugees and migrants. Furthermore:
‘Since 2015 more than €80 million have been financed, through different EU finan-
cial mechanisms, helping Serbia to ensure the accommodation of migrants and 
refugees in accommodation centres; to support the delivery of health and other 
primary services to refugees, migrants and host communities; and to reinforce its 
border control capabilities.’299
In May 2015, there were five refugee centres in Serbia, mainly serving refugees and IDPs 
from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Then, as Mirjana Milenkovski from the UNHCR’s public 
information unit explained, the state responded to the new crisis by setting up thirteen more 
centres, all with the help of the EU and humanitarian organizations.300 These new facilities 
were set up in abandoned halls, hotels, and former centres of collectives, all very quickly 
adapted in order to accommodate the large numbers of migrants. In March 2016, when the 
Balkan route was closed, around 8,000 people were stranded in Serbia. They were distributed 
amongst the eighteen centres. Initially the centres did not meet even 40 percent of the EU 
standards, but they improved with time. The capacity promised by the Serbian authorities 
in consultation with the EU was 6,000 places. By the end of 2016, this had been achieved, 
and, at the same time, the numbers of newcomers decreased. The UNHCR and its partners 
estimate that almost 7,000 refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants were present in Serbia 
in December 2016, with over 5,760 (82 percent) accommodated in governmental facilities.301 
By June 2017, the overall number had shrunk to 5,948.302
It is worth looking at how all this was started up. In May 2015 the Serbian government estab-
lished a working group for migration that included the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare, the Commissariat for Refugees (up to this point concerned only 
with refugees and IDPs from the former Yugoslavia), the UNHCR, and several international 
organizations such as Youth for Refugees. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible 
for registering the migrants; the Ministry of Defence saw to security issues; and there was 
support from many individual volunteers like the imam of a nearby village, Miratovac. With 
all this support, the government acted quickly and professionally. The first of the new cen-
tres was established in July 2015 at Preševo in southern Serbia: it was a converted tobacco 
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factory. The Preševo centre functioned between July 2015 and August 2018, when its inhab-
itants were distributed to other centres.303
Most of the refugees have an Islamic background. Has religious affiliation played a role in 
the distribution of migrants in Serbia? Some of the decisions about where to build the new 
centres had to be made literally overnight. In Bogovađa, a village situated in the Lajkovac 
municipality about seventy kilometers south of Belgrade, the locals had already tried to get 
the first wave of Middle Eastern migrants evicted. This was in 2014. In Banja Koviljača, to the 
west of Bogovađa at the border with Bosnia, there had also been problems. There the num-
ber of migrants came to equal the number of local people, who found it troubling that many 
strangers arrived without registration or any recognizable official procedure.304
Thus the decision was made to transfer the migrants to the towns of Sjenica and Tutin in 
Sandžak, a far-off area 300 kilometres to the south of Belgrade and near the border with 
Montenegro and Kosovo. Vladimir Lukić, the social worker at Krnajča, believes the state pur-
posely chose places in the south of Serbia with a Muslim majority, and he told me that there 
have indeed been fewer problems of assimilation there.
In practical terms, building refugee centres in Sjenica and Tutin was not an economical solution 
for the state, as the centres are at about 1,000 and 760 metres above sea level, with snowfall 
between October and March, making them expensive locations to keep heated. Their physi-
cal distance from Belgrade also complicates efficient management.305 But, as Lukić maintains, 
this is a small price to pay for social peace: ‘Muslims have it easier in Muslim environments.’306 
Polls indeed confirm that in the municipalities of Sjenica, Tutin (and also Preševo), all areas 
with a Muslim majority, the percentages of mutual acceptance are strikingly above average: 
‘In Sjenica 99 percent of the contact was positively rated, in Tutin it was 100 percent, and in 
Preševo 94 percent.’307 How far religion plays a role in this cannot be properly established on 
these data alone.
Another huge issue that demonstrates how disruptive the sudden closure of the Balkan route 
was, was the ‘railway station case’ in Belgrade. When it became clear that migrants were not 
going to be able to leave Serbia at all soon, the Serbian authorities launched a push to evict 
migrants and aid organizations from the Belgrade parks. In January 2017, between 700 and 
1,000 young men, several of them unaccompanied minors, lingered on near the railway sta-
tion. They did not want to go to the centres, as they were afraid that they would be registered, 
and that this would prevent them from applying for asylum in Western Europe: the countries 
there might send them back. The Serbian government found a way to handle the situation 
that avoided any major use of force. They moved the people from the two parks near the 
central bus station to state-run centres. Most were transferred to Obrenovac, some 40 kilo-
metres southwest of Belgrade. An old military barracks was converted for their exclusive use 
and became the home for almost all of these men. They continue to live there, unregistered 
but tolerated by the state and receiving humanitarian aid, even though they have no legal 
status.308 Nevertheless, in Belgrade, the state authorities restricted the activities of the non- 
governmental groups providing aid:
‘[A] squatted building serving as the No Border Hostel was demolished, and shortly 
afterwards the nearby central aid distribution facility Miksalište was torn down too. 
In the following period, the grassy parts of the parks where migrants used to sleep 
were ploughed over and fenced in.’309
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In sum, Serbia’s treatment of migrants and refugees has been strongly influenced by interna-
tional circumstances – by the policies of neighbouring countries, and by the political decisions 
of the European Union and of Germany in particular. Clearly, it has been in the European 
Union’s interest to support Serbia in managing the stranded refugees. If the EU loses this 
interest, Serbia’s pragmatic approach might very well change.
A Particular Serbian Story. Migration from Iran
If international policies and EU requirements influence Serbia’s migration policies, Serbia itself 
has some responsibility for who comes in. The great increase in Iranian migrants to Serbia 
in 2018 has already been mentioned. That trend was directly linked to the abolition of the 
visa regime for Iran in August 2017, which made Serbia the only country in mainland Europe 
to offer Iranians visa-free travel.310 The Serbian government says this move was made for 
economic reasons, but many doubt this and see it as a reward for Iran’s support for Serbia’s 
case in Kosovo.311
Serbia’s Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications, under Rasim Ljajić, has confirmed 
that in the first seven months of 2018, a total of 15,855 Iranians visited Serbia. Of these, more 
than 1,500 expressed an ‘intention to seek asylum’. An unknown number then proceeded to 
the EU, and a lot of them emerged as migrants in Bosnia on their way.312 Between January and 
September 2018, the number of Iranians entering Bosnia was more than a hundred times 
higher than the figure for the entire previous year. According to data gathered by Bosnia’s For-
eigners’ Affairs Service, sixteen Iranians requested asylum in 2017; in 2018, up to September, 
the number was 1,647. Denis Zvizdić, chairman of Bosnia’s Council of Ministers, commented 
on the ‘fake Iranian tourists’ suddenly appearing: ‘They come to Serbia as tourists, and then 
emerge in Bosnia without any identification documents.’313
Shortly after the abolition of the visa in 2017, direct flights from Tehran to Belgrade were 
introduced, and the first Iran Air plane in twenty-seven years landed in Belgrade the follow-
ing March. Two more Iranian airlines, Qeshm Air and Mahan Air, immediately followed suit. 
Iran Air, which is state-owned, took to operating on this route twice a week and tickets on the 
flights sold out several months in advance.314 However, though the planes arrived full, they 
departed considerably emptier: ‘When the number of tourists coming from Iran on arriving 
flights to Belgrade are compared to those returning to Tehran,’ the director of Info Park, 
Gordan  Paunović, told The Guardian, ‘there is a 30 percent difference. The people who are 
missing on the return flights have continued their path toward [Western] Europe.’315 
I was told that, while Info Park met most migrants in Belgrade after their arrival, the Iranians 
were an exception, because their recently established community in Belgrade had become 
so strong so quickly, and Serbia had become a place of opportunity for them, from which 
they could continue their journeys. In addition, Vladimir Lukić points out, Serbia was a budget 
country for them, and travelling there was comparably cheap – they did not need to spend 
their money on the long trip through Turkey, Greece or some other intermediate country, as 
migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria do. Many of them came well dressed and with 
lots of luggage, and were not necessarily accommodated in the migrant centres. In March 
2018 there were about 500 Iranians altogether living in the centres, fifty of them in Krnjača; 
the others were seeing to themselves.316 Belgrade’s hostels and holiday apartments were full, 
thanks to the Iranian tourists. If they intended not to return, they got into contact with traffick-
96
ers. Other migrant groups huddle together in the centres or even camp in certain parks, as in 
the Luka Ćelović park, near Belgrade’s main railway station, nicknamed ‘Afghani Park’ (Avgan 
Park) by the locals. The Iranians, by contrast, made their presence known. In Knez Mihailova, 
Belgrade’s main pedestrian boulevard, Farsi could frequently be heard. In his interview with 
The Guardian, Gordan Paunović described how:
‘you immediately recognise Iranians. You see Syrians, Afghans, and they all look 
poor. Suddenly you see a group of kids with backpacks, who look like they’re on a 
school excursion […] You look at them and you give them a smile and you get so 
many smiles back.’317
The reason for attempting to take refuge in Europe that most Iranians gave was that they 
were either LGBT, Christian, politically oppressed, or blacklisted because they had fought for 
the Assad regime in Syria.318 My interlocutors confirmed that several Iranian Christians lived 
in the Krnjača Asylum Centre, and that most of them were converts from Islam. Their defiance 
of Islam was such that they would ask for pork on the menu, despite having no real desire to 
eat it.319 The Guardian report just mentioned tells how Amin, a 27-year-old gay Iranian, fled 
from Shiraz after his father reported him to the police for having sex with his partner. Amin 
was quoted as saying: ‘I came here with nothing. In Iran, my biggest threat was my own fam-
ily, not the government. Family is the biggest problem when it comes to LGBT.’320 For those 
who were fleeing from persecution, returning to Iran was not an option. Often, when Iranians 
arrived, it was clear how little they knew about Serbia; the only thing they knew was that they 
did not need a visa.321 But ‘one way or another, they will end their journey elsewhere, outside 
of this country,’ Vladimir Lukić insists.322
No consensus exists on what the number of Iranian migrants may have been during 2018. 
Gordan Paunović believed it to be a significantly higher number than Rasim Ljajić at the Min-
istry admitted. According to NI and data that Info Park presented to the media in October 
2018 (with the help of various other NGOs, and of Frontex, the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency), more than 40,000 Iranians entered Serbia after the visa requirement was lift-
ed.323 Serbia received criticism about this from the European Union, and the European Coun-
cil demanded that it respect EU visa policies. On 8 October 2018, the Serbian government 
gave in to this pressure and on 16 October it reintroduced its visa requirement for Iranians.324 
The Serbian minister of the interior, Nebojša Stefanović, said in parliament that Iranians had 
‘abused the abolition of visas’.325
Conclusion
The response of the Serbian state to the refugee crisis was from the beginning both pragmatic 
and flexible. Refugees who registered and claimed an ‘intention to seek asylum’ have been 
allowed to stay in the reception centres for an unlimited period of time, despite the stipula-
tions of the law, which defines them as ‘migrants in transit’, Serbia has adapted its laws so as 
to manage the situation – partly for its own political advantage, but to an extent out of genu-
ine concern for the migrants. The state authorities have played an important role in contain-
ing outbreaks of racism and violence towards migrants, such as have occurred in Bulgaria 
and Hungary. President Aleksandar Vučić publicly denounced protests against migrants, and 
the media – often strongly influenced by the authorities – has largely refrained from using 
inflammatory language. A humanitarian approach is being enforced by autocratic means.
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This has a lot to do with Serbia’s EU accession process – its strategic goal of obtaining EU 
membership. In July 2016, the country formally opened Chapters 23 and 24, which, along 
with issues of human rights and anti-discrimination, deal with migration and asylum policy. 
Thus, Serbia’s treatment of migrants and refugees has been influenced by EU conditionali-
ties. Moreover, Serbia’s ‘humanitarian face’ has depended on the assumption that migration 
through its territory will remain temporary and transitional.
On the other hand, Serbia’s own policy has influenced incoming migration. This was especially 
the case when, in August 2017, Serbia offered Iranians visa-free travel. It was the first and 
only country in mainland Europe to make such a concession (probably because the Iranians 
had agreed not to recognize Kosovo). The move triggered a wave of migration from Iran in 
the months that followed. A significant number of Iranian ‘tourists’ came to Serbia visa-free 
but did not get on the return flights, instead becoming illegal migrants. Because of this, the 
Serbian government reintroduced the visa regime in October 2018.
Despite Serbia’s deficient asylum system and the limited institutional and infrastructural 
capacities it had at the beginning of the refugee crisis, the country has opted for a policy 
of open borders. Its political discourse and its handling of the crisis can, on the whole, be 
assessed as positive. Numerous non-governmental and civil society organizations have played 
an important role in this achievement. They have been indispensable partners in tackling the 
migration problem.
Personal contacts and interactions between local populations and the migrants has been very 
limited. However, many Serbian citizens help by donating food and equipment; and flare-ups of 
conflict are comparatively rare. An analysis of opinions expressed in the Serbian media shows 
that the transitory character of the migrant community is key here: so long as the migrants 
are perceived as people who will not stay permanently, they are relatively well accepted.
A really exemplary achievement has been the enrolment of migrant children in schools. Since 
February 2017, almost all the migrant children in greater Belgrade have been attending seven 
selected primary schools and have been successfully integrated into the formal education 
system. Many teachers have shown extraordinary devotion and engagement in managing 
this. The efforts made seem to be governed by a widespread talent for improvisation, born 
out of notorious deficits in systematic planning. It is this that has made the teachers so capa-
ble of informal yet efficient help.
Last but not least, one reason for the relatively warm acceptance of the migrants by the local 
population is the lack of a fully-fledged welfare system. In Serbia, there is not much cause for 
jealousy and mistrust as it exists in richer countries, since there is no social security system 
which local people might accuse the refugees of infiltrating, and there is no labour market to 
engender fears that migrants might take over local jobs for less money under worse conditions.
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Abstract
This paper investigates how the Hungarian government responded to the events of 2015 
along the Balkan Route by systematically constructing the refugee as a threatening Other – 
one that is supposed to be a danger not only to our physical safety and jobs, but also to our 
very identity. The analysis relies on securitization theory, which depicts how security threats 
are socially constructed through language as a securitizing actor (usually the government) 
labels an issue as a security problem. If such a securitizing move is accepted by the relevant 
audience, most commonly the general population, the issue becomes by definition a security 
theat. Whether an issue can be successfully and efficiently turned into a security threat then 
depends on the context in which securitization unfolds. The paper identifies this context as the 
power-relations among relevant actors, the psycho-social disposition of the audience, and the 
presence and role of actors that offer a counternarrative – in the Hungarian case, civil society. 
Introduction 
Hungary has been oft-cited in the international press as a textbook example for hostility 
towards refugees and migrants. During the course of the 2015 so-called migration crisis, the 
country introduced harsh anti-immigration registration, constructed a fence on its Southern 
borders with Serbia and Croatia, expanded, and has consistently resisted European level 
solutions, rejecting those that involved burden sharing through mechanism such as reloca-
tion quotas. Since 2015, Hungarian domestic politics underwent radical changes: while the 
FIDESZ-government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continues to cement its power through 
attacks on democratic freedoms and the rule of law, politics has become single issue. The gov-
ernment has periodically renewed its initial anti-refugee media campaign that now includes 
virtually all political opposition. Populist slogans depict corrupt globalist circles – personified 
by the image of Hungarian-American financier and philanthropist George Soros – in cahoots 
with European elites all aiming to dissolve Hungarian (and European) national identities by 
inviting migration. Meanwhile, in Hungary, the formula is simple: if you are critical of the gov-
ernment and any of its policies from healthcare to crackdowns on an independent judiciary, 
you are by definition with the above forces. Domestic politics have become dominated by a 
migration frame wherein migration to Hungary and Europe is depicted as the number one 
security threat.
The paper proceeds with a short introduction of securitization. It then offers the Hungarian 
securitizing campaign as a case study. Due to scope limitations, we focus our attention to the 
initial phase of the anti-immigration campaign from early 2015 until the construction of the 
border fence in September 2015. By highlighting its core elements, we suggest that the core 
of the Hungarian discourse is an adaptation of pre-existing European discourses that adds 
little to how migration has generally been securitized in terms of the frames used. Building 
on securitization theory, the paper identifies the specificities of the Hungarian case in terms 
of its socio-political context, which in turn will lead us to a set of conclusions that clarify how 
the events of 2015 could influence contemporary politics in Hungary.
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Securitization and Migration
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán first mentioned migration as a threat to Hungary and Europe in 
the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, after which the government launched 
a coordinated, well-funded media campaign that has showed all migrants and refugees as 
a threat to national security. The Hungarian government’s strong anti-immigration rhetoric 
and policies that followed have since shocked many observes, begging the question of what 
made such a shift possible and how it came about. Xenophobic tendencies in Hungary have 
been steadily increasing since the introduction of the campaign, and the domestic discourse 
on migration is clearly dominated by the security frame326. Though the precise mechanisms 
of persuasion and their effectiveness are still under investigation, this paper is based on 
the assumption that the increase in xenophobia in Hungary can be largely attributed to the 
government’s ongoing media campaign. Such success is puzzling as the campaign predates 
the ‘migration crisis’, meaning that at the time of its launch, the everyday Hungarian had no 
real experience with mass migration. Thus, the rapid securitization of migration cannot sim-
ply be attributed to societal shock and feelings of insecurity in the wake of the events of the 
summer of 2015. 
The current Hungarian discourse on migration as a security threat bears some striking 
resemblance to some Western European discursive structures of the 1990s and early 2000s 
that depicted migration as a multi-faceted source of danger, threatening national job mar-
kets, identities and lives in the form of terrorism327. Yet, we argue that despite borrowing of 
frames, the Hungarian securitization campaign stands out due the context of its inception 
and its evolution. In order to highlight this crucial distinction between discourse and domes-
tic conditions, the paper relies on a refined version of securitization theory328 that expands 
securitization-as-discourse to include practices and processes of securitization. This prac-
tice-oriented version of securitization invites three assumptions: effective securitization is 
audience-centered; it is context-dependent; and it is power-laden. For the purposes of this 
paper, the approach is used to highlight that, despite similarities in terms of the migration 
discourse, various European societies are receptive to different constructions of security. 
Therefore, on the one hand, we draw attention on structural aspects such as prevailing xen-
ophobic tendencies in the Hungarian population (the audience), and the state of the polit-
ical-institutional environment. On the other hand, we also highlight agential aspects of the 
context in deconstructing the governmental campaign. Finally, the paper draws attention to 
the role non-traditional desecuritization actors – most importantly civil society – can play, as 
well as to the role of non-policies as securitization tools, i. e. the elite’s deliberate neglect of 
an issue in order to demonize the subject of security. 
In its original formulation, securitization is the process when a securitizing actor uses the 
rhetoric of an existential threat on an issue, and thereby takes it out of the realm of normal 
politics into the realm of emergency politics, where any appropriate measure can be taken 
to curb the threat329. Thus, the utterance of the world security on its own creates a new social 
order wherein normal politics are bracketed, and emergency measures can be taken to coun-
teract a threat. But contemporary securitization scholars, such as Thierry Balzacq330 argue 
that securitization should be rather understood as a strategic practice. The practice oriented 
version of securitization combines processes of threat construction/design with that of threat 
management; and draws attention to a number of issues, specifically non-discursive securiti-
zation instruments such as border walls331, the role of the audience(s) and veto powers, as 
well as the context within which securitization occurs. Securitization’s key components for the 
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purposes of this paper therefore are: the securitizing actor, the referent subject (that which 
is threatening), the audience, and the context and adoption of distinct policies. 
The differences in securitization outcomes, say for example Germany’s Willkommenskultur as 
opposed to Hungary’s hostility, can be best explicated through their context. This context can 
mean a number of things, ranging from the political regime within which the securitization 
attempt unfolds to intersubjective meanings that govern threat perceptions, or the institutional 
structures that define relevant audiences. Thus, in the case of migration, the specific frame 
used to classify the phenomenon as a security threat largely depends on the national identity 
of the receiving – or in Hungary’s case, transit – state as elites draw on established national 
symbols and myths to shape the discourse, achieve the issue’s securitization, and enable/
limit policy options. The aforementioned institutional structures and discursive practices that 
produce relevant audiences within the context of securitization merit special attention; they 
necessitate the analysis of actors beyond the government and the agencies to which they del-
egate authority in threat identification. Three such actors stand out: the political opposition, 
the judiciary and the media. These three institutions represent veto powers in democratic 
states that are able to question the securitization claims of the governing elite, and check the 
legitimacy of the policies they introduce. 
The media in particular has been frequently highlighted as a key institution in the securiti-
zation of migration, since it has an important role in reproducing and maintaining dominant 
constructions of national identity332. By extension, the media also plays an instrumental role 
in constructing the ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’ when explaining what the conflict – in our case, the 
so-called migration crisis is about and what can be done to stop it333. As the media rarely 
generates its own frame, but selects from those available, the power relations among secu-
ritizing actors and those that present counter-frames influences the media image. For these 
reasons, the analysis of media coverage is essential to any understanding of the securitiza-
tion of migration.
In the following, we will apply the above conceptualization of the securitization progress and 
its socio-linguistic concept to the case of Hungary’s response to the 2015 refugee crisis.
Securitizing the Migrant Other in Hungary
The successful securitization of migration and the continuous increase in xenophobic tenden-
cies in Hungary are perplexing if one takes a look at the sequence of events that culminated 
in the erection of a barbed wire fence on the Serbian-Hungarian border in the September of 
2015. First, the securitizing campaign was launched months ahead of the summer migration 
wave. Second, migrants were constructed as both an economic and a cultural threat, even 
though they were merely passing through the country on their way to Western and North-
ern Europe. In order to better understand the Hungarian government’s motivations behind 
launching the securitization campaign, as well as the reasons why a large portion of the pop-
ulation approved of the securitizing move, the domestic context needs to be investigated.
When an actor engages in a securitizing move (attempt), they seek to elevate an issue into 
the realm of security, thereby limiting certain policy options and enabling others. Though the 
final goal of securitization is placing an issue on the agenda and then taking control over it, 
motivations differ among elites and individuals. Actual fears of a phenomenon may propel 
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elites to securitize an issue, like environmentalist groups do with climate change334 (Hayes 
& Knox-Hayes, 2014; Mason, 2013). Nevertheless, highly dramatized national security crises 
also garner public attention and support, and through securitizing certain issues, the elite can 
also divert public attention away from other problems, like a crumbling healthcare system. At 
the same time, the successful mitigation – or the appearance of thereof – of the newly con-
structed threat can provide a government with political capital, and can be used to discredit 
opposition. ‘We could do what the opposition could not, and thereby provided security.’ We 
posit that this kind of cost-benefit calculation was the primary motivation behind the Hun-
garian government’s initial securitization moves in early 2015.
Since its landslide victory in the 2010 elections, the governing party335, FIDESZ (Hungarian Civic 
Alliance), has been relying on its constitutional majority to redraw political-institutional power 
relations in Hungary. Utilizing standard populist tropes like claiming to speak on behalf of the 
whole population, the party and its Prime Minister successfully capitalized on disillusionment 
with the first two decades of democratic change since the end of the Cold War, as well as 
the letdown of EU membership. Rather than proposing structural reforms, FIDESZ sought to 
monopolize political space and solidify its hold over the country – all under a strong nationalist 
rhetoric that offered a sense of exceptionalism to voters.336 The resulting institutional changes, 
coupled with near-total control over the media now define Hungary’s ‘illiberal democracy’337, 
which has by now become, for all intents and purposes, a competitive autocracy338. 
Political opposition was limited, and organized opposition movements were only created 
prior to the 2014 elections, and around narrow, topical issues, like the proposed ‘internet tax’ 
in the fall of 2014339. Nevertheless, by late 2014 FIDESZ’s public support was visibly waning 
due a series of corruption scandals, an underperforming economy, high unemployment, and 
the general feeling of fatigue with the aggressive rhetorics of the government340. Such loss 
in support necessitated new action to mobilize the core electorate and draw back lost vot-
ers. Meanwhile, FIDESZ’s extreme right wing opposition, Jobbik, became the second strong-
est political force in Hungary, overtaking the democratic opposition as the main challenger 
of the governing party (a fact reflected by the 2014 national election results). In an attempt 
to stop disillusioned voter gravitating towards Jobbik, FIDESZ had been taking over some of 
the extremist party’s most symbolic program points since 2010. The government rarely con-
demned anti-Roma or anti-European remarks coming from Jobbik, and even co-opted the 
party in parliamentary debates, including the one that made the 15 September 2015 laws on 
migration control possible341. Beyond mobilizing FIDESZ’s core electorate, catering to Jobbik 
sympathizers and drawing them closer to the governing party is the other motivation explain-
ing the government’s initial approach to migration.
 
Since migration during the first few months of 2015 was limited when compared to numbers 
later that year, and not directed at Hungary as a destination, migrants and refugees repre-
sented an easy and obvious target for securitization. The government-controlled institutional 
structures could then be used to take over public discourse with the government’s frame and 
crowd out alternative views. In this sense, power relations underlying the context of securiti-
zation of migration in Hungary are so skewed that they can be externalized for the purposes 
of the analysis. FIDESZ’s monopoly over Hungarian politics namely effectively negates the veto 
power of the judiciary, the parliamentary opposition, as well as the media, leaving NGOs and 
non-institutionalized civilian movements as the promoters of a desecuritization frame, i. e. 
a narrative that seeks to depict refugees not as a security threat, and the migration ‘crisis’ as 
not a security, but a humanitarian issue. 
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The turn towards migration as a security challenge, which forms part of the political specta-
cle of FIDESZ’s governing style, had mobilized supporters, drawn in extremist voters due to 
its hard stance on aliens, divided up the population along familiar lines, and avoided political 
costs traditionally associated with securitizing migration in Western Europe. This latter point 
merits our attention: when securitizing migration, the elite runs the risk of engaging two dif-
ferent groups: a softer stance might alienate extremists342, while a more radical stance on 
migration might alienate pre-existing migrants and moderate voters. Given that Hungary has 
had no prior experience with large-scale migration, and only served as a transit country in 
2015, FIDESZ’s securitization attempt offered higher benefits than costs. In addition, since a 
crisis narrative evokes societal feelings of danger and insecurity, they are by default high on 
the public agenda. As such, securitizing migration was yet another way for the government to 
detract both public and media attention from high profile scandals that wrecked support.343
Security as Spectacle – FIDESZ’s Governing Style
The current politicization of migration in Hungary is part of a wider political spectacle344 (Edel-
man, 1988) wherein the conditions of belonging are contested. Within the spectacle, crisis 
situations and political myths are invoked as drama. It legitimates political decisions through 
summoning threats and dangers. Within this spectacle, one of the key issues is cultural iden-
tity, which in turn enables the politicization of migration, but also its securitization as a threat 
tonational identity345. This dramatic interpretation of politics on behalf of the governing party 
originates in FIDESZ’s unexpected election loss in 2002. Despite getting the majority of votes 
(48.7 percent), the governing party had to hand over power to a Liberal-Socialist coalition with 
an unstable majority in parliament346. Shocked by election results, FIDESZ supporters called 
fraud, and Orbán gave a series of speeches where he called for unity on the Right, with the 
slogan being ‘the Fatherland cannot be in opposition’ (‘A haza nem lehet ellenzékben’). This 
image of a government-in-exile effectively divided Hungarians into true Hungarians (FIDESZ 
voters), and traitors/communists/liberals (supporters of the government); as well as lending 
FIDESZ’ time in opposition a war-like tone, wherein ‘retreat was impossible’347. This rhetoric 
followed the party throughout the 2000s.
With FIDESZ’ landslide victory over the scandal-ridden Socialists in 2010, the rhetoric did not 
change: the party had to look for new ‘enemies’ to fight. This trope of Hungarians under attack, 
with only the government – more specifically, the Prime Minister – there to save them has 
been applied to a strikingly varied mix of issues, ranging from the ‘war on unemployment’, 
the ‘war on national debt’ all the way to 2014’s ‘war on utility costs’. This war-rhetoric has also 
been consistently used to delegitimize FIDESZ’s critics, Hungarians and not the government 
serving once again the referent object of the ‘attacks’. Again, the group of foes is very diverse, 
ranging from the EU on various occasions348, to foreign multinational corporations, the West-
ern press (‘a liberal conspiracy against Hungarians’), Western liberals, Hungarian watchdog 
NGOs349, and his domestic opposition (’the fight against Communism’). This constant rhetoric of 
war can then be used to justify restrictive domestic policies and the dismissal of compromise. 
The analysis of the official discourse from January 2015 on reveals a strong, hostile language 
towards migrants, which served as the major legitimizing factor in introducing restrictive 
policies like the border fence, or a stricter penal code for ‘illegal’ border crossings. Security 
considerations have since dominated public discussions and have led to a shift in xenopho-
bic tendencies350. The official discourse does not differentiate between asylum seekers and 
economic migrants, nor does it distinguish irregular from regular migration. Instead, all these 
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categories are subsumed under the term ‘bevándorló’ (migrant). This term in Hungarian has 
an additional layer: it suggests an inward direction of movement, meaning that it refers to 
migrants coming into Hungary. 
With relatively low migrant numbers at the beginning of 2015, official discourse mainly warned 
of economic migration as a potential threat, disregarding research on its benefit, as well as 
the massive outflow of Hungarians towards Western Europe. Elevated domestic and inter-
national media attention was directed at the question of migration after the January 2015 
Charlie Hebdo attacks, when Orbán put the blame squarely on Western integration policies, 
and claimed that ‘economic migration is a bad thing for Europe. One should not think of it 
as a beneficial thing, it only brings problems and dangers into the life of European people. 
Therefore it must be stopped’351. The rhetoric of the Hungarian government from the begin-
ning of the concerted anti-migration campaign in late March 2015 matured as the security 
and identity axes supplanted the economic axis. FIDESZ has identified migration as a threat 
to the Hungarian state (terrorism), and, due to assumed cultural and religious differences, as 
a main threat to ethnic homogeneity (influx and higher birth rates), and the national tradition 
(Islam). It was, as in many other cases, reified as a threat to the survival of first the national 
community, and more recently, European civilization, defined as exclusively Christian. Not 
only did this discourse exclude the migrant from society, but framed them as dangerous.
The ‘criminal migrant’ is yet another familiar trope from Western European discourses, one 
that relies on dubious statistical data, commonsensical arguments, mandated ‘expert’ testi-
monies, and misrepresentative media reports352. This image tranforms all migrant, irrespec-
tive of individual motivations, into threats to any receiving or transit country. Even if one 
accepts that migrants are passing Hungary towards Germany and other, more prosperous 
European states, as long as they are in Hungary, they represent a clear and present threat. 
One of the consequences of the criminalization of migration is the elimination of distinction 
between migrants and asylum seekers/refugees. This, as in other EU countries with similar 
discourses, can be seen in the reduced the number of asylum seekers granted refugee sta-
tus. With migrants criminalized, all of them become subject to suspicion by the host popula-
tion, shifting the public discourse on economic migration – a bad thing in this context – and 
refugees – moral obligations to help those in aid – towards separating ‘real’ refugees from 
‘impostors’, i. e. economic migrants or terrorists in disguise. It is then hardly surprising that 
the majority of the population considers most asylum seekers ‘fake’.
As we mentioned, initially, migration was securitized primarily as an economic threat. Follow-
ing the exponentially increasing pressure of growing migrant waves, the ‘job loss’ frame was 
dropped for an identity-based threat frame, wherein the economic threat only manifested 
in the costs Hungarians would have to bear while hosting migrants. Migrants therefore now 
threaten Hungarian culture, but also European civilization at large. Within this frame, the 
future of the community is a choice for or against migration, leaving no middle road open 
for a more nuanced treatment of a complex issue, especially the state’s obligation to protect 
refugees353. Here, the role of Hungarians is that of the crusaders, the last defenders of Europe 
from a Muslim threat, mirroring the Turkish invasion of Europe in the Middle ages. In turn, 
any European criticism can be framed as betrayal.
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Resistance to Securitization 
Political elites are not always able to rely on securitization to claim control over an issue. This 
ability is contextual and is conditioned by power relations between the securitizing actor 
and various audiences and veto powers, such as courts, opposition parties and the media. 
In the Hungarian case, however, political power relations are extremely asymmetrical. Due 
to FIDESZ’s dominance of the media, competing frames offered by the opposition and local 
NGOs received little to no visibility. As both the judiciary and parliament have been filled 
with party loyalists, other, traditional veto powers also lacked the necessary political power 
to mount a desecuritization campaign.
These asymmetrical power relations forced desecuritization agents (those who sought to 
reverse securitization) to adopt new approaches. The centerpiece of these efforts were the 
counter-offensive mounted against the government’s anti-migration billboard campaign, and 
the previously unprecedented grassroots campaign of activists in Budapest and major cities 
to help refugees into and out of transit zones during the summer of 2015. Both issues were 
highly symbolic, therefore they caught the attention of the Western media, offering further 
visibility to the desecuritization frame. 
The à propos of the early June poster campaign was to boost awareness of the April 2015 
‘National Consultation on Migration and Terrorism’. National consultations are a key element 
of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary: they have been used to supplant referenda, offering a sem-
blance of influence on policymaking to supporters of the government. In reality, these ques-
tionnaires are little more than propaganda pieces with questionable methodology, biased 
and suggestive question. They provide tropes for supporters to shape public discourse, raise 
awareness about the government option, and are frequently used to demonstrate both the 
presence of democratic institutions and wide support for government policy against critics. The 
language used in the migration-related consultation is symptomatic of the securitization frame 
constructed by FIDESZ: it labels migrants as terrorists, and as a source of economic and cultural 
threat. The billboard campaign – which could also draw on Western examples – is equally hos-
tile and reflects the image of the criminal/alien, with slogans like ‘If you come to Hungary, you 
need to abide our laws/respect our culture’ and ‘you cannot take away the jobs of Hungarians’. 
The billboards were clearly not targeting migrants, but the general population: they were all in 
Hungarian and used the informal speech register, which in this context suggests condescension. 
The poster campaign provoked outrage in many, and as soon as they were planted, a number 
of them were either painted over and/or rewritten. Those who did so mostly relied on humor 
to mock the hatred that the government media campaign, including billboards, radiated: they 
painted over certain words and letters to give new meaning to the poster. Two organizations 
elected to respond the campaign in kind: the mock-political party Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt 
(Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party-MKKP) and the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, both laucnhing 
poster campaigns of their own, but independently of each other. MKKP began collecting money 
for their campaign shortly after the billboards appeared. They were able to collect 33.3 million 
forints in donations by the early June, which showed unprecedented levels of activism among 
Hungarians.354 This amount of funds – roughly one tenth of the cost of the government cam-
paign – allowed MKKP to pay for 800 billboards, which, since they were positioned, allowed 
their message to reach a fairly wide audience. As mentioned, the campaign was not exclusively 
about migration, but involved other topical issues that had been the source of dissatisfaction 
with Orbán’s government, including corruption, mass migration to Western Europe, or the con-
troversial Paks II355 deal with Russia.356 The goal of the campaign was to ridicule government 
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fear-mongering, to raise awareness about systemic problems of Hungarian politics, and to 
reach out to the international public. The campaign was therefore targeting the government’s 
securitization campaign, but did not offer a specific counter-frame about migrants themselves.
UNHCR on the other hand wanted to present a counter-frame about migrants that was to 
change the public’s perceptions.357 Their set of billboards, posted in Budapest metro stations, 
showcased refugees who have successfully integrated into Hungarian society. Not offering a 
comprehensive solution to the migration issue writ large, the UN campaign sought to prob-
lematize the undifferentiated, xenophobic treatment of migrants, and highlight the importance 
of assisting refugees. The posters themselves underlined this latter point: when helped, these 
refugees can become productive and successful members of Hungarian society. Though the 
posters spurred heated debates in social media, they did not really engage the population out-
side of Budapest due to their limited circulation.
The third element of the desecuritization campaign came from the NGOs and civilian activists 
working with refugees in transit stations, refugee camps and border towns. NGOs such as the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Association of Pediatric Practitioners, Menedék Alapítvány 
(Refuge Foundation), Menhely Alapítvány (Shelter Foundation), and Oltalom (Sanctuary) Charity 
Society worked together with ad hoc, non-institutionalized activist groups like Segítsünk Együtt 
a Menekülteknek (Let’s Help Refugees in Hungary), Migration Aid, and the Migrant Solidarity 
Group of Hungary (Migszol). These latter, non-institutionalized organizations merit special 
attention: relying mainly on social media, they managed to attract media and public atten-
tion, as well as company and personal contributions in terms of know-how, working hours 
(activists, interpreters, drivers, cooks etc.), in-kind contributions (food, clothes, medicine). 
These contributions were all used transparently to assist migrants to reach transit zones, 
spend the minimum necessary time there and then move on to either a refugee camp or a 
train heading towards Western Europe. As their names suggests, these organizations sought 
to offer solidarity to migrants, irrespective of personal motivations. With a strong presence in 
the social media, active links to non-state and active media, they not only promoted solidar-
ity for migrants, but also an image of Hungarians as solidary people with bad leadership. By 
organizing the daily life of migrants at transit stations, these civilian organizations effectively 
took over the responsibilities of the state, from providing information, food and shelter to 
providing legal council about migration policies. Their continued efforts form the backbone 
of the desecuritization campaign as they continuously promote a counter-frame that depicts 
migration as a humanitarian issue, not a question of security. Though unable to revert the 
government securitization efforts, these organizations helped to create an alternative frame 
that has received wide visibility in the capital and in the foreign press, but less so in the coun-
tryside. We suggest that the presence of an alternative frame can provide the basis of further 
desecuritization attempts. However, our initial research still suggests that NGOs and activist 
groups indeed lack the political power to mount a full desecuritization campaign on their own, 
without the assistance of traditional veto powers (judiciary, parliamentary opposition, media).
The increase in xenophobia in Hungary stabilized in late September according to recent polls, 
although it has reached record levels. This slowing down can partially be attributed into the 
rerouting of migration flow towards the countryside, and the resulting ‘disappearance’ of 
migrants from frequented urban areas, as well as the government’s rhetorical turn towards 
European migration policy. However, with such a complex issue, a multi-causal explanation 
should not be excluded, wherein the promotion of counter-frames through unconventional 
means plays a role in shifting the public perception of migrants away from a racialized, threat-
based security frame. This issue will have to be in the focus of further research.
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Conclusion
Countries of the Visegrad region have been converging on their hostile stance on migration 
since the second half of 2015, making the Hungarian case less unique than it was seen in the 
summer of 2015. Nevertheless, the case study we presented in this paper can be seen as a 
pure, ‘textbook example’ for securitizating migration. It draws attention to the importance of 
the domestic sociopolitical and sociolinguistic context when investigating variance in state 
responses to the so-called migration crisis. Once we look closer into the country-specific con-
text of securitization dynamics, Hungary is indeed a pure case where securitization discourses 
are largely unchallenged. The fact that the campaign at the core of government reactions was 
initiated well before the summer 2015 wave of refugees further highlights the importance of 
contextual specificities. Despite obvious parallels with other, European states both in terms 
of discourse and policies, the Hungarian story stands out. Accordingly, we emphasized a 
number of elements of the case that explain the initial construction of the refugee Other – 
a construct that dominates Hungarian politics to this day. 
First, securitization is audience-dependent, and Hungarian voters on the one hand show con-
sistently high levels of xenophobia, and have also been conditioned by government rhetoric to 
think in terms of emergencies and clear and present dangers. Second, securitization is pow-
er-laden. In the case of Hungary, power relations are extremely skewed with the government 
holding control over the media, the opposition and the judiciary. Therefore, desecuritization 
attempts were restricted to civil society actors – among them issue-specific, nontraditional 
grassroots – which used nonconventional techniques to counteract the government master 
frame. However, without the aforementioned veto powers present, these desecuritization 
attempts only received limited visibility. To these two elements, the chapter added non-dis-
cursive tools termed non-policies. These, along the practice-based approach of Balzacq, 
demonstrate that a focus on discourse is insufficient for understanding securitization. As 
its own contribution to this revision, the chapter suggested that non-policies are important 
precisely because they appear to be products of chance and circumstance, so they usually 
fall outside the analysis of practices targeted at securitizing certain issues, such as migration.
Hungary’s position on migration is deeply rooted in domestic considerations, and is almost 
exclusively motivated by them. The anti-migration rhetoric has been serving the purpose of 
voter mobilization and thereby the consolidation of FIDESZ’s hold over the country ever since 
the launch of the anti-immigration campaign in 2015. Thus, the rhetoric is not about perceived 
policy problems, but about manipulating public opinion. With this anti-migration campaign 
still in full swing, Hungarian politics has been rendered single-issue. Voters are primarily 
motivated by fears of migration (despite the lack of incoming migration), and the govern-
ment equates all opposition of any kind with ‘pro-migration forces’. Allegations of managed 
migration used against any form of criticism, for instance that of NGOs, the ‘Soros network’, 
EU elites, opposition parties and more recently, academics. Accordingly, the securitization 
frame is constantly expanded: people respond to securitized migration, so the government 
subsumes all policy issues under this frame. Moreover, until this rhetoric remains effective, 
the official position will not change vis-a-vis migration policy on the EU level. Therefore, we 
suggest, it is pivotal to understand how the anti-immigration campaign was initially conceived, 
how it operates, and how it resonates with the domestic context, first and foremost with the 
Hungarian public at large.
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Abstract
This paper analyses the possibility of Serbia becoming a country of destination by taking on 
part of the burden by means of defined quotas. Although the idea of social solidarity and 
distribution of responsibility for the refugees has been rejected on the European level, this 
paper examines the justification and the effectiveness of the Quota system and its possible 
application in Serbia. The author points out the authorities’ positive attitude towards migrants 
while the Balkan route was open, but that there are objective reasons why Serbia is not a 
preference for asylum seekers. Furthermore, the effects of the ‘migrant crisis’ on the EU inte-
grations and European values are highlighted. 
Introduction
Ever since it was opened in mid-2015, the Balkan migrant route started from Greece, Bulgaria 
or North Mace donia, through Serbia towards Hungary and then alternatively also toward Cro-
atia, i. e. toward the western part of the European Union. Before it was formally closed upon 
the conclusion of the agreement between the European Union and Turkey in March 2016, the 
walls between certain Balkan states erected in order to prevent further influx of unwanted 
guests had become symbols of this route. Concrete walls and barbed wire reinforced the atti-
tude of some European countries that ‘we do not owe anything to those people358’. From the 
moment it was opened, this route was characterized by heterogeneity and dynamism, in the 
face of rapid changes regarding the numbers of migrants in pursuit of international protec-
tion, but also diversity as to their countries of origin, nationality, religion, language, sex and 
age at which they were forced to depart from their homes359. It was exactly these ‘features’ 
of the migrants that played a key role when deciding about the possibility of their admission 
and permission to stay in the European Union countries, primarily in Germany.
In the course of 2015, more than 600,000 refugees passed through the territory of Serbia, 
heading towards the developed Western European countries, notably Germany. The reaction 
of the government of Serbia was assessed as very humane, since the state officials called for 
appropriate treatment of refugees, undertaking measures to ensure their adequate recep-
tion. Moreover, the attitude of the entire society, who demonstrated a remarkable level of 
understanding and compassion, added to the positive reputation of Serbia during the mayor 
wave of the ‘migrant crisis’. Both sides, the state and the society, including non-governmental 
organizations, provided an unexpectedly high level of assistance and support to the refugees. 
One of the proposed solutions for social solidarity in distribution of the burden of the sudden 
influx of migrants is the Quota system. Although this refers to the European Commission pro-
posal about the member countries’ joint response, Serbia as a candidate country expressed 
readiness to take on part of the burden not only in ensuring a safe and humane transit, but 
also in permanent care for the refugees. The intention of this paper is to answer the ques-
tion why Serbia offered to assume part of the responsibility and whether this tentative was 
underpinned by real reception capacities? Our initial argument connects the idea about EU 
common response through a Quota system with the role of Serbia in sharing the burden of 
the ‘migrant crisis’ 2015: in spite of officially expressing readiness for participation in the Quota 
system, Serbia has limited capacities for full social integration of refugees. 
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Quotas for Refugees: Between Solidarity and Dignity
The issue of fair allocation of responsibility for the refugees has been the topic of numerous 
theoretical debates for quite a long time. The controversy addresses the situation when the 
need for solidarity in sharing the burden encroaches upon the dignity of human beings who 
had been forced to depart from their homes. Even when there is unanimous consent on the 
need for establishing quotas for the refugees, setting objective criteria upon which the distri-
bution of responsibility among the countries will be effectuated is no easy task.
Global trends indicate that there is a disproportion between the North and the South and 
that developing countries bear 80 percent of the burden in caring for the refugees, whereas 
Germany is the only country of the developed North among the top ten host countries360. 
The 2015 ‘migrant crisis’ targeted Germany as the principal European destination not only 
for the population of war-torn Syria, but also for all the economic migrants from the area of 
the Middle East and northern Africa. Despite its traditional ‘Willkommenskultur’ and unilat-
eral suspension of the Dublin Regulation, which is based on the principle of redirecting the 
asylum seekers to the first EU member state of entry, Germany persisted on the pursuit of a 
comprehensive, European response to the abrupt influx of migrants, in the form of reloca-
tion and resettlement361. 
Pledging for a normative defense of the demand for fair distribution of refugees among host 
countries, Gibney362 argues that the criteria need to be based on the integrative capacities 
relating to population, gross domestic product (GDP), and the existing refugee population. 
However, although many EU member states, according to their economic power and infra-
structural capacities, would be eligible host countries, the absence of immigrant culture and 
public resistance to foreigners considerably diminishes their integrative potentials. 
Although a remarkable number of authors emphasize the moral duty to provide a safe haven 
for asylum seekers, which does not entail their right of choice of destination, it is indisput-
able that the refugees often put forward justified preferences for a certain country. Their 
preferences depend on multiple factors, the most prominent being the presence of their 
compatriots in that area from earlier periods, the possibility to preserve their religious and 
cultural specificities, as well as to have good chances for employment in a non-discrimina-
tory labor market363.
As opposed to the concept of solidarity there is the idea on tradable refugee quotas, which 
legitimizes the right of countries to express higher or lesser degrees of preparedness to admit 
and integrate asylum seekers. Nevertheless, this does not exclude their moral obligation of 
sharing the burden and contributing in other ways to the care of persons who have been 
forced to leave their home countries. 
Disputing the moral difficulty of the market for bargaining in refugee quotas, Kuosmanen364 
analyzes three objections: the preference objection, the dignity objection, and the exploita-
tion objection. We shall particularly dwell on the two latter ones, which have been confirmed 
during the ‘Migrant Crisis’. In reply to Gibney365, who argues that such a system of distribu-
tion means negative valuation, since the refugees are treated as ‘toxic waste’ that ought to be 
avoided, Kuosmanen believes that, basically, every proposal for burden sharing may encom-
pass a negative connotation366. 
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However, in the case of the ‘migrant crisis’, the request for a solidary response was primarily 
concerned with providing timely assistance to refugees, as a massive influx of migrants within 
a short period of time can paralyze even a system infrastructural wise prepared for the inte-
gration of asylum seekers. Moreover, the arguments put forward by Hungary, Slovakia and 
Poland encroached upon the issue of dignity, since they refused to receive refugees of Muslim 
religion, with Slovakia even publicly proposing to admit Christians exclusively367. Thus, Gibney’s 
claim has been confirmed that ‘when a state considers specific groups of refugees as less 
desirable than other groups, and attempts to purchase the physical accommodation of these 
refugee groups from other states, the traded refugees are humiliated as a consequence368’.
The next objection Kousmanen analyzes refers to the exploitation of less developed countries 
in the case of bargaining with refugee quotas. Although he points out that participation in this 
market is on voluntary basis and that the host countries enjoy some benefits when admitting 
refugees, there is justifiable fear that the avoidance of the rich parts of the world to assume 
responsibility will turn underdeveloped countries into ‘refugee accommodating factories369’. 
Actually, Turkey can serve as a showcase of a country which, for the sake of financial assistance 
for the integration of large numbers of refugees and visa liberalization for its citizens enabled 
the EU to find a way out of the failure to create a single asylum system370. Serbia and the other 
countries of the Western Balkans may well find themselves in a similar position in case of 
a new migrant wave, where the EU countries would be more willing to financially assist the 
integration of refugees away from the threshold of their borders, rather than to admit them. 
Based on solidarity mechanisms in emergency situations contained in the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, the Council adopted a quota to relocate 40,000 individuals. 
Still, due to a massive influx of migrants over a short period of time, this figure was augmented 
to 120,000 asylum seekers. In addition to relocation quotas, a resettlement quota was pro-
posed for 22,000 persons in need of international assistance, with the aim to decrease the 
pressure on Syria’s neighboring countries. However, the 28 EU members were not prepared 
to proportionally assume responsibility even for a total of 160,000 persons who were already 
within the borders of the Union371.
By rejecting the Quota system, the European Union has renounced from agreeing on a com-
mon response to the ‘migrant crisis’ and thus brought into question the idea of a common 
destiny of the Union. The Dublin Regulation has proved to be unjust and inapplicable, and 
the Schengen as easily to suspend. The treacherous concept of EU members ‘regaining’ their 
sovereignty actually brought about the physical closure of their national borders and absence 
of will to assume responsibility. 
It should be noted that, from the normative point of view, the European Union had ideal 
conditions for agreeing on a common and systematic response to the ‘migrant crisis‘. Firstly, 
it is a coalition of countries characterized by close cooperation, whose mutual relations are 
defined by the European Union Treaty. Secondly, the joint participation of member countries 
in executive, legislative and judiciary bodies of the Union coupled with their indisputable 
supra-national authority would have ensured smooth coordination of a fair distribution of 
the burden. The third characteristic is that, by entering the region of interconnected coun-
tries, the refugees could have been offered alternatives of care through joint mechanisms of 
supervision, instead of leaving this task to individual countries of first entry. Lastly, the EU has 
developed logistic capacities of registration and monitoring by means of data exchange within 
the Schengen system, as well as direct operational assistance in saving and caring through 
the common European Boarder and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex372. 
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The question is why a common institutional response did not occur, in spite of all the mecha-
nisms that the EU has put in place so far. Likewise, why did the number of 160,000 migrants 
bring about the absence of a common asylum policy, when Germany alone took in around one 
million refugees in the course of 2015? Zaun373 points out that the traditional asylum recipients, 
such as Germany, Austria and Sweden required solidarity because of internal pressures for 
the reduction of the influx of new asylum-seekers, whereas other member countries, espe-
cially those with no immigrant culture, wished to avoid similar pressures.
The attitude of the countries of the Visegrad Group has shed a light on the challenges the 
European Union is facing, which up to that point, Brussels was not aware of. Firstly, that it 
is not easy to reach a unanimous decision of the EU countries in conditions of real crises, 
i. e. when one of the most developed regions of the world ‘failed to address the health and 
humanitarian needs of refugees374’. Secondly, that the countries that became full-fledged 
members after 2004, and which prior to the ‘migrant crisis‘ had a low bearing on the deci-
sion-making process in the EU, have actually diversified the EU societally much more than it 
had been presumed, especially regarding its values and cleavages375. Thirdly, that an agree-
ment with Turkey was concluded so as to prevent a complete breakdown of the European 
system, which does not comprise control mechanisms that would sanction any instance of 
misuse of the €6 billion fund provided by the EU376. Finally, the ‘migrant crisis‘ has generated 
so strong anti-immigrant preferences mobilized by the rightist populist forces in the Visegrad 
Group countries that they are in power in as many as four EU countries377. 
In the context of the above mentioned outcomes of the ‘migrant crisis‘ affecting the European 
Union, we can talk about the consequences for the Western Balkan countries situated along 
the Balkan Route, and primarily Serbia. It is evident that the experience of absence of a com-
mon asylum policy will have taught EU representatives in the path of further integrations, not 
only that legal commitments have to be made to respect European norms and practices, but 
also that European values have to be shared. Although it is a normatively undefined term, its 
political power is reflected in preferences dictated by public discourse in member states and 
candidate countries. On this trail also lies part of the explanation for the discourse of the Gov-
ernment of Serbia supporting idea of burden sharing of the ‘migrant crisis‘. 
Serbia on the Balkan Route
Before we explain the reasons why Serbia has created a positive discourse toward the 
migrants, it is necessary to explain the importance of the Balkan Route in the establishing of 
a new regional and European political context: 
 › The ‘migrant crisis‘ has exposed the fluidity of the European Union borders, since the Bal-
kan Route encompassed both its member and non-member countries, with the migrants 
formally entering the territory of the Union twice, first through Greece or Bulgaria, and 
proceeding via Serbia into Hungary or Croatia afterwards.
 › Non-member countries or candidates for membership were indispensable in creating 
a comprehensive and effective action in the registration, care and accommodation of 
migrants. The Prime Minister of Serbia repeatedly pointed out that it was in the territory 
of Serbia that the migrants were often registered on their way from Syria378.
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 › There were diverse responses of the countries along the Balkan Route to the process 
of reception and transit of the migrants. However, it is obvious that old feuds (between 
Serbia and Croatia) or new alliances (between Serbia and Hungary) had a bearing on the 
degree of regional cooperation and interstate solidarity.
 › Irrespective of its real capacities to become a destination country, the declarative read-
iness of Serbia to participate in the Quota system and the absence of anti-migrant cli-
mate in the public and political sphere gave it a more ‘European’ image as compared to 
many EU members. 
There are several reasons for such a reaction of Serbia, which was in sharp contrast with the 
other countries of the Balkan Route. State representatives were guided by two key motives: 
the first derived from the wish to prove that Serbia, in spite of not being a full-fledged mem-
ber of the EU, is a country that shares European values and is prepared to implement a policy 
of solidarity toward the migrants, as promoted by Germany. Coupled with this was the need 
to demonstrate institutional capacities for efficient registration and providing assistance to 
all those whose trajectory was through the territory of Serbia. The second reason is the wish 
to alter the image of Serbia, whose international reputation had been tarnished during the 
wars of the nineties. Out right solidarity was demonstrated with the Muslims, in clear con-
trast to ethnic conflicts it had been engaged in with people of the same faith in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo during the 1990s. 
The open approach and the humane reaction of the entire society were based on a still vivid 
experience with the refugees from Croatia and Kosovo. Many Serbs who had fled those areas 
identified with the tragedy affecting families from a war-affected Syria. Also, the population 
knew that Serbia was not the migrants’ final destination and that the extended hospitality in 
transit was not going to have any serious bearing on their habitual way of life.
With the closing of the Balkan Route for the migrants, the context of the crisis, as well as the 
institutional framework of behavior towards the migrants began to change. As of March 2016, 
when the borders towards Croatia and Hungary were almost completely sealed, it became 
increasingly obvious that a considerable number of refugees were going to seek asylum in 
the attempt to remain permanently in the territory of Serbia. That meant that Serbia would 
no longer be a country of transit, but a final destination. 
For the majority of migrants, Serbia is not a country they genuinely intend to stay in, but rather 
a transit territory they plan to leave as soon as they have an opportunity to do so. The role of 
Serbia was exhausted on registration, providing initial assistance at reception and accommo-
dation for asylum seekers. In its territory, it opened 5 permanent centers for asylum seekers 
and another 14 shelters that began mushrooming as of 2015, due to the increasing numbers 
of migrants who were predominantly using them while in transit379.
According to indicators for April 2019, the centers for asylum seekers host 848 persons (total 
accommodation capacity is 1,770) predominantly hailing from Middle East countries. As for 
reception centers, there are 14 altogether and they were opened between 2015 and 2017. 
The reception centers, according to data from April 2019, host 2,212 persons. Therefore, the 
current capacity utilization is 3,060 persons, as compared to the total capacity of 6,140 and 
the capacity of temporary accommodation for an additional 1,155 persons380. 
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Since the beginning of 2019, according to the statistics of the Asylum Office, 2,269 migrants 
who have also expressed their intention to seek asylum have been registered in the Republic 
of Serbia. There have been a total of 63 recorded requests for asylum since the beginning of 
2019, out of which subsidiary protection has been granted to 10 persons, whereas 12 per-
sons were granted asylum381.
The enormous influx of migrants in the area of the Balkans at some points seemed to revive 
old feuds among the countries situated along the Balkan Route. Croatia, and especially Hun-
gary saw themselves as the ‘guardians’ of the external boundaries of the Union. Although 
the countries along the Balkan Route did not have the same policy toward the migrants, with 
Hungary erecting a wall along its border with Serbia at one moment, and then extending it 
along its border with Croatia, Serbia and Hungary have strengthened their partner relations. 
The Hungarian Prime Minister advised his Serbian counterpart to follow the example of Hun-
gary in controlling national borders. ‘We are ready to help, because it is our interest that no 
one should enter Serbia in an illegal way, which also increases the security of Hungary. That 
is why in the sphere of migration our security agencies and our ministries of the interior will 
be cooperating and we offer you our help’, said Viktor Orban382.
However, the ‘migrant crisis’ brought the relations between Serbia and Croatia to their lowest 
point since the breakup of Yugoslavia, at the point when Hungary erected a barrier along the 
border with Serbia and thus redirected the wave of refugees toward Croatia. Croatia blamed 
Serbia for such developments arguing that it had concluded a secret deal with Hungary at 
the detriment of Croatia. The reaction of Zagreb sparked a kind of ‘trade war’, with a ban for 
heavy trucks to cross into Croatian territory from the direction of Serbia. Belgrade reacted to 
the refusal of Croatia to withdraw the imposed measures by countermeasures for Croatian 
trucks, upon which Croatia banned all vehicles with Serbian registration plates from entering 
its territory. This crisis was accompanied by sharp rhetoric of Croatian Prime Minister Milan-
ović, who said that: ‘We can allow people in through the fields, like Serbia is doing, but then 
it is not a state. It is an accidental, disorganized state that wants to join the European Union 
and they have to think very carefully about their future behavior in European Union, because 
I see this as a very bad signal. What I mean is that Croatia is the only one doing this job in an 
organized way at this moment’383. The then Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, also 
reacted to such measures publicly: ‘We believed that the times when people were being taken 
off buses on the grounds of their nationality were long gone. We are not going to do that384’.
In the absence of a supra-national coordination and a common EU policy, Serbia as one of the 
countries situated along the migrant route, often found itself in the paradox situation of receiv-
ing the support of international organizations and institutions in providing a humane transit on 
one hand, and on the other being under pressure of EU member countries to stop the influx 
of migrants. Moreover, to be facing a situation where EU officials insist on the countries of the 
Western Balkans upholding European values, while at the same time closing the Balkan Route 
by legitimizing the autocratic rule in Turkey, in order to solve the refugee issue385. 
The Prospect of Serbia Participating in the Quota System 
In October 2015, at the summit in Brussels dedicated to the ‘Migrant Crisis’, the then Prime 
Minister of Serbia said: ‘We will accept the quota and we are prepared to bear our part of the 
burden386’. With that message, the prospect of Serbia changing its status from a country of 
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transit to a final destination for several thousand asylum seekers was publicly announced. To 
what extent would, under such conditions, Serbia be a more desirable destination for long-
term stay of a certain number of migrants and possibly participate in the system of distribu-
tion according to quotas, depends on a number of circumstances. 
First of all, Serbia as a country candidate for membership in the EU has been trying to har-
monize its entire legal framework, including the asylum policy, with the legal heritage of the 
EU. In the normative sphere, Serbia has done this by adopting laws which are adapted to the 
newly created situation: The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, the Law on Foreigners 
and the Law on Border Control387. By adopting these new laws Serbia made the asylum pro-
cedure more effective in legal terms, as well as provided for a better definition of the rights 
and obligations of foreigners in its territory388.
The UNHCR report noted a significant legal improvement of the right to asylum and tempo-
rary protection, in particular provisions providing gender-sensitive asylum procedures, as well 
as the introduction of gender, gender identity and gender-based violence in the definition of 
refugees. Also, in identifying children as asylum seekers, especially unaccompanied children, 
improvements are recognized389.
Serbia’s aspiration to become a full-fledged member of the European Union, in addition to 
legislative adaptation, was followed by a political commitment to the European values of 
sharing the burden of the ‘migrant crisis’. However, Serbia has very limited resources for the 
actual integration of refugees into society. Although the accommodation capacities signifi-
cantly exceed the current number of asylum seekers, a host country’s long-term commitment 
is to provide a better and more humane living environment than asylum centers, as well as 
real opportunities for employment in the labor market.
Prior to the outbreak of the ‘migrant crisis’, Serbia was the first European and the 14th coun-
try in the world in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons390. It is therefore 
not surprising that it has not yet managed to find a long-term and comprehensive solution 
for people affected by conflicts during the breakup of Yugoslavia. According to UNHCR data, 
Serbia has about 22,886 households or 97,286 internally displaced persons in need. Unem-
ployment in this group of people in need is 39 percent, while the majority (74.3 percent) sur-
vive on an income lower than €200 per month. The main problem is housing, with 94 percent 
of all internally displaced persons in need having emphasized this problem391.
Moreover, in addition to the concern about the care for refugees and displaced persons, as 
well as, migrants from the Middle East, based on readmission agreements in the EU accession 
process, the Balkan countries have committed themselves to the readmission of their own 
citizens who do not fulfill the conditions of permanent residence in the territory of the EU. It 
is a process parallel with the ‘migrant crisis’, where thousands of their own citizens return as 
economic migrants392. With this number of people, it is impossible to imagine Serbia being 
a successful destination country for new migrants without crucial financial assistance from 
EU countries. 
According to experts, who from the beginning had been involved in monitoring institutions’ 
activities in the admission of and care for refugees during the ‘migrant crisis’, Serbia is not 
ready for any longer-lasting admission of a large number of refugees: ‘How will accommo-
dation be organized for these people, learning of the Serbian language, access to the labor 
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market, and so on? For, these are all rights that our country guarantees to asylum seekers. 
We believe that Serbia is not prepared for that393’. Speaking about the capacities that the 
Republic of Serbia has at its disposal, the spokesman for the Commissariat for Refugees, Ivan 
Mišković said that Serbia ‘has capacities for six and maybe even nine thousand places, but 
this applies for a shorter period of stay in the Republic of Serbia. We believe that Serbia is not 
ready for that394’. On the other hand, Antonijević395 from the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights (YUKOM) points out that if there really were a need for Serbia to take part in quotas, 
‘the society would not feel a greater burden by receiving about 6,000 refugees’. 
The second argument that relates to Serbia’s long-term prospect of being a destination country 
concerns demographic indicators. Serbia faces a number of serious demographic problems, 
such as the birth rate that is far below the need for the shift of generations, an intensive delay 
of the birth of the first child, depopulation, over-aging populations and a negative migration 
balance. As a result of these circumstances, Serbia cannot avoid two permanent processes: 
aging of the population and reduction of the total population. Therefore, it is not excluded 
that in the near future a structural deficit in the labor market will emerge as a result of the 
emigration of highly educated and highly qualified individuals, combined with the retirement 
of baby boom generations born in the 1950s. Migrants can be a significant solution for struc-
tural unemployment in Serbia, because it has already been noted that, although their volume 
is not large, asylum seekers illegally do jobs that the home population refuses, especially in 
agriculture396.
Although Serbia had a pronounced pro-migrant attitude, after the formal and coordinated 
closure of the Balkan Route, there has been a certain degree of securitization of the migrant 
issue. There were statements in the public space that showed a xenophobic tone and empha-
sized the negative consequences of the long-term presence of migrants followed by concrete 
actions, that is, the petitions of the local population to move away camps from Šid and Subot-
ica. However, this did not hinder the process of integration of migrants into society. It turned 
out that the enrollment of children in schools has given the most positive results in bringing 
the migrant families and the local population closer397. 
Conclusion
Serbia, as one of the countries on the Balkan Route, expressed its commitment to a humane 
and timely treatment of the refugees, whose final destination was predominantly Germany. 
There is a prevailing opinion that the attitude of Serbia derived from a combination of expe-
rience in similar situations of crisis in the past and the wish of the political elite to present 
itself as an acceptable and cooperative partner of the EU in the context of further Euro-inte-
grations. Also, its task was facilitated by the fact that Serbia was a country of transit, and not 
a destination on the migrant route.
It can be said that the promotion of European values by Serbia was ‘with no or little cost, and 
with much benefits to itself’398. However, it should be taken into account that the anti-migrant 
attitude bore a certain political attraction as well, and that the representatives of some coun-
tries along the Balkan Route were not prepared to capitalize on the ‘benefit’ of a humane 
treatment of the refugees. As Reljić points out: 
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‘When a head of government says ‘Be nice to refugees’, then the majority of a society is more 
likely to not be hostile to refugees. When, as in Hungary, the head of the government says 
‘We need to finish this brutally’, then you see a different societal reaction emerge399.’ 
Despite dilemmas about its justice, solidarity and dignity, the Quota system constituted an 
attempt to provide a united European response in sharing the burden of an unexpected 
influx of migrants in 2015. Serbia officially offered to participate in the shared distribution of 
responsibility by admitting a certain number of migrants. Nevertheless, objective parameters 
indicate very modest capacities for full-scale social integration of larger numbers of refugees, 
although there have been some very positive instances of asylum-seekers’ excellent adapta-
tion to the Balkan social environment. Despite the inclusive legislation, a key obstacle is still 
the labor market and the limited possibilities of earning a decent living. However, the arrival 
of larger numbers of migrants could have ‘positive demographic effects and help to stabilize 
society, bearing in mind that the annual migration from Serbia is estimated at between 10,000 
and 15,000400’. Should Serbia in the near future become a more developed country and a full-
fledged member of the European Union, and in case the migrant waves from various parts of 
the world reach once again the Old Continent, the option of Serbia being offered participation 
in the quotas one day cannot be excluded. 
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Conclusion
Abstract 
The Erasmus+ Jean Monnet project MIGRATE looks into the developments in the Balkan 
Route pre and post the EU-Turkey Statement and the responses by the individual countries 
inside this framework. The study aspires to broaden the discussion on the ripple effects cre-
ated during and in the aftermath of the post-2014 ‘migrant crisis’ and the related responses 
to it affecting both integration and enlargement. It concludes that an open and inclusive 
de- securitised asylum and migration policy would be most beneficial to the future of the EU 
integration and enlargement. 
The Impact of the ‘Migrant Crisis’ on EU Integration and Enlargement 
The EU construct has been experiencing during the past years one of its most turbulent peri-
ods, with the ‘migrant crisis’ acting as an event that led the EU spiralling down a maelstrom 
in unchartered waters. The current analysis sets out to explore the recent ‘migrant crisis’ in 
South-East Europe and more specifically, how the crisis acted as a trigger event that unearthed 
dormant crises or underlined pre-existing ones in the EU. These were mostly the Eurozone 
debt crisis and the crisis of liberal democratic institutions, which led to the advent of populist 
political parties occupying a political sphere that mostly represents secession inside the EU. 
The case of the Balkan Route being the central focus point of the post-2014 ‘migrant crisis’ 
showcases that the degree of integration and solidarity among EU members is not as deep 
and complete as expected. The lack of a common EU policy and reluctance to share sover-
eignty became evident among EU members from early on, exposing a deep split among EU 
members’ policies towards managing the crisis. The main parameters setting the frame of 
this split have been the securitization of the ‘migrant crisis’ and its use in popular discourse. 
A prime example used as a case study in this volume is Hungary. Szalai and Göbl (Chapter 
6: The Construction of the Refugee Other in Hungary during the 2015 ‘Migration Crisis’) ana-
lyse the process of securitization in the country. The authors assure that Hungary is far from 
being a unique case, but rather a ‘text book’ example of a Visegrad group state, vehemently 
anti-immigration, with a government constantly expanding the securitization agenda to include 
other issues other than migration. This, they caution, will continue to have a direct impact on 
Hungary’s and other similar minded states’ stance on policy formation at the EU level. 
The impact of this tendency within the EU was evident in the case of the eventual common 
response of the Union to the crisis. The initial open door policy adopted by Germany was 
heavily opposed to by some EU members, which also became very critical of the lack of strict 
border controls in the transit states on the Balkan Route. As a result of the pressure, the policy 
was abandoned following a move by many countries to reinstated border controls, effectively 
suspending the Schengen regime. The EU-Turkey Statement was introduced in March 2018, 
quintessentially closing down the Balkan Route. 
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The EU-Turkey Statement is discussed by Engler (Chapter 1: Route Closed? The impact of the 
EU-Turkey Statement on refugee migration flows into Europe) who provides a critical overview 
of the statement by examining humanitarian, legal and other related considerations. Eng-
ler, while questioning the direct causality between the decrease in the numbers of migrants 
crossing the Mediterranean and the Turkey-EU Statement, he asserts that the heavily criticised 
in respect to human rights violations agreement sends out a message of prioritising border 
security over solidarity and burden sharing. 
The impact of the split among EU policy makers, as Keridis showcases (Chapter 3: The Migra-
tion/Refugee Crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe: Risks and challenges for Greece) is most 
evident in Greece, which found itself cut off from the rest of the EU when it was suspended 
from the Schengen zone and later when it faced the closing of its borders with North Mace-
donia. The latter incidence was of particular importance as a non-EU member state closed 
its borders to an EU member state with the help of police forces from other EU-members. 
Further to impacting on EU’s human rights, solidarity and burden sharing principles, outsourc-
ing management of the ‘migrant crisis’ to its bordering EU candidate member states had an 
effect on the Union’s normative influence on them. The various countries on the Balkan Route 
formulated their policies based on their domestic political situation, EU conditionality and the 
specific trade off they had with the Union. The cases of EU candidate members used in this 
volume refer to Turkey, North Mace donia and Serbia. 
On the Turkey case, Tsarouhas (Chapter 2: Turkey and the European Migration Crisis: appre-
hensive cooperation) examines the pre- and post- environments that were formed with the 
Joint Action Plan and the EU-Turkey statement in the country and he points out that the quid 
pro quo nature of the statement enhanced a transactional securitised form of cooperation 
between the two. 
Likewise, Ilievski and Runcheva Tasev (Chapter 4: The Balkan Refugee and Migrant Corridor 
and the case of North Mace donia) discuss extensively the case of North Mace donia, a country 
in a prolonged political crisis at the time of the height of the ‘migrant crisis’, heavily impacted 
domestically by the wave of securitization of the ‘migrant crisis’ and adopting to EU policies 
on managing migration pertaining to its EU candidacy member status. 
Serbia is another such example. Galijaš (Chapter 5: Permanently in Transit. Middle Eastern 
Migrants and Refugees in Serbia) makes a case of how EU conditionality played a significant 
role in the decisions taken by the Serbian government, in an attempt to move closer to open-
ing more Chapters in the accession discussions with the EU. While other countries faced with 
the crisis exhibited secessionist tendencies, the Serbian government consciously adopted a 
more agreeable position having as a strategic goal the country’s EU accession.
An example of the latter is Serbia’s willingness to join the Quotas system, as described by 
Surlić (Chapter 7: Who said Quotas? The Role of Serbia in Burden Sharing of the Migrant Cri-
sis). Nonetheless, the very nature of this transactional relationship if it were to be applied, 
echoing the EU-Turkey Statement, might lead to the creation of a EU periphery where core 
countries would be more willing to financially assist the integration of migrants away from 
their borders, rather than to admit them in their territory.
Along the Balkan Route
Conclusion
The post-2014 ‘migrant crisis’ focusing on the Balkan Route has been a major test to EU inte-
gration and enlargement. Core values related to the protection of human rights, solidarity 
and burden sharing were side-lined in favour of renationalizing policies, border security and 
outsourcing of crisis management in the periphery of the EU, short-circuiting in the process 
central principles of EU enlargement like the strengthening of democratic forces in the region. 
As migration flows to the EU will most probably continue in the future, an open and inclusive 
de-securitised asylum and migration policy at the EU level would be most beneficial to the 
future of EU integration and enlargement401. 
401 For policy recommendations, see Dimitris Tsarouhas 
 (ed.) (2019) MIGRATE Policy Paper, available on the 
project’s website: http://www.migrate-project.com/. 
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